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. Human rights in Cambodia : hearing before the Subcommittee on Intl Organizations of the Committee on Intl Relations, House of Representatives, Ninety-fifth Congress, first session, July 26, 1977. (1977).

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(1977). Human rights in Cambodia hearing before the Subcommittee on International Organizations of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, Ninety-fifth Congress, first session, July 26, 1977. . .

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# HUMAN RIGHTS IN CAMBODIA

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HEARING  
BEFORE THE  
SUBCOMMITTEE ON  
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS  
OF THE  
COMMITTEE ON  
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS  
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES  
NINETY-FIFTH CONGRESS  
FIRST SESSION

—————  
JULY 26, 1977  
—————

Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations



U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

96-150

WASHINGTON : 1977

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## HUMAN RIGHTS IN CAMBODIA

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TUESDAY, JULY 26, 1977

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS;  
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS;  
*Washington, D.C.*

The subcommittee met at 10:15 a.m. in room 2255, the Hon. Donald M. Fraser (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. FRASER. Today the subcommittee begins a second hearing on human rights in Cambodia. On May 3, 1977, the subcommittee held its first hearing on this subject, during which reports of widespread detentions and deaths and forced mass relocations in Cambodia were reviewed and discussed.

Since the coming to power of the National United Front of Kampuchea (Cambodia) in 1975, it has been extremely difficult to obtain firsthand knowledge of the situation there due to the Government's general policy of restricting entrance of most foreign western journalists.

From the testimony of the May 3d hearing it was generally established that human rights violations have taken place including incidents of forced mass relocations and substantial deaths through executions and hardship conditions. However, the extent to which such events occurred was difficult to determine based on the varied testimony.

The United States has no political or commercial relations with Cambodia, therefore has little leverage. It is, nevertheless, important that we remain informed of the situation in Cambodia.

Our witnesses today are Hon. Richard C. Holbrooke, Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State. He is accompanied by Mr. Charles Twining, a Foreign Service officer who, while stationed in Bangkok, closely followed the situation in Cambodia.

We are happy to have both of you here today.

Mr. Secretary, if you want to proceed in any manner that you like, we would be delighted to hear you.

### STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD C. HOLBROOKE, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. HOLBROOKE. I have a brief opening statement if I may, Mr. Chairman. I will keep it brief because I know you want to question Charles Twining who has just returned from the American Embassy at Bangkok. He has followed the situation in Cambodia for 2 years and interviewed a great number of Cambodian refugees.



Also with me are my special assistant Kenneth Quinn and the acting Director of the desk concerned with Indochina, Timothy Carney. The three of them form, to my mind, the American core of expertise on Cambodian affairs today in the U.S. Government.

Since 1975 Cambodia has been almost completely sealed from the outside world. Our information on life there comes mainly from official Cambodian radio broadcasts, from official public statements and from refugee accounts. Unfortunately, impartial outside observers are not allowed into Cambodia so the tragic refugee reports cannot be conclusively documented. Nevertheless, the reports are too numerous and too detailed to be denied reasonable credibility.

Based on all the evidence available to us, we have concluded that Cambodian authorities have flagrantly and systematically violated the most basic human rights. They have ordered or permitted extensive killings; forcibly relocated the urban population; brutally treated supporters of the previous government; and suppressed personal and political freedoms.

In 1976 a new Constitution rechristened the country "Democratic Kampuchea," using an ancient name for Cambodia. That document provides no guarantees of the rights we consider basic. It declares that every Cambodian has the right to work and that unemployment is nonexistent. This may be true since the entire population is now organized into work groups. The Constitution also speaks of "religious freedom" but proscribes undefined "reactionary" religions.

The ordinary Cambodian has no opportunity to influence the new political system. Elections for a national assembly were reported in March 1976, but most refugees say that they did not really vote. Some report that officials told them they had voted on behalf of the village or cooperative. In fact, the Communist Party of Kampuchea, acting through the "revolutionary organization," totally controls political life.

The new government seeks a radical restructuring of Cambodian personality and society. Coercion is their instrument to effect rapid change. Individual political liberties have been eradicated or subordinated to collective goals.

The most common refugee complaints about life in their homeland cite pervasive fear of execution; the absence of personal freedom; constant hard labor; and inadequate food and medical care.

Estimates of the number of deaths resulting from the new Cambodian Government's policies vary widely. Cambodian authorities claim that only 2,000 to 3,000 died during the evacuation of Phnom Penh after the Khmer Communist takeover and as many again during the first months in the countryside. Journalists and scholars, some testifying before this subcommittee, guess that between half a million and 1.2 million have died since 1975. We have no way to confirm a precise figure but the number of deaths appears to be in the tens if not hundreds of thousands.

Reports indicate that many were killed at once because of their connection with the former government at even low levels. Political executions still take place without trial or any pretense of due process but in reduced scale. Others have been killed because they were "educated" or privileged or because they complained of the hard work or low rations. Many others, particularly the aged, the infirm, and the very young, have died because of disease, malnutrition, or the rigors of life in Cambodia today.

The Cambodian authorities do not recognize freedom of speech, assembly or press. International travel is controlled and emigration forbidden. Despite constitutional "guarantees," traditional religion apparently has no role. In some locations Buddhist monks have been forced to defrock and pagodas have become warehouses. A Khmer Muslim student group in France recently appealed for help to end the suppression of Islam in Cambodia. Mosques have reportedly been closed and defiled.

Neither the United States, the United Nations nor any Western European nation has the leverage to affect the human rights situation in Cambodia today. Only Cambodia's ideological partners have embassies there, with the exception of one nonaligned state. I do not believe those countries closest to Cambodia have the desire, or enough influence, to move the Khmer authorities.

We have unsuccessfully tried to make contact with the Khmer authorities and taken small steps to ease the plight of the Khmer people. In March we tried to contact the Cambodian authorities on MIA's during Leonard Woodcock's trip to Hanoi. They spurned our request. The United States has made exceptions to the Export Administration controls on Cambodia to permit sales of DDT as a means of easing the outbreak of malaria there.

We have said that our human rights policy applies to Cambodia, and I must reemphasize that here today. We cannot let it be said that by our silence we acquiesce in the tragic events in Cambodia. I wish to say in the strongest possible terms that we deplore what has taken place there. I cannot tell you, however, that anything we can realistically do would improve the lot of the Khmer people in the foreseeable future.

Although we have taken the position that the United States would support a responsible investigation into the situation there, we have no reason to believe that the Cambodian authorities will permit impartial investigators to enter the country.

What we can do to affect the human rights situation in Southeast Asia as a whole is to continue our assistance to refugees who have fled Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. We should continue to aid the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees who is supporting a creditable Thai effort to care for Indochinese refugees. Helping these persons who are in great need will reinforce our commitment to the decent treatment of political refugees—an important area of human rights.

Mr. FRASER. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.

We have a vote in progress on the floor of the House so perhaps at this time we will take a brief recess and then we will return to the questioning.

[Whereupon, the subcommittee recessed.]

Mr. FRASER. The subcommittee will resume its sitting.

Mr. Secretary, you have indicated in your statement that Mr. Charles Twining who is accompanying you today, has been in the American Embassy at Bangkok. Then you indicated that you had two others, a Mr. Kenneth Quinn, your Special Assistant, and Timothy Carney, the desk director for Indochina.

I would like to get into some specific questions but first, I have a question concerning resources you mentioned, from which I understand comes considerable information about Cambodia. I don't know if you can answer this or not in open session, but do we have other

clandestine or intelligence sources that amplify or elaborate on our knowledge?

Mr. HOLBROOKE. We normally don't discuss clandestine sources but we make use of every conceivable source that you might logically think of that might be available to us to collect the limited amount of information that is available but I am just not at liberty to go into the details.

Mr. FRASER. I assume that we also seek to exchange or cooperate with other Western nations in attempting to find out what is going on inside Cambodia.

Mr. HOLBROOKE. That is correct. The primary source of information is the refugees. Of course, one understands there are limits to that: one has to interpret very carefully what one finds out. I think Mr. Twining can address that from personal experience.

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Twining, were you in a position to engage in interviews with refugees who came into Cambodia?

**STATEMENT OF CHARLES H. TWINING, FOREIGN SERVICE OFFICER,  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE**

Mr. TWINING. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Chairman, if you will yield for just a moment at this point.

Mr. FRASER. Yes.

Mr. SOLARZ. Just for the record I would like to say that as you may know I traveled a little bit over the course of the last 2 years to different countries around the world.

Mr. FRASER. I know that. [Laughter.]

Mr. SOLARZ. I really feel obligated to say that Charlie Twining in my judgment is just about the most decent and dedicated Foreign Service officer that I met during that period of time. I think the country is really privileged to have someone of his intelligence and integrity and commitment representing us.

On two occasions I was in Bangkok over the last 2 years during which time I had lengthy conversations with Mr. Twining and on one occasion we traveled together to a refugee camp. I am delighted that you were able to get him to testify at this hearing today because in my judgment there are few people in the world who would be in a better position to make a kind of objective determination about what is happening there than Mr. Twining who for the last 2 years has been our Cambodia watcher in Bangkok.

Mr. FRASER. Well, that is quite an endorsement. Maybe you want to quit now. [Laughter.]

Mr. TWINING. While I'm ahead, yes, sir.

Mr. HOLBROOKE. He is being sent to Cornell for a year.

Mr. TWINING. Thank you.

Mr. FRASER. Could you perhaps give us some description of the kinds of contacts you were able to have with the refugees and other sources that you can discuss in the medium here?

Mr. TWINING. Yes. I studied the Cambodian language for 10 months and was to replace Mr. Carney in Phnom Penh in June 1975, and with the events that took place I was then sent to Bangkok as the Indochina watcher with responsibility primarily for finding out

what is happening in Cambodia and Vietnam. As a good part of that work I went regularly to meet with Cambodian refugees, tried to talk with them on a number of occasions, comparing their stories and then as well exchanged information with other governments, Western and others, who were interested in Cambodia.

Mr. FRASER. Did other governments have people like you in Bangkok attempting to assess what was happening?

Mr. TWINING. To a degree. Two governments, the Australians and the Indonesians, had formal Cambodia watchers in Bangkok so they were really my direct counterparts. Other embassies covered it less thoroughly but a number of governments, both Western and Communist, were trying to follow Cambodia from Bangkok.

Mr. FRASER. Can you give us some idea of the flow of refugees? Give us an image of what happened? Were they coming in groups or singly? Was this a steady stream or was it in response to the events inside of Cambodia? Tell me about that.

Mr. TWINING. Early on, of course, they came out in great masses—in April, May, June 1975. The number has really shrunk now to perhaps 50 to 100 a month. One thing that the Cambodian Government has done has been to remove people from along the border with Thailand. There is now a no man's land of about 40 kilometers, 25 miles or so, in which virtually no people live and they have done this purposely so they can cut down on the refugee flow.

Now what you have coming out of Cambodia are refugees who escape in groups of 5 or 10. They may start out in groups of 30 but hazards are awfully great. The Cambodians have mined all of the frontier and a lot of people get blown up by mines. There is also frequent patrolling. The Cambodians have seen fit to bring soldiers out of the interior even at the risk of some insecurity in the interior and place them along the frontier. This may be in part to stop resistance or to stop people from entering Cambodia but it is designed at least as much to stop refugees from getting out of Cambodia.

Mr. FRASER. Do some get away by boat?

Mr. TWINING. Some come into Vietnam. The flow is continuing into Vietnam from Cambodia from what we hear, Cambodians have not been removed from the border with Vietnam so they go into Vietnam and stay there a while and then try to get a boat out of Vietnam into Thailand most often. What is sad now in the Cambodian refugee flow is that you have almost exclusively men coming into Thailand. Every refugee who comes will tell you the same thing; It is too dangerous to bring the wife and children. For example, if you have a group of five which has tried to come out, often you will have only one who was successful in doing so, meaning that women and children have been left behind 100 miles away or 200 miles away.

Mr. FRASER. What do the refugees say their reasons are for leaving? Let's take those say in recent months.

Mr. TWINING. They have a combination of reasons. If the refugee is an ex-military or ex-Lon Nol government official type, it has often been because he has feared that he was going to be executed next. If it is a peasant, as is often the case, it is because he said, "We just can't live under these conditions any longer" or "Our loved ones have been

dying of disease or malnutrition; we have been working 7 days a week. They, the Cambodian Communists, don't respect our religion, they don't respect any of our customs. These people are not human." It is often said, "These people are not Cambodian." So when they see a way to make a break, then they do. So it is really a combination of reasons. Either people feel immediately threatened or they just can't take it any longer.

Mr. FRASER. Do you have any information about what has happened in the population of Phnom Penh? As I understand, there was a mass evacuation after the war.

Mr. TWINING. Yes, sir.

Mr. FRASER. What is the situation now in Phnom Penh?

Mr. TWINING. Our only knowledge of Phnom Penh really comes from the few diplomats who are there who are willing to report something of what they see. They themselves are so limited. They are restricted to a one or two block area in Phnom Penh with permission only once a week to go out and get some meat for the following week, so they don't have an idea of what all of Phnom Penh looks like. The estimates of the population vary from 20,000 to perhaps 50,000 people.

Mr. FRASER. You mean who live there now?

Mr. TWINING. Who live there now.

Mr. FRASER. What was the population?

Mr. TWINING. I think by April 1975, it was greatly swollen by refugees to 2 or 3 million, something like that. What you have now are people who are there either to work as cleanup crews or to work in some of the small factories which have begun operating again. This is apart from the Khmer Rouge.

Mr. FRASER. To what extent now are executions continuing?

Mr. TWINING. They continue. One thing perhaps we ought to say about Cambodia right away is that we have information from some parts of Cambodia, especially the northwestern part, and we have no information from other parts. This makes it hard to get into the numbers game about how many people have died because we don't even know what the situation is in northeastern Cambodia, for example.

We hear about executions from refugees who have just come out. You must talk to a refugee as soon as he comes out or the story may become exaggerated. Most reports say executions continue. I often ask a refugee, "In your particular village when was the last time you saw someone killed." Well, in most cases they don't see it. Sometimes they find bodies later in the fields or in the woods. Then I ask, "When is the last time that someone disappeared?" and then I say, "And did you ever see the body?" They sometimes reply, "Later on."

Based on that you get a feel that executions are continuing. It depends, though. Those from some places will, say, "Well, there are still two or three a month who are being taken away."

"Did you see a body?"

"Well, I did happen to see a body of one of the two or three of those."

Other places they say, "No; there have been no executions for about 6 months."

I would say there are probably more, generally, people who have heard or know of cases of people executed, say, a month prior to their coming out than people who say, "No; there have been none for 6 months."

Mr. FRASER. When a refugee tells you of executions in his village, are you able to get corroboration of that from other refugees? Do patterns develop which lead you to believe that the refugees are reporting factually?

Mr. TWINING. Yes; patterns do develop at least about the categories of people who are taken away. What happened, though, since they began running out of ex-military or ex-civil servants or even the leading intellectuals, what has happened, say, since March 1976, is that the types of people who often are executed now are people who have just been discovered to have been in one of the categories or they are people who seem to have an independent mind or who complain or who are lazy about going out to the fields. In effect, you are accused of being disloyal by not doing some of these things that the Khmer Rouge asked them to do. That is now grounds for execution.

Another ground has been and continues to be sexual immorality. This means a Cambodian who has had an affair with a woman is subject to execution or in some places to imprisonment without food and water which is tantamount to the same thing.

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Goodling.

Mr. GOODLING. Was there any testimony?

Mr. FRASER. No; he is just responding to questions.

Mr. GOODLING. No; it would not be fair to my colleague since I got here late.

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Solarz.

Mr. SOLARZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

How many refugees would you say you have interviewed in the course of the last 2 years? Could you give us a rough estimate?

Mr. TWINING. It really is difficult to estimate.

Mr. SOLARZ. Is it in the hundreds, thousands?

Mr. TWINING. I suspect it would be in the thousands because as well as interviewing them for this sort of information, I was also heavily involved in the refugee program when I first got to Thailand and that meant talking to every Cambodian who wanted to go to the United States.

Mr. SOLARZ. You were also, if I recall, monitoring the Cambodian radio.

Mr. TWINING. Yes.

Mr. SOLARZ. How frequently does that broadcast?

Mr. TWINING. It broadcasts several times every day. It broadcasts for several hours each time.

Mr. SOLARZ. You also indicated, I believe, that there is now one Cambodian newspaper—a weekly publication—which I gather you were able to get copies of as well.

Mr. TWINING. There is a Cambodian newspaper and a Cambodian magazine. Unfortunately, no copies have ever come out into Thailand as far as I know. These would normally be controlled by someone in a village. Sometimes the people were allowed to read them and sometimes not. So far as I know, none of them has ever reached the outside.

Mr. SOLARZ. Wherever possible you were interviewing diplomats or journalists or any outsiders, as it were, who were able to obtain entry into Cambodia.

Mr. TWINING. Yes; or I would try to talk to somebody that did.

Mr. SOLARZ. Do you have any knowledge that trials were held where people were taken away for execution or were they just summarily yanked out of their village and executed?

Mr. TWINING. I have never heard of one trial. Often the Khmer Rouge will execute in front of the entire village population people who tried to escape. This is without trial. They say, "Let this be a warning to anyone else who tries to escape." Otherwise, people are frequently told, "We are taking you to Ongka Loeu," which means to the organization, to the higher levels, and also they say a person is being taken away "because we want you to study about the new system." Often these people would be taken away and the bodies sometimes discovered later on. So as far as I know there never has been any kind of trial.

Mr. SOLARZ. As you know, there were originally estimates, particularly by the Reader's Digest team which published "Murder of the Gentle Land" that the total number of executions were in the vicinity of a million.

Mr. TWINING. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOLARZ. There was a French priest also, I think, who reported executions in that rough magnitude.

Mr. TWINING. Yes.

Mr. SOLARZ. Now I gather, based on a dispatch a few days ago in the Washington Post there seems to be an emerging reassessment, that the number of executions may have been much less than originally projected. Could you give us your sense, based obviously on imperfect knowledge, of how many have been killed and whether the original assessments were exaggerated?

Mr. TWINING. Very honestly, I think we can't accurately estimate a figure. We cannot even estimate how many have been executed because we simply don't have complete information on Cambodia. So far as I know, no one knowledgeable about Cambodia has been reappraising his original estimate or his original views on magnitude. In the otherwise excellent article that Mr. Simons did the other day, I really would question his source on this reevaluation. There were very few of us in Bangkok who actually talked to the refugees; really most of us were Cambodia watchers. Two of us have now left and there is only one still in Bangkok and he does not talk to the press. So if they are European diplomats who are talking about reappraising, I think that these are people who are not really in constant contact with the situation.

Mr. SOLARZ. Well, leaving aside the exact number, would it be your judgment, based on your experience there, that in the very least there were several hundred thousand killed?

Mr. TWINING. Certainly thousands or hundreds of thousands. Then again I think we have to look at what Mr. Simons very rightly pointed out—we have to look at the total magnitude of deaths. I am convinced that the number of people who have died from disease and malnutrition has been even greater than those executed. If people died from disease, then there is the question why didn't the Cambodians accept, for example, medicine that was waiting for them when I came to Thailand from some nonaligned countries. The Cambodians would not accept it and finally it was given to the refugee camps. If the Cambodians somehow don't care about their people any more than that, they are guilty of killing them.

Mr. SOLARZ. Who was trying to give them those drugs or medicines?

Mr. TWINING. Three nonaligned countries—three countries that viewed Cambodia, I think, with some sympathy.

Mr. SOLARZ. Which ones?

Mr. TWINING. One was Algeria and another was one of the Asean countries. Cambodia refused to accept these medicines.

Mr. SOLARZ. I see. Now could you give us any kind of rough estimate of the magnitude of deaths which resulted from disease and malnutrition as distinguished from the number of deaths that resulted from the deliberate physical executions?

Mr. TWINING. I might give you at least one example of what one refugee said in his own village, and I wonder if we can do any more than that. I interviewed a refugee at the beginning of June who had come out of a village where he had been living for a year. You realize, of course, the refugees are frequently moved around, so that often a refugee is not in the same place for 2 years. He had been in the village for a year; he was a very low level ex-military. He himself was not executed or threatened with execution so he was already an exception to the rule.

He said that in his village, which was probably about 50 kilometers inside Cambodia, in the past year out of 1,200 people 15 military personnel higher than himself had been taken away and presumably executed. He said, "I saw four bodies of these 15 in the woods later on." So that was 15 military.

Almost the same number of civilians were taken away, either ex-Lon Nol government officials or civilians who were accused of being disloyal or CIA elements.

There were at the same time perhaps 50 older people who died of disease—not natural death but disease combined with malnutrition.

There were 80 children who died of disease during this time or malnutrition together with disease.

Another problem was that frequently women could not conceive. When they did conceive, they didn't have enough milk, they were very thin. Of the number of babies born, he estimated that only 15 percent lived. Often the mothers died, as well, during childbirth.

So just for one village it was a pretty gruesome number, and again it was more disease and malnutrition than it was execution.

Mr. SOLARZ. What accounted for the shortage of food that seems to be responsible for the malnutrition problem?

Mr. TWINING. Customarily in the past two harvests in December-January 1975-76 and December-January 1976-77 Cambodian officials have taken away all or most of the food that each village produces. It seems they put the food in regional storage areas, or perhaps they take it to Phnom Penh. I think this is how they account for their so-called surplus in production. So even in this chap's village, for example, where this year the production was good unlike areas not very far away, two-thirds of the production was taken away.

Mr. SOLARZ. What did they do with the food when it is removed from the village where it has been grown?

Mr. TWINING. All the people know is that they see it being taken away either by ox cart or by tractor or by truck and they don't know what happens to it except as far as we can tell it is put at least in regional storage areas.



Mr. SOLARZ. Were there any refugees who reported that they came from villages where food had been brought in to feed the villagers?

Mr. TWINING. I am not sure that I know of one case of a village which has had enough food to sustain it throughout the year. Virtually always, because the need becomes so great, officials are obliged to bring some rice back in.

It is interesting that, in this man's village during the time they were harvesting, the people were receiving two milk cans of rice per day. After the harvest was over, after about a month or a month and a half, then the people were down to rice soup once a day even though the village had produced much more than the previous year.

Mr. SOLARZ. You indicated in your testimony that among those who were killed by the regime were individuals who were identified with the previous government in either military or civilian capacity.

Mr. TWINING. Yes.

Mr. SOLARZ. As well as those who were complainers or trouble makers or sexually immoral or whatever. Is it your judgment that there was a policy of systematically exterminating everyone who could be identified as having served the Lon Nol regime in the military or civilian capacity? In other words, once it became clear that somebody had previously functioned in that capacity, were they more or less earmarked for execution?

Mr. TWINING. Yes, I think there were at the minimum broad guidelines handed down from on high as to the types of people to be eliminated. At first I didn't think so, I had my own change of mind. I went to Thailand thinking that all of the horror stories were probably an exaggeration. At first I saw there were areas in southern and southwestern Cambodia where very few people were being killed, if any.

There were other areas where they were killing all conceivable categories of people, for example, around Pailin. Then things became quieter. Around September 1975 you started to see a more general pattern of groups of people being systematically killed and then at the end of December and the beginning of January 1976 you saw the categories expanded somewhat to include almost all intellectuals, if you will. There were always exceptions and there will continue to be exceptions.

Mr. SOLARZ. What was the definition of an intellectual in the sense that we are using?

Mr. TWINING. As of approximately January 1, 1976, an intellectual was anyone who had a seventh grade education or above. This meant then primary school teachers, this type of person.

Mr. SOLARZ. And your impression is that anybody so identified was being exterminated?

Mr. TWINING. Yes. There were always exceptions but it was so widespread that it seemed to be a consistent pattern.

Mr. SOLARZ. Did you get any testimony from refugees or others indicating that there had in fact been a directive from the organization or is this a deduction that you have made?

Mr. TWINING. This is my own deduction. No refugee would ever be in a position to know what orders were coming down.

Mr. SOLARZ. Could you describe how these executions were being conducted? Was there a chosen form of murder or did it vary widely?

Mr. TWINING. It varied but the most common form was, often judging from the bodies found afterwards out in the forest, to hit the people on the back of the neck with a hoe handle or an axe handle. It is not an immediate death, it is a slower death. It was almost as if they were trying to save ammunition. After the initial month or so of executions it is rare that you heard of people being killed by bullet.

Mr. SOLARZ. Now what is our sense of who is in charge in Cambodia at this point? There is this sort of shadowy organization. Could you give us a sense of whether it is Khieu Samphan or someone else who seems to be calling the shots? Could you also give us a sense of how the organization establishes its authority throughout the country?

Mr. TWINING. First, our knowledge of what is happening in Phnom Penh is still so superficial. The diplomats who are assigned there—with the exception of the Chinese who don't tell us the score—don't know the score. They are just so isolated. Refugees don't know who is in charge because when they ask, the local Khmer Rouge admit they don't know who is in charge. Our only source of what has happened in Phnom Penh, what is the situation in Phnom Penh, was a pilot who came out on April 30, 1976. He was a former helicopter pilot who bombed Lon Nol's palace in 1973, joined the Khmer Rouge and stayed with them until April 30, 1976. He himself was on the periphery of Phnom Penh, at Pochentong Airport. He would only occasionally get a pass to go into Phnom Penh but at least he was a member of the organization. His job at Pochentong was to train new helicopter pilots.

When he would go to Phnom Penh he would sit down with his friends with whom he had been in the jungle and ask them, "Who is in charge? What is happening?" From this source we have our only really firm idea. This chap said the Khmer Communist Party has full authority. The "organization" is essentially the Khmer Communist Party.

Within the Khmer Communist Party there are two levels. One is the politburo made up of five people headed by Saloth Sar, whom the U.S. Government has identified during past years as heading the Khmer Communist Party, a very shadowy figure about whom we hear nothing on the radio or from other public sources.

Khieu Samphan, in effect the President of Cambodia, is not within the inner circle. He is there to show off to the world, if you wish. Below the inner circle of five there was an outer circle—no one knows how many people, 9 or 10 perhaps. Khieu Samphan was in the outer circle, perhaps the second ranking in the outer circle.

In the inner circle were Saloth Sar, the head of the Communist Party. The No. 2 man was a man we don't know, someone named Nhan or something of that type. Third was Ieng Sary, the Deputy Prime Minister for Foreign Affairs. Fourth was Son Sen, the Deputy Prime Minister for Defense. Fifth was someone named Yat or Yan. We have not been able to identify who this is. So that is the inner circle.

One thing the pilot did emphasize is that every decision is taken collectively. He reminded me of his own indoctrination when he became a Khmer Rouge. In his own indoctrination he was always told that the individual counts for nothing, the individual is expendable.

What does count is the collective group. He said Saloth Sar would probably not make a decision on his own. A decision would be made in the small or in the expanded group.

Mr. FRASER. We are in the middle of another vote on the floor. I think perhaps we better take another recess.

[Whereupon, the subcommittee recessed.]

Mr. SOLARZ [presiding]. I have been authorized by the chairman to commence a rump session of the hearing until he gets back, so with your permission, Mr. Twining, we will continue.

Do we have any indication whatsoever as to how the government of the Democratic Kampuchea justifies what has been going on in their country? Do they in fact concede that these executions have taken place and, if so, on what basis do they attempt to justify it?

Mr. TWINING. The little that has been said publicly, when Khieu Samphan was in Colombo, for example, or when Ieng Sary was in Kuala Lumpur, was that the few people who had been killed were corrupted anti-revolutionary elements who had so harmed Cambodia that they had to be put out of the way.

The Khmer Rouge sometimes on a local level will tell villagers that, "We can afford to lose 1 million or even 2 million people." You hear this story often enough from enough places to make you think it has been handed down from on high.

We can lose 1 million or 2 million if we must to create the new Cambodia and the people whom we lose are those same elements who opposed us in the past or whose minds have been brainwashed by what happened in the past.

Tim, would you want to address this?

#### STATEMENT OF TIMOTHY M. CARNEY, COUNTRY OFFICER FOR VIETNAM, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. CARNEY. In a recent interview by the Deputy Prime Minister Ieng Sary in Kuala Lumpur, during his trip throughout South and Southeast Asia, he said that some 2,000 or 3,000 died in the takeover of Phnom Penh and only another 2,000 or 3,000 died in the fields afterwards. He dismissed as madness any claims of greater numbers of deaths made by western observers.

Mr. SOLARZ. Have they attempted in any way to justify the depopulation of Phnom Penh—and I gather the other cities as well—as an effort put in ideological terms, to eliminate corrupting urban western influences in order to reestablish a more pure and agrarian society in the image of Thomas Jefferson?

Mr. TWINING. Something like that. I think they have, indeed. The main justification they have given publicly has been that they could not meet the food needs of the people in the cities. You are right: every city has been emptied out, every town. Often they have gone on to say that in the new Cambodia the cities will not count for much except to contain those elements which are absolutely necessary. The new Cambodia is essentially an agrarian state in which other things will be built upon the agrarian base, but it is the base which will count.

Mr. SOLARZ. So they don't, to your knowledge, have any plans to repopulate the city.

Mr. TWINING. I would be very surprised if they ever repopulate any city to a very large degree. They will have just those people who are essential to the running of the city.

Mr. SOLARZ. The Cambodians, of course, are prohibited from leaving the country. Are they also prohibited from leaving their villages?

Mr. TWINING. Yes. A very intricate system has been devised. You must have a pass to go from one village to another village which may be only 2 kilometers away. Previously they didn't have rubber stamps but now they have developed a rubber stamp mentality so it is hard for a refugee to create his own travel pass, to forge one. In effect no one travels with the exception of truck drivers who are the ones taking the rice from one point to another. In that way some word gets around.

Mr. SOLARZ. They have no school system any more these days?

Mr. TWINING. They really have no school system. It is just astonishing. Ieng Sary has claimed that in the fields and in the factories children or adults are given an education but what seems to be the case is that in most villages small children, say from 5 to 10, may have an hour a day in which they learn revolutionary dances or revolutionary songs. In some places they may learn one letter of the alphabet per week, something of this type, but it is not real education.

On a higher level, people who are 10-12 years old, until marrying age, 20-25, are put into work teams and generally they get some indoctrination there but no education. The most we know is that there seem to be some technical schools set up. We don't know where—perhaps Phnom Penh. Some technical schools are set up for people to learn how to run a lathe or something of that sort.

Mr. SOLARZ. Did the organization have a preconceived plan to do what it has done since the fall of Phnom Penh or did this sort of develop after they seized power?

Mr. TWINING. I think everyone generally agrees that they were surprised themselves that they received power when they did and that they perhaps were not as prepared for it as they could have been. There is one neutral person whom I think I am not at liberty to name who is very close to this and who has followed the Khmer Rouge and has followed what has been happening in Cambodia for a number of years.

He said that as for the evacuation of the cities, what he has been able to learn from Cambodian Communists themselves is that there was a special congress of the Khmer Communist Party at the end of February 1975 presided over by current Chief of State Khieu Samphan, at which decisions were taken and a plan was elaborated at least for the evacuation of the cities. If he is right, there was some planning.

Mr. SOLARZ. If the organization had a policy of systematically exterminating anybody identified with the Lon Nol regime as well as intellectuals defined as those with a seventh grade education or more, by this time is there anybody left for them to murder other than those who expressed their unhappiness with what is going on?

Mr. TWINING. I think there are not a great many people left to execute, but my faith has been strengthened in the Cambodian people by the fact that a lot of them have been awfully good at hiding their former identities. Often the Khmer Rouge will bribe people's children to tell on their father, to tell about his past life; the Khmer Rouge will give them extra food for this. I think a lot of people even today have

been successful in hiding their identities. At least the dispersal of the population has had that advantage.

Mr. SOLARZ. You describe the two-tier level of a decisionmaking within the Khmer Communist Party. Do you have any sense of how the people at the top manage to establish their authority over these young soliders out in the villages who are carrying out this policy of extermination?

Mr. TWINING. It is a difficult question. We know the levels of administration in Cambodia; it goes from the central to the region to the sector to the district to the commune to the village. Presumably, then, there are loyal people at all of these levels. What really binds together these largely Paris-educated fanatics at the top with almost purposefully ignorant farm boys at the bottom who are the ones with the guns carrying out their orders—I really don't know what it is that keeps them together and I wonder in the future how long something like this can continue, how long that glue can hold.

Mr. SOLARZ. What countries now have diplomatic relations with Cambodia?

Mr. TWINING. A large number of countries have diplomatic relations with Cambodia but there are only nine countries represented inside Cambodia.

Mr. SOLARZ. Which are they?

Mr. TWINING. My friend just handed me a list.

These are China, Cuba, Albania, North Korea, Vietnam, Laos, Rumania, Yugoslavia, and Egypt.

Mr. SOLARZ. How did Egypt slip into the pack?

Mr. TWINING. Egypt during the war years was a supporter of the winning side. There was an embassy in Cairo the whole time representing Sihanouk's government-in-exile. It is thought the Cambodians, who are always talking about their nonalinement, want to demonstrate their nonalinement by bringing in a friendly Egypt.

Mr. SOLARZ. To your knowledge, have any of the countries that have Ambassadors in Cambodia expressed their concerns to the Cambodian Government on what is going on in the country, or made any efforts to emaliorate the harshness of the regime or to call for a cessation of the extermination policy?

Mr. TWINING. I know of no efforts that have ever been made on the part of any embassy there to convey this point of view. They themselves are almost prisoners in Phnom Penh except for possibly the Chinese and the North Koreans. I wonder whether they would even dare make such a demarche.

One other thing which Mr. Holbrooke just mentioned to me, is that Cambodia, of course, has Ambassadors abroad, too, but only in four places: Peking, Hanoi, Pyongyang, and Vientiane. So presumably those four Ambassadors could be subject to pressures, as well.

Mr. SOLARZ. Is Cambodia receiving any kind of foreign aid or economic assistance from any other countries in the world?

Mr. TWINING. As far as I have ever been able to learn from all sources, the Cambodians receive considerable aid from the People's Republic of China. They receive a fair amount of aid from North Korea and, third, they just recently agreed to accept aid from Yugoslavia. I could go into the aid if you would like.

Mr. SOLARZ. Would you briefly describe what kinds of assistance they have been getting and the magnitude of it.

Mr. TWINING. Right. The magnitude is virtually impossible to know. We don't know the magnitude. I think that for China, the Chinese have been very, very liberal in sending in technicians. The pilot told me that at Pochentong Airport there were 400 Chinese technicians living there while he was there. The Chinese are involved in various things: they provided new patrol boats; they are teaching the Cambodians how to pilot these patrol boats. The Chinese have been the ones who got the factories working again. The Chinese have apparently been providing advice to the railroad. In agriculture they have been serving as advisers. After the Chinese, the North Koreans have been helping get aircraft prepared and moving again, and they seem also to be involved on the agricultural scene. Finally, the Yugoslavs are just giving some tractors, some farm equipment to the Cambodians.

Mr. SOLARZ. Charlie, in your judgment, is there anything that we can do about this situation to have any kind of a constructive influence in the Cambodian regime? As you know, today we are hopefully going to be considering the resolution I have introduced expressing the sense of the Congress that these outrageous executions and other denials of basic human rights could hopefully be brought to an end, but as a practical proposition, while I think the adoption of such a resolution is an imperative one, can we realistically hope to accomplish anything?

Mr. TWINING. I'll turn that over to Mr. Holbrooke.

Mr. HOLBROOKE. Answer with your absolutely personal viewpoint.

Mr. TWINING. Be glad to.

Mr. SOLARZ. Particularly considering your sense of what is going on in Cambodia and how any action that we might conceivably take or other countries might take or which we might engage in collectively with other countries would influence, if at all, positively or negatively, the new Government in Cambodia.

Mr. TWINING. I would feel, first of all, that there is a moral imperative for us to speak out. Second, I am not sure that it would have any influence on the Cambodian Government, unfortunately. These people are really a xenophobic group, and I strongly doubt in my own mind whether the Chinese, who are the main aid suppliers, could bring pressure to bear on the Cambodians, could make them change their ways. There is a question whether even the Chinese or the Vietnamese approve of what has been happening in Cambodia. Also Cambodia as well, as you know, turned down OPEC. OPEC had a great amount of money for aid. Cambodia has turned down that money. Cambodia is not getting foreign loans from any international organization. Therefore, I think we could speak out, but I am not sure that the Cambodian leadership would care a hoot about what we or anyone else would have to say.

Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Secretary.

Mr. HOLBROOKE. Mr. Congressman, let me just add to what Charlie has said. I fully agree with you that we should speak out regardless of what we can do to affect the situation for the reasons which I think are self evident if one listens to Mr. Twining's testimony.

Now, I really don't know what the impact of our words are going to be. I think you speak out because it is the right thing to do, and beyond that one can hope that over time that kind of statement will have a cumulative effect. So I would support that, but there is very little we can do to affect the situation. We don't have relations with Cambodia. Our legislation does not permit aid to Cambodia. We have no intention of offering it. Our export and finance controls prohibit any licensed transactions. All of those things are in theory leverages which are not available to us.

One thing that Charlie did not mention which we might take note of is that last year we did license a humanitarian group to send \$50,000 worth of malaria medicines to Cambodia and those apparently did get through. It is a very minor step, but one that I think is consistent with the differentiation between attempting to alleviate human suffering.

Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Chairman, I very much appreciate your indulgence in permitting me to pursue this line of inquiry at such great length. Let me just say this is about the most remarkable testimony that I have heard as a member of this committee in the last few years.

My only regret is that this committee could not get testimony along these lines back in the 1930's and 1940's when another holocaust was going on in the world. Then we had the excuse of perhaps being ignorant of what was going on. After what we heard today and what we heard in our previous hearing, I don't think the excuse of ignorance can be put forward by any reasonable, responsible person.

So I would very much hope that we recognize our moral obligations and adopt this resolution. I think it would be a terrible thing to have on the conscience of this country the fact that these exterminations went on in another part of the world without our having even raised our voice in protest.

Mr. FRASER [presiding]. Mr. Secretary, are we doing what we ought to be doing with respect to refugees?

Mr. HOLBROOKE. We are awaiting a final step in the process by which we will be able to move forward to grant parole authority to additional refugees. So my answer to you, Mr. Chairman, is that I believe that within the executive branch we are now doing what can be done; however, there are additional requirements for involvement of Congress.

I would also mention parenthetically that for various reasons which I think Mr. Twining and I can both address, a very limited number of the refugees who would come in under additional authority would in fact be from Cambodia. They would primarily be from Vietnam and to a lesser degree Laos.

Mr. FRASER. Cambodians who lived in these areas you mean?

Mr. HOLBROOKE. What I am saying is if we exercise additional parole authority or other authority to let in additional refugees, the number talked about in the newspapers has been 15,000. Only a limited number of those 15,000 would be Cambodians, just primarily Vietnamese and Lao.

Mr. FRASER. 15,000 you mean for Indochina?

Mr. HOLBROOKE. Yes, sir.

Mr. FRASER. And the reason that Laos and the Vietnamese might use up most of the 15,000 is what?

Mr. HOLBROOKE. Well, for one thing, for various reasons I think which Charlie has outlined there have been very limited numbers of Cambodians who have gotten out. The boat cases which have drawn the world's attention and which are the most pressing humanitarian situation, in my opinion, are almost entirely Vietnamese. We now believe that there are approximately 6,000 boat cases scattered around the littoral of Asia.

A rough estimate which comes from Frank Sieverts in the Humanitarian Affairs Division of the State Department is about 750 of 15,000 people that we are talking about might be Cambodians.

Mr. FRASER. I perhaps missed that. Did you give an estimate on the number from Cambodia?

Mr. TWINING. No.

Mr. FRASER. In fact, there have been a relatively small number of refugees with respect to numbers flowing out of other countries.

Mr. TWINING. From Laos there are 65,000 to 70,000. If I may go on for a minute, I think what you have in the Thai refugee camps from Cambodia now today, if you wish, are farmers or very low ranking soldiers who, if we continue to adhere to our past criteria for entry into the United States as refugees, are not going to meet those criteria.

Mr. FRASER. What criteria do we have to bar them?

Mr. TWINING. The criteria provide for immediate relatives of people already here, people who worked for the U.S. Government previously and people whom we consider high-risk types.

Mr. HOLBROOKE. Under those criteria, Mr. Chairman, the Cambodians who qualified and came in 1975-76 were 6,000. So they just would not qualify, and the limited number that we are hoping to bring in under these additional criteria would follow those priorities.

I would like to add, though, that we have been engaged in discussions with governments of Asia about this issue and indeed with other governments, so the Secretary of State noted in his speech on June 29 in New York. Among the other countries was Israel, an unexpected source, but theirs was a very dramatic and praiseworthy gesture particularly because the refugees Israel has taken in had trouble finding places to go.

Mr. FRASER. Were these Cambodians?

Mr. HOLBROOKE. Vietnamese. When we talk in relation to the United States today, we are talking almost entirely about Vietnamese. We hope that we will be able to encourage the nations of Asia and other parts of the world to play a larger role themselves in this problem.

Mr. FRASER. Just one last question. I gather both from the way you stated some of your facts, Mr. Twining, and also the Secretary that there are to continue to be substantial tensions between Hanoi and Phnom Penh or between the Vietnamese Government and Cambodia.

Mr. HOLBROOKE. That is correct. Those tensions are more than tensions. There is a continuing refugee flow into Vietnam which, as I understand it, is much greater than toward Thailand because the border does not have this scorched earth policy. Second, there have been reports which, to the best of our knowledge, are to a certain extent correct about actual fighting along the Cambodian-Vietnamese border.

Mr. FRASER. I think I heard from one Vietnamese refugee that in some parts of the delta area—this now goes back many months—



there was a continued resistance to the Vietnamese Government and that presumably they were getting support out of Cambodia's resistance, right?

Mr. TWINING. There have been rumors to that effect. These rumors have been almost impossible to trace.

Mr. HOLBROOKE. It is important to stress that there is a very long-standing antipathy going back at least 400 years. I spent 2 years of my life in a Vietnamese province in the Mekong Delta which was two-thirds Cambodian population and the feelings between the two people have just been very hostile throughout history. Given the present political situation with the Soviet Union having no connections at all with the Cambodian Government and the Vietnamese Government having close and fraternal relations with the Soviet Union, I think we are unquestionably going to see a continuation of that tension. I see no reason to assume that it would end.

Mr. FRASER. It seems a projection of the Sino-Soviet tension; that is, that the Vietnamese are not close to the Chinese.

Mr. HOLBROOKE. That is one way of looking at it.

Mr. FRASER. Sort of indigenous.

Mr. HOLBROOKE. I would prefer to look at it as Sino-Soviet rivalry leaning up on the side of an antipathy which goes back to the period of Angkor Wat.

Mr. FRASER. Do you have any notion of how the Cambodian refugees are being treated in Vietnam?

Mr. TWINING. Generally they are being well treated. The Vietnamese ask of the Cambodians only to stay out of politics, don't get involved with anti-Cambodian resistance or anything that is going to be anti-Government of Vietnam. Otherwise, they are free to work, they are free to go to new economic areas, they are free to do more or less what they want.

Mr. FRASER. In your descriptions in response to Mr. Solarz' question I didn't detect any reeducation camps in Cambodia, except one reference. If there are, are they modest?

Mr. HOLBROOKE. As far as we know, if there are any, they are modest.

Mr. FRASER. People who might have gone to reeducation camps have been killed?

Mr. TWINING. We have heard of what you would call hard labor camps, and my friend says the whole country is a camp, in effect. These hard labor camps, the few that we have heard of, seem to be designed with no aim of education at all in mind, but purely to work someone to death.

There was one interesting example of a reeducation effort, and you had some testimony in your past hearing on Cambodia dealing with this. A chap I interviewed named Doctor Oum Nal was placed in some sort of reeducation for a few days and after that was put out into a village again. So much of what you hear about Cambodia you wonder if you should not attribute to a local leader and what that local leader has decided to do. If you have one rather enlightened local leader in one place and just a thug in another place, perhaps that is why you have differences in stories the refugees tell.

By and large there is no reeducation. What refugees are told in sessions that take place any time from once a day or once a night to twice or three times a week, sessions in which the Khmer Rouge talk

to them, the main message is that mistakes were made under past governments so these were inhuman governments. "We are going to correct all that and make a new Cambodia and for this you must work."

The message normally is, "You must work hard." Sometimes they say there are certain countries that are enemies and they refer to the Soviet Union, the United States, France and, in the past, Japan. They will talk about this sort of thing, but if that is reeducation it is not much reeducation.

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Derwinski.

Mr. DERWINSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Let me pick up the point you just made in response to Mr. Fraser's question. In other words, we look at the three countries in Indochina: Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. The question generally asked is how the Soviets and the Red Chinese are doing in their competition. I gather that in the case of Cambodia the Soviets are far out in front in whatever influence there might be from another country.

Mr. TWINING. The Chinese are far out in front, yes.

Mr. DERWINSKI. Excuse me. Yes, the Chinese. And this is historical or it might be, an immediate reaction to their new political views.

Mr. HOLBROOKE. Let me just say, Congressman Derwinski, that the Soviet Union left an embassy in Phnom Penh up to the end of the Pon Nol government, so it was inevitable, I think, that to the new leadership in Cambodia it was an enemy.

The traditional Vietnamese-Cambodian hostilities have now been played out, as Chairman Fraser pointed out, on this larger Sino-Soviet terrain, but the Chinese do have relationships with both Hanoi and Phnom Penh and they do retain a friendly relationship with the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.

Mr. DERWINSKI. Do we have a complete list of the countries that maintain embassies?

Mr. HOLBROOKE. In Hanoi?

Mr. DERWINSKI. No; Phnom Penh.

Mr. HOLBROOKE. Yes; we do.

Mr. TWINING. China, North Korea, Cuba, Albania, Vietnam, Laos, Rumania, Yugoslavia, and Egypt.

Mr. DERWINSKI. Egypt would be the one nonaligned.

Mr. TWINING. Yes.

Mr. DERWINSKI. Now, in terms of our obvious lack of leverage, are any of those countries in a position to render any cooperation to us if we did have some special humanitarian efforts that we would try to make?

Mr. HOLBROOKE. If any American efforts are to play any further role in relation to events in Cambodia, my inclination and preference would be to begin by talking to the People's Republic of China. They are the dominant external influence external to this, if there is any in Cambodia. And we are able to talk to them.

Mr. DERWINSKI. The current regime, I guess it is almost oversimplification to say they are Communists, but the point is they are attempting to return to some primitive kind of operation. Now, to what extent is this a military decision as opposed to an ideological decision? In other words, what role does the military have in what seems to be this national policy?

Mr. TWINING. This is really getting to the question of, Do we know how they make decisions and do we really know how much voice the military has? In my mind—I believe there are other more expert people in back of me who may have other ideas—it is primarily an ideological decision that these people who have been out in the woods for years have made themselves, presumably with the complete concurrence of the military who are carrying out their dictates on this.

Mr. DERWINSKI. In other words, you think it is so much ideological as to be an obsession with the internal security?

Mr. TWINING. Both must be seen together. That is a very good point.

Mr. DERWINSKI. What about the autonomy referred to? Is this autonomy one of the local military commanders or of local government administrators?

Mr. TWINING. It is really hard to know on a local level whether it is military commanders or government administrators who are calling the shots or whether the local administrators are not frequently military themselves. In fact, often on a village level the administrators are exmilitary. The Communists seem to be placing such persons there methodically, resulting in a complete marriage between the two. I personally believe that the administrative structure of Cambodia is largely based upon the military structure that is there. I see them basically as one and the same unless we get indications to the contrary.

Mr. DERWINSKI. The ideological issue which includes the anti-professional, anti-intellectual effort—in other words, to stamp out the intellectual, the professional, or the commercial class—to what extent is this either again an ideological approach or is this because they feel that there could be subversive elements involved in these classes?

Mr. TWINING. I personally believe that although it may be somewhat ideological it is also the feeling that if anyone is going to make trouble for them they think it will be these people—these people being the old elite generation, the old class.

Mr. DERWINSKI. So, therefore, their policy is for whatever processes could be used to eliminate them regardless of what the consequences are?

Mr. TWINING. Exactly.

Mr. DERWINSKI. In other words, anyone who in any way associated with the previous government is presumed to be guilty and not trusted.

Mr. TWINING. Right. In fact, I think it goes further. Anyone who shows indications of being an independent thinker, of having an independent mind, even if he was not with the past government, is liable to be in danger of losing his life.

Mr. DERWINSKI. I have one more question, Mr. Chairman.

What about the recent clashes between the Thais and Cambodians? Do we have any idea at all as to what the motive might be for the Cambodian-instigated military incursions?

Mr. TWINING. I think that for these most recent ones, in the past few days, I am not sure that we have very good information. I notice the New York Times said that the principal one last Thursday or Friday was due to hungry troops who were foraging for food.

Mr. DERWINSKI. Do we have any information in the State Department other than that of the New York Times? I mean, it sort of seems to me I would like an answer from our professionals rather than having somebody quoting the New York Times' story.

Mr. HOLBROOKE. Well, the facts as reported in the New York Times about the border clash are essentially correct. We do have reporting from Bangkok which corroborates that it is a local affair. It was more intensive than the previous ones, but we do not see it at this point as building into a general affair.

Cambodia does not pose a direct military threat to Thailand. It has small military forces and its obsession, as you pointed out earlier, is with its internal problems. I think we are going to have continuing clashes of that sort. I would not at this point read into that the beginning of a problem of some other nature. I would predict that there will be continuing friction over a boundary which, as you know, Mr. Congressman, has been in dispute for many, many years going back to previous governments.

Mr. DERWINSKI. Did this become more of a pattern of local harassment rather than any major technical military?

Mr. HOLBROOKE. I would put it somewhere between local commander harassment and a larger pattern. It will continue because more than local commander frictions are involved. It is not an accident. The two countries have very bad relations and undefined borders. I do not at this point expect it to build into something major because both countries involved have serious internal problems which are their primary concern: the Thais, with their guerrilla problems in the Northeast, North, and South; and the Cambodians for all the reasons we have discussed this morning.

Mr. DERWINSKI. Thank you.

Mr. TWINING. I was just going to add to that we in our Embassy in Bangkok, from which I have just come, have seen these instances recurring. They seem to happen for a combination of reasons:

(1) Because the border is ill defined at two major points and, therefore, this xenophobic regime wants to establish control over contested territory.

(2) Because the Cambodian troops are hungry. It is not only the villagers but the Khmer soldiers. They get only rice gruel, rice soup during the day so they are hungry. They are producing rice, they are growing rice and other things.

(3) Because there is sometimes resistance going out of the Thai-Cambodian border area into Cambodia and they always want to retaliate, if you will, for that resistance. So I think it is a combination.

Mr. DERWINSKI. Thank you.

Mr. SOLARZ. Would the gentleman yield for 1 minute while some copies of that revised resolution are being run off.

Charlie, would you briefly describe what the daily regimen is now like in Cambodia for the average soldiers as you understand it based on refugee reports.

Mr. TWINING. Normally a person gets up at 4:30 or 5 a.m. He then goes to the fields about a half hour later or to the place where he is going to dig ditches or build dams.

At perhaps 10 o'clock children may eat.

Around 11 o'clock the adults themselves will probably stop work and rest, eat or hear lectures until maybe 1 o'clock. Then they begin work again until 5:30, 6 o'clock in the evening. They stop and eat for an hour and either then they have lectures that evening or if it is a nice moonlit night or they have torches, they go back and work in the

fields from 7:30 to 9:30 or 10 o'clock. So it is a very long day and it is every day of the week, every day of the month.

Mr. SOLARZ. Seven days a week?

Mr. TWINING. Seven days, yes, sir.

Mr. SOLARZ. No vacations.

Mr. TWINING. No, sir. The only vacation is National Day, April 17, and perhaps on election day but otherwise, no.

Mr. SOLARZ. Is the work performed in the presence of armed guards?

Mr. TWINING. It depends. Often there are armed guards. If there aren't armed guards, then there is always the ever present fear that armed guards will walk by at any moment so perhaps it amounts to the same thing.

Mr. SOLARZ. Thank you.

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Harrington.

Mr. HARRINGTON. The Solarz resolution; we have it now?

Mr. FRASER. Yes. We are making some changes in it. It is being copied. Do you have any questions?

Mr. HARRINGTON. I didn't want to intrude on that priority.

I may be covering ground that has been the subject of conversation this morning. If I am, say so because I am noticeably very late.

Give me some sense of the population of that country over the course of, let's say, the period from the middle-1950's over the last generation.

Mr. TWINING. I wonder if I might turn to one of the old Cambodian hands for that.

Mr. CARNEY. There was a census in 1962 which by all critical accounts was inadequately carried out. I believe it produced a figure of 5.7 million in the country. Nothing ever happened since in the way of a census except that the new authorities claimed after the 1976 elections that the population was about 7.7 million. They have not produced any evidence to support that.

In a 1976 interview with an Italian magazine, Khieu Samphan said that there were 5 million people in Cambodia. A more recent statement by the Deputy Prime Minister for Foreign Affairs claims that there are 7.7 million in Cambodia. I think we can conclude that nobody really knows.

Mr. HARRINGTON. What I am really trying to get without renewing a debate is the comparative element of the human destruction. How much human destruction?

Mr. CARNEY. At the United Nations in 1976 Deputy Prime Minister Ieng Sary said that there were 1 million people killed or wounded during the war.

Mr. HARRINGTON. What is your sense of the accuracy or veracity of that estimate?

Mr. CARNEY. That is probably close.

Mr. HARRINGTON. What is the estimate of the destruction that has been occasioned since then?

Mr. TWINING. We have no information. You must count deaths from executions, malnutrition, and disease. All we can say is it is in thousands or hundreds of thousands or tens of thousands. Our information is just inadequate. Most of it is from northwestern Cambodia and we have virtually nothing from northeastern Cambodia, so it is

awfully hard to put together a significant figure and I think none of us want to give an estimate.

Mr. HOLBROOKE. Congressman Harrington, I want to sum up on the question of the figures having worked on Indochina matters since 1963. We will give you some figures we have, but I don't think they are worth very much either in regard to the destruction and tragedy of the 1970-75 period or the terrible situation now going on.

One thing that is crystal clear is that the country has undergone an experience and is still undergoing an experience which is, if not unique in recent human history, very close to it. It is a terrible, terrifying thing. I don't believe that anybody could listen to Mr. Twining's testimony this morning, which I found very moving, without recognizing this. Even though I have read the same data, it is the first time I have heard Charlie explain it at length from his own point of view, or read all the available information, including that of the people who have tried to convince your committee that the figures are grossly exaggerated, and failed to conclude that this is one of the worse cases, or possibly the worst, of tragedy and human suffering, if you will, human rights violations that exists anywhere in the world. I am not qualified to speak on a global scale, but it is certainly the worst in Asia today.

These figures we are giving you could be off by a factor of 2 or 10, I don't know. Charlie, who is really the best expert, I think, that exists in the world today does not know, but we all agree on the dimension of the tragedy.

The final point I would make is that there has been a lot of talk about how many people were executed. My guess is, and it is just a guess, that for every person executed several people have died of disease, malnutrition, or other factors which would have been avoidable if the Government itself had not followed the policy which we have described this morning, a policy which seeks to completely transform the society by the most Draconian measures possible.

Mr. HARRINGTON. The high point and the reason for getting down here is not to be contentious or bleak. I don't think anybody here would doubt both the concern, the sentiment, the motivation on all sides. I would like to see a comparatively greater concern for that period that we as a people control rather than being witness to things we don't control.

I am only asking the questions for that reason, to get some sense of that period that we were directly involved in, and the impact of the government that is there now. That is the reason, Mr. Holbrooke and Mr. Twining, for the question.

Mr. HOLBROOKE. Before I took this job I spoke out and wrote at length about American involvement in Indochina and in Cambodia, particularly in that 5-year period 1970-75 and there is nothing I wrote then that I would retract or change a word of. I share your feelings about that policy and what it did. The situation that exists today is a terrible one and the purpose of the hearings as we understood it, and one that I fully share, is to make clear the facts or feelings about the facts and explore in what ways, limited though they may be, we might publicly make clear our feelings and see if we can effect a change. I don't think the objectives at all are in conflict with one another and I certainly share the spirit in which you made your last comment.

Mr. FRASER. Well, I want to thank you very much, Mr. Secretary and Mr. Twining, for your testimony this morning; it has been extraordinarily useful to our subcommittee.

I just want to add that I share your last comments on the human rights pursuit. We continue to be confronted with the fact that the United States own performance in many respects has fallen far short of what we might have wished. The problem is that if we say that does it disable us from now speaking out. It does not seem to me that anybody profits from that and we have to take the world as we find it today and move on.

Mr. DERWINSKI. Mr. Chairman, I don't want to turn this into a debate, but for the record I would like to say that I personally am in strong disagreement with the interpretation that you and Mr. Harrington and the Secretary give to the period between 1970 and 1975. I think our motives were good, I think our actions and policies were basically sound. It is unfortunate that there was not support in the Congress to carry them out properly but we obviously are going to disagree on that for a long time, so I will disagree here.

Mr. HOLBROOKE. Mr. Chairman, I am not questioning anybody's motives. I was addressing the specific question.

Mr. FRASER. I think it is clear we are looking at the tip of that old iceberg where the United States should have been directed.

Well, thank you very much.

We have before us a resolution draft which is simply a revision of an initial draft. I don't think it has been introduced.

Mr. SOLARZ. It has been introduced.

Mr. FRASER. In any event, whether it has been and whether reformed, we agree with it. If we do agree to one, we may want to introduce a clean bill and then go directly to the full committee for whatever action they may take. I shall read it:

Whereas, the foreign policy of the Carter Administration gives high priority to the issue of human rights conditions around the world;

Whereas, there have been numerous credible accounts by refugees from Cambodia telling of countless killings and other barbaric brutalities by the Government of Cambodia; and

Whereas, the United States and the peoples of the world must protest the brutality taking place within Cambodia; Now, therefore, be it Resolved, That the U.S. House of Representatives,

Expresses deep concern over the continuing disregard for basic human rights, including atrocities and killings, of the Cambodian people by Democratic Kampuchea;

Calls upon the President to cooperate with other nations, through appropriate international forums such as the United Nations, in an effort to bring the flagrant violations of internationally recognized human rights now taking place in Cambodia to an end.

In the first resolve clause would you say "by the Government of Democratic Kampuchea" describes it in the name of the country, isn't it?

Mr. SOLARZ. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. So we want to say "by the government"?

Mr. SOLARZ. Yes, by the government of.

Mr. FRASER. And then you say forums or fora?

Mr. SOLARZ. I suggest we leave that to the staff.

Mr. DERWINSKI. We need Peter Frelinghuysen.

Mr. FRASER. What is the pleasure? Fora?

What is the pleasure of the subcommittee?

Mr. DERWINSKI. I will move the adoption.

Mr. FRASER. All right.

Any discussion?

Are you ready for the vote?

All in favor of reporting the resolution indicate by saying "Aye."

Mr. HARRINGTON. Aye.

Mr. DERWINSKI. Aye.

Mr. FRASER. Aye.

Those opposed so say.

The motion is carried.

We will reintroduce a clean bill and then if those who would like to cosponsor would let Mr. Solarz know, he will be glad to entertain.

Put me on, if you will.

With that, the subcommittee stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:11 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned, subject to the call of the Chair.]





