This book presents an objective description and analysis of the path followed by the Kampuchean revolutionaries in building a socialist society in their country. It also counters the allegations of brutality made against the Pol Pot government.

The author, Malcolm Caldwell, was lecturer at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London. He was also co-editor of the renowned **Journal of Contemporary Asia.** His specialisation was on South East Asia. He was the author of several books, including "Cambodia in the South East Asian war". He also actively participated-through research, lecturing writing and fund-raising tours-in the fight against imperialism and the growing racist and fascist movements in Britian. He was assassinated in Phnom Penh on December 23, 1978.

KAMPUCHEA

RATIONALE FOR A RURAL POLICY

MALCOLM CALDWELL

JANATA PRACHURANALU
HYDERABAD

HO CHI MINH CITY — There is one shrine to a martyr of the Pol Pot era that visiting foreigners to the Cambodian capital of Phnom Penh are taken routinely to see. In room No. 5 of the former Hotel Royale, three beds have been set up and a great stain of blood and hair smeared across the floor, according to numerous travellers.

"Here," the visitors told, "is where the British professor, Malcolm Caldwell, was murdered by the Pol Pot assassination squad." Documents have been "discovered" proving this.

It is a complete fabrication. I know because I was there when Caldwell was shot to death last December by unidentified terrorists in a guest house about one mile from the hotel in a far less protected area of the Cambodian capital. Not once on his trip did Caldwell step inside the old Hotel Royale.

Yet newspapers around the world, including a major American weekly, and many communist governments have accepted and repeated the Vietnamese version as fact. In their need to convince the rest of the world that their January invasion of Cambodia was justified, the Vietnamese have rewritten history, casting themselves as disinterested liberators. They so seriously miscalculated the political, military and human cost of the occupation that they appear to have no choice but to blame everything wrong with Cambodia then and now on the four-year rule of Pol Pot.

Asserting that Caldwell's death took place in the Royale gives the Vietnamese a propaganda edge. The Royale was completely under the control of Pol Pot forces — in contrast to the more remote guest house. Thus it would appear that Caldwell was killed by Pol Pot forces and was not, as Pol Pot and others have charged, a Vietnamese-encouraged murder that was a prelude to the invasion.

ELIZABETH BECKER
WASHINGTON POST
OCTOBER 1979

KAMPUCHEA

RATIONALE FOR A RURAL POLICY

MALCOLM CALDWELL

(Preliminary Draft of a paper read at the seminar 'Under development and subsistence reproduction in South East Asia' – April 1978)

JANATA PRACHURANALU
HYDERABAD

May 1979

Price Rs. 6-00

For Copies and details :

Janata Prachuranalu
10-1-17/2 (Upstairs)
Shyam Nagar,
Hyderabad-500 004.

Printed at

NATYAKALA PRESS
Khairatabad,
Hyderabad-500 004.

CONTENTS

PREFACE

The Kampuchean Revolution is "the most maligned revolution in the world", the author of this book, Malcolm Caldwell, has said. Caldwell was an intellectual of integrity, committed to the cause of revolution. He was not prepared to accept motivated propaganda, either originating in the refugee camps of Thailand, or as later spread by the Vietnamese and the Soviets. He was a scholar; teaching at the University of London's School of Oriental and African Studies, and his specialisation was on South East Asia. He was also co-editor of the Journal of Contemporary Asia. His approach was scientific; he investigated as a researcher, using the rigorous objective methodology of social science research. He searched for facts and finally came to the conclusion that most of the propaganda against the Kampuchean revolutionaries was false. Being an active fighter for truth, he set out to write a thorough defence of the Kampuchean model of building a socialist society in an underdeveloped, impoverished and war-torn Third World country. This book was the product.

Caldwell could not give the finishing touches to the manuscript. He first submitted it as a "preliminary draft" at a seminar held in Bielefeld, West Germany, in April 1978 and promised to submit the final paper later. In order to collect the latest material and also to investigate the border war with Vietnam going on at that time, he went to Kampuchea in December, 1978. There he had to pay with his life for the bold stand he had taken with regard to the most maligned revolution. He was assassinated on December 23, 1978, obviously by those who did not like his exposure of their false propaganda.

We are publishing this preliminary draft with the purpose of making available to the Indian reader something more than just propaganda and counter-propaganda. Caldwell could not write down his findings on the border war. If he had not been killed he could have given us more information about what after his death, developed into a full-scale war and occupation. It

would be necessary to write at length on this war. In this preface we would restrict ourselves to just a few questions. If the Pol Pot government and the Communist Party of Kampuchea were really so unpopular and brutal as the Vietnamese and the Soviets would have the peoples of the world believe, why was it necessary to send more than one lakh Vietnamese soldiers to overthrow that government? Why, after several months after the overthrow, is it still necessary for the Vietnamese army to fight in Kampuchea? (The Vietnamese no longer deny this. The Vietnamese delegation that recently visited Hyderabad admitted this. "Answering a question as to the justification for the continued presence of Vietnamese troops in Kampuchea, Prof. Phan Anh said that they were necessary to clear the remnants of the Pol Pot regime and other reactionary forces"; The Indian Express, Hyderabad, April 17, 1979.)

Why is the resistance still growing?

Caldwell's paper nails the lie to another aspect of the propaganda, viz. that the Kampuchean revolutionaries were following a mad path of building a socialist society. He has not only shown that this path is correct but that it is the best suited, not only for Kampuchea, but also for most of the under-developed Third World countries in the age of imperialism. In his analysis he has demonstrated the futility of the concept and path of development followed by most Third World countries including some socialist ones.

Caldwell had intended to add a few appendices to his paper. In one he wanted to deal with the falsification of "evidence" of atrocities, in another he wanted to deal with the border disputes with Thailand and Vietnam. But unfortunately, the preliminary draft that we have, does not contain these appendices. We tried our best to collect them, but failed.

Caldwell's paper is a theoretical and scholarly one written for a seminar. It elucidates certain questions thrown up by events leading to the recent war and occupation. This paper lays the foundation for the understanding of the long-term Kampuchean model of building socialism, which was aborted through the occupation, as well as the various short-term measures taken by the Kampuchean revolutionaries. We hope, this publication will be appreciated by all concerned as our contribution to the understanding of the Kampuchean Revolution.

Hyderabad,
4-5-1979.

Friends of Kampuchea

INTRODUCTION

To most of the outside world, events in Cambodia (Democratic Kampuchea) since its liberation in 1975 appear totally outlandish and incomprehensible. Most commentators conclude that the most charitable explanation for them lies in bungled and inept improvisation by ignorant and ill-organized cadres floundering in disastrous circumstances and sustained only by an opportune callousness and a monopoly of firearms. This paper argues that, on the contrary, the leaders of the Cambodian Revolution had evolved both short-term tactics and a long-term socio-economic strategy, based upon a sound analysis of the realities of the country's society and economy, in the years before liberation; that, in the face of great difficulties, they have attempted with some success to implement these in the last three years; and that the chosen course is a sound one whether one judges it in terms of its domestic appositeness or in terms of its reading of the future of the international economy. The paper is divided into five sections as follows :

1. Cambodia-Natural Endowment and Colonial Legacy ;
2. Formation of social revolutionary thought pre-1975 ;
3. The liberated areas, 1970-75, and planning for the food crisis of national liberation ;
4. Economic development, 1975-78, and prospects ;
5. Significance of the Kampuchean Revolution in international and historical perspective.

Appendices deal with such matters as falsification of "evidence" of Cambodian "atrocities", the border disputes with Thailand

and Vietnam, and evaluation of the adequacy of the post-liberation diet. I use the forms 'Cambodia' and 'Kampuchea' interchangeably : they are, after all, but varying ways of transliterating the Khmer original.

1. Natural Endowment and Colonial Legacy

Democratic Kampuchea today consists of a substantially smaller area than that administered by the great Khmer empires of the 10th, 11th and 12th centuries.[1] Nor are its present boundaries co-extensive with either the spread of Khmer-speaking and identifiably Khmer peoples or with the natural region of the great Cambodian plain centering on the Tonle Sap (great Lake) whose seasonal vicissitudes play so great a part in the regulation of regional water flows and therefore in food production. The plains and deltas of Indochina, including the Tonle Sap lowlands, are healthy and habitable when - and only when - ordered settled agriculture is practiced : when agriculture has to be abandoned (commonly as a consequence of the ravages of war- most recently those visited upon the area by the United States) they quickly become unhealthy and uninhabitable again.

Wet rice cultivation here produces but one crop a year in the absence of systematic water- control and irrigation works. The elaborate irrigation networks of the early period of Cambodian greatness crumbled and became derelict with its passing. Nonetheless, in reasonably normal circumstances, rice- supplemented with numerous fruits and vegetables and with fish from the ubiquitous waterways - afforded the Cambodian peasant a comparatively generous subsistence. Or rather we should perhaps say " *would have* afforded the Cambodian peasant a comparatively generous subsistence *in the absence of oppressive and exploitative ruling groups*" - ruling groups which Khieu Samphan (now President of Kampuchea) sees as presenting " a feudal character" [2]. but which others characterise as typical of societies built upon the Asiatic Mode of production.[3] Even from Khieu Samphan's own further comments upon and descriptions of pre-colonial life, I am inclined to view Cambodia as having exhibited pre-capitalist features strongly suggestive of

the Asiatic Mode, and I am encouraged in this persuasion by D. L. Elliott's recent analysis of neighbouring Thailand's socio-economic history.[4] What is clear is that much of the rural surplus, over and above the food needs of the farmers themselves and the provision of seed for future harvests, was engrossed by the court and the non-productive *sethey* (a land-controlling and mandarinal oligarchy). Abundance of cultivable land presumably mitigated the severity of the *sethey's* rice extortions and demands upon labour, since hypothetically it would always have been possible to move *in extremis* to evade intolerable exactions (and to make good territorial encroachments by expansionist neighbours like the Vietnamese). As trade was little developed before the arrival of the French conquerors,[5] there was no other parasitic group battening on the peasant's produce, so that even with the low yields associated with this part of Asia[6] we may conjecture that the peasants generally made ends meet.

The colonial rule of France fundamentally altered conditions. To begin with, not only was the agricultural surplus now expected to maintain in addition to its customary local unproductive dominant class a fresh ruling oligarchy of French and French-levied administrators, bureaucrats and military, it was also expected to contribute to the maintenance of French rule in Laos and in Vietnam. It should be pointed out here that the ruling apparatus of the French in Indochina was no "ordinary" colonial bureaucracy but a grossly overblown establishment - a vast system of generous "out-door relief" for the French middle, lower-middle and even working classes.[7] On top of all this, colonial encouragement of export and import trade introduced a significant stratum of middlemen and merchants, all of them -insofar as not actually French-in effect compradors.

Steadily more exacting tax demands and the availability of imported consumer goods created circumstances highly propitious to extension of usury and its familiar : rural indebtedness and ruin. Both the pressing money hunger of the peasant and the greed of the merchants guaranteed that more and more produce would be made available for commercial dispo-

sal and export. By the 1930's Cambodia was contributing some 350,000 tons of rice and about as much maize annually to French Indochina's exports. From the point of view of Paris and of the commercial classes such an outcome could be regarded with satisfaction – and indeed it was. More curiously, it is still so regarded by those who profess to regard growing exports as a measure of the economic "development" of a colony.

But we ought to probe a little more sceptically behind this indicator, the chief recommendation of which is after all nothing else than the ready availability of a simple statistic. The rising exports came-as did the support of all those in the "new" tertiary sector–from depressing the consumption of the Cambodian rice and maize growers. In the absence of other than dilatory and dilettante French concern for irrigation, fertilisers, and improved seed strains rice and maize yields show no sign of having risen-and if the experience, better documented, of neighbouring countries is any guide, they probably fell.[8] Population rose. In the 1930's there was an abnormal number of unusually poor harvests. One is driven to conclude that exports were maintained at the expense of the Cambodian diet, thus demolishing whatever insubstantial supports the case for "development" (even of a peculiar kind) might have had.

The blunt truth is that the peasant masses suffered cruelly from colonial-style "development". This was of course self-evident to them, however opaque and obscure the representation conjured out of the self-same realities by foreign experts (whose mirror not unnaturally tended to reverse images). But on the other hand the capital city, Phnom Penh, undoubtedly blossomed and flourished under French (and later American) imperial patronage. It was perhaps asking a lot-too much!–of the sorely oppressed peasants to have expected them to appreciate the compensation for their own involuntary sacrifices this flowering of Phnom Penh signified : that kind of broader, more dispassionate, vision seems - alas - to remain largely the monopoly of the more fortunate. On the contrary, it was with bitter hatred that the sweating hordes of

toilers on the soil regarded flourishing Phnom Penh, with its gailylit hotels and restaurants, thriving shops specialising in luxury commodities, fat magistrates and merchants and slim bar-girls, and all the rest of its urban fripperies and frivolities. The rural people in fact talked of "their" capital as the "great prostitute" on the Mekong-a vigorous and significant figure of speech, dead on target[9] . (Ordinary Frenchmen might have reflected upon their own feelings towards a German–occupied Paris).

The conventional picture of pre-1970 Cambodia minimizes social conflicts of interest not only by implying that 19th and 20th century developments brought benefit to all, but also by eulogizing rural life. We are encouraged to believe that, whatever might have been the case elsewhere in South East Asia, in Cambodia a satisfactory degree of equality, prosperity, and contentment characterized the peasant sector.[10]. Adequately fed and clothed, in the conventional representation, the peasant derived further comfort from the familiar symbolism of the royal family and from the values and day-to-day practices of Buddhism.[11] This is the reassuring myth which-although in large part their own creation-helped lull metropolitan and colonial reactionaries into complacency "it couldn't happen here".

In fact, life was far from idyllic among the 85% or more of the population who lived in and from the countryside. Nearly 86 percent of peasant families owned small properties (not all of them in the form of consolidated holdings either) up to 5 hectares, constituting altogether some 54 per cent of the total cultivated area. The top 4 per cent, owning large properties over 10 hectares, accounted for 21 per cent by area. General production methods, based on "cow, buffalo, plough, rake, spade, hoe, ox-cart, basket, bucket", had not changed in a thousand years. Many peasants owned less than one hectare-insufficient to support a family. Big landholders preferred to sub-divide their own fields into very small plots which were easy to rent out or to have share-cropped. Contrary to generally accepted impressions, there were also many landless peasants-as many as 40 per cent of the total in some areas-and these,

together with poor peasants owning plots of land "the size of a palm of one's hand", made up about 35 per cent of the rural workforce of pre-revolutionary Cambodia.

The low level of technology, prevalence of small holdings, lack of incentive among the poorer half of the peasantry, and absence of large state or co-operative works to combat the vagaries of an insensitive Nature, all meant low yields: in the case of rice, below even India's and Indonesia's, and but a quarter of socialist North Korea's.[12] Besides, inadequate and defective irrigation permitted only one crop per year. Low productivity, high rents and crucifying usury in turn spelt poverty, listlessness and debility in the peasantry: however hard they laboured, they were assured, at best, only of bare subsistence. The problems intensified and became more general in the course of the 1960's, when powerful functionaries from the military, police, compradors and big landlord class (and headed and given a lead in this by Lon Nol, Sirik Matak and Son Ngoc Thanh) brazenly took to seizing land and to treating the peasantry contemptuously, like serfs or discardable human debris.

Naturally, after the Second World War and attainment of independence, Cambodia did not escape infection by the ideology of "modernisation" nor the attentions of those intent-for good reasons or bad-upon foisting "modernisation" upon the country. Yet another layer or two of non-productive strata sought to batten upon the economic "surplus" of the rural areas. But now in addition there was U. S. "aid"–"aid" which created a whole class of "dollar addicts", whose painful withdrawal symptoms when Sihanouk rejected it in 1963 could only be assuaged by calling back the Americans, overthrowing the legitimate government, and unleashing all hell upon the rural people.[13] "Aid" dollars enabled the old whore on the Mekong to indulge crazier and crazier extravagancies and ostentations which mocked the privations of the people. The elites converted the economy into a system designed to satisfy their insatiable appetite for the most meretricious "luxury" tawdries of Western "civilisation" while the masses lacked the bare necessities of life and labour. Even the limited welfare programme reflected the hopeless-even contemptuous – irrelevance of Western ideas and influence: one American project had as its objective fostering the use of powdered milk.[14] (Others promoted formation of Boy Scout troops and Parent - Teacher Associations.)

But even as the siege tightened round a doomed Phnom Penh after the 1970 *coup*, cynical American and European interests were jockeying for the contract to establish a national *airline* (sic), the "need" for which they had succeeded in impri nting upon those around Lon Nol, America's gauleiter (who allegedly diverted 1 million a year from the U.S. naval aid pro gramme for his personal use), who had their hands on the pro digal dollar tap.[15] To the very end, with waves of Khmer Rouge troops virtually lapping against the city limits, the rich and privileged continued to live with lavish abandon, importing German cars and French wines while starving wraiths haunted the streets in search of scraps and charity grain: "... in the darkest days of starvation in Phnom Penh, the expensive lifestyle of the elite was not visibly affected. While the government's 'austerity' programme kept the poor neighbourhoods in darkness because of power cutoffs, air-conditioned homes of the wealthy continued to receive full power and the lights went on at the Cercle Sportif for evening tennis players. 'For the few privileged elite,' an American correspondent wrote in April, 1975, 'the good life of tennis, nightclubs, expensive French meals and opulent brandy-drenched dinner parties went on almost to the very end, wnile the majority of the city's swollen population sank into deeper and deeper misery."[16]

"Aid", as construed by Washington, consisted, in the first part, of military *material* and, in the second, of the wherewithal to provide the elite with a life-style flamboyant enough to motivate them to use it and thus prolong the war. Responsibility for provisioning the bulk of the population of the capital, greatly swollen by continuing rivulets of refugees forced out of the rural areas by bombing, shelling and other military activities, was explicitly renounced by the Americans, under cover of specious excuses and special pleading. Representatives of the few voluntary agencies which heroically-but hopelessly-endeavoured to

make good this callous dereliction are unanimous in their testimony on two points: first that countless thousands of Cambodians died of starvation in Phnom Penh (and other US -occupied and -administered enclaves) as a direct consequence of these deliberately chosen and pursued official priorities; and second, that much of the humanitarian aid which came from all over the world in an attempt to mitigate the resulting malnutrition and starvation was itself subject to, and substantially eroded by, official and officially-condoned corruption and peculation.[17]

The attitude of Cambodian revolutionaries and of the bulk of the Cambodian population towards "aid" and reliance upon aid, as opposed to the policy of self-reliance *(klouon opatham klouon)*, is thus hardly a matter for surprise. "Aid" entailed, on the one hand, immiseration and pauperisation of the people (not to speak of their starvation and physical destruction), and, on the other, the personal fortunes of millions- and in the case of the topmost leaders such as Lon Non (the chief gauleiter's odious brother) tens or even hundreds of millions- of dollars accumulated by the quislings and hirelings as they supervised the massacre of their humbler fellow-citizens from the safety and satiety of their banqueting tables. Small wonder, then, that-on the other, patriotic, side- aid was spurned, and emphasis put on the contrary on relying on one's own resources.[18] So strongly is this attitude embedded in the people from the evidence of their own experience that Kampuchean representatives at the 1976 conference of non-aligned nations in Columbo, Sri Lanka, removed their country from a list of nations in need of reconstruction assistance.[19]

We may conclude this brief survey of the geographical heritage and imperialist legacy by reiterating the two principal points.[20] The first is that Cambodian agriculture is vulnerable to disruption, but can provide if there is an adequate return to the tiller and has great potential granted good management, including water mangement. Hitherto in history there has never been a sustained regime wherein all three enabling conditions for general prosperity have been observed (domestic peace, a

guaranteed right to the whole product of labour, and social acceptance of responsibility for continuous upkeep and improvement of irrigation and other capital inputs contributory to progress in yields and to crop and livestock diversification). Second, the intrusion of first French colonialism and subsequently American neocolonialism contributed to, insofar as they did not in certain particulars set afoot, accelerated deterioration in the status, security and subsistence of the peasant producer and in the coherence, resilience and morale of the society. The process culminated in the total degeneracy of Phnom Penh and the other urban enclaves held by the United States at the war's end in 1975- with food production more or less abandoned, the destruction of agriculture in the liberated zones the top priority of government, and the hapless captive population caught in the occupied towns and cities abandoned to their resortless hunger. We shall now see what conclusions Cambodian patriots and revolutionaries drew from contemplating these bitter lessons.

— o —

2. Formation of social revolutionary thought pre-1975.

Since "For most of Cambodia's history, most of the people were always"[21], and given the precariousness of agricultural yields at the mercy of both weather and warfare, it is hardly surprising that peasant revolts recurrently punctuated passage of the centuries.[22] A further consideration was the traditional role of the monarch : there was no equivalent of the Western "divine right of kings", the ruler on the contrary having to substantiate his legitimacy constantly by organizing men and nature for the good of his subjects. Failing observance of that obligation, the monarch forfeited the right of the obedience of his subjects, thus freeing them to rise up in revolt behind any suitably qualified leader (the qualifications traditionally being either membership of the royal family or proof of a sacred calling and superhuman powers-Lon Nol pretending to the latter, having unceremoniously jettisoned Prince Sihanouk).

Recurrence of peasant risings meant tnat a continuous tradition of how to conduct such an undertaking was kept alive, its specifics passed by word of mouth and by example from generation to generation. During the harvest season peasant guerrilla forces dispersed to work in the fields with the people, obeying the classical guerrilla dictate (for them, deduced their own repeated experience) to "wage armed struggle and the struggle for production in parallel".[23] Peasant father transmitted to peasant son vital information on the best hideouts in the mountains, on the most devastatingly effective locations for laying ambushes for inquisitive "counter-insurgency" forces, and on a host of other crucial matters for survival and success. That not all those desperate peasant guerrilla uprisings were foredoomed is clear from the record : as Pol Pot says : "Some of these uprisings were crushed while others saw the peasant class triumph over the feudal landowner and warlord class. However, those few successful uprisings did not have a correct political guideline to serve the oppressed peasant class and to liberate its members from oppression. On the contrary, those peasants who defeated the feudal landowners always proclaimed themselves part of the feudal land owner and

warlord class and thus became in turn the oppressors of the peasant class. Refusing to accept these new feudal landowners and warlords, the peasants then rose up against them as they had done against their predecessors."[24] The important thing for our purpose here to note is that an appropriate tradition of integration of armed struggle and food production – as opposed to armed struggle and "living off the land" (i. e. pillage) – existed as secure foundation for elaboration of further thought on the part of cambodian revolutionaries.

It is true that there were also other, less effective and more pathetic, traditions: grossly oppressed peasants would on occasion march on the capital, or wherever the monarch happened to be for the time being, their numbers swelling as the trek proceeded. in order to present a petition for redress of grievances. Such demonstrations persisted into the twentieth century - indeed one may say that some of the very first and quite spontaneous pro-Sihanouk manifestations immediately following his overthrow in 1970 were reminiscent echoes of this tradition, as peasants set out for Phnom Penh or a provincial capital to present the authorities with their demand for the Prince's return and reinstatement.[25] . The bullets and brutality with which Lon Nol's notables met these peasant demonstrators put an abrupt and conclusive end to this tradition: many of the survivors drew their own conclusions and slipped away in to the maquis. It is worth making this observation in passing because we have a parallel in Western social history with the pre-Trade Union tradition of the early industrial revolution period of distressed workers petitioning the King for alleviation of their distress.[26]

The ineffectiveness of such appeals made evolution and adoption of a revolutionary socialist perspective inevitable (just as, in the West a century before, the timidity and impotence of this archaic reflex made construction of a powerful and independent labour movement inevitable). I am not here concerned with the details and chronology of the emergence of the Cambodian Left and in particuiar of the Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK otherwise Pak Kommunis Kampuchea (PKK)); new information is continually surfacing and being accumulated

on this aspect of the matter.[27] Instead, I seek to detect formative influences in the area of ideas : the interpretation of Cambodian realities and articulation of the implications perceived to flow from these insights and understandings.

It is useful to clear the ground first of the kind of ideas promoted as appropriate to the "development" and "modernisation" of Cambodia by Western experts, advisors, and educators, by those Cambodians who either purported to be enamoured of them and convinced of their relevance, or-more plausibly - grasped that, enacted, such ideas would guarantee an "open" inegalitarian society where the elite of "developers" and "modernisers" would be free to engross and enjoy (in whatever form they decreed) such wealth as might thus be created.[28] (The latter category did not have to be geniuses to see as much : rather we should marvel atthe obtuseness of those development "experts" who persist in professing to believe that ever more of what has already demonstrably impoverished the peoples of Asia will somehow- if long enough persisted in and intensified- magically start alleviating their plight.)

A handy compendium of such ideas might be derived from a variety of Western texts on Cambodia, and from the ambitions of pre-revolutionary Cambodian notables and functionaries, as expressed in their programnes and policies and more importantly, in their actions w h e n opportunity offered. The first were, of course, more discreet and camouflaged than the last : where as the Human Relations Area File volume speaks of the "need" for foreign investment, more Western-style education, encouragement of Cambodian businesses alongside of (or at the expense of) Chinese ones, the extension of capitalism in agriculture, and the like, those in the Cambodian elite fired by he mission to prove their mastery of the mysteries of modern Western economic science plunged into the exercise with a wholeheartedness which culminated, logically enough, in the outright plunder of1970-75and the ruination of the country. There is, it must be admitted, something to be said for such a candid exposition of the underlying dynamic of orthodox Western developmentalism, for it is safe to say that its tenets

have been extirpated for all time from Cambodian consciousness.

No doubt evidence of the enthusiasm of actual or would-be Cambodian compradors to fulfil their development destiny (and of its consequences) was one of the considerations helping to form the thought of more responsible Cambodians who avoided sucumbing to the obviously attractive rationalisation that what was good for them was for the good of the country. Another must certainly have been the peculiarly blatant-almost ostentatious - uselessness of the bureaucratic segment of the tertiary (service) sector in colonial and neo-colonial Cambodia : it was vastly too numerous; it was idle and corrupt, and insofar as it ever dld stir itself it was to attend to its own comforts and advancement. Even after independence, and with all the good will of Sihanouk and some of those in his service, the traditions of the old French colonial administration- somnolent and self-indulgent - persisted, while there was grafted on to it a carapace of American-influenced drive, cynicism and ruthless accumulation.

But we must start with the rural sector, in Cambodia above all. And long before intellectuals or cadres articulated it, the peasants of the country had sensed salvation from the economic blasts from outside which threatened to uproot and rot them in their retreating to subsistence, hugging the ground so to speak to avoid exposure. To evade paying taxes and incurring debts, which invariably led to disaster, the peasants adopted a variant of subsistence economy, embodying vegetable gardening, the cultivation of fruit trees, simple crafts, fishing, hunting, and general self-provisioning. Of course, granted the vicissitudes of an untamed nature, as yet untrammelled by adequate public works, and the equally capricious exactions of colonials, alien dealers, and local functionaries, even this survival strategy was all too vulnerable. The tentacles of trade, the city, local and central officials and notables kept probing into the rural honeycomb, sucking out the sustenance to be found there. Independence merely extended the scope for Cambodians of the more powerful social strata to

step up exploitation, their energies redoubled by increased power.

There were, however, others who stood on the peasant side and gave voice to their view and to their aspirations. One such was Khieu Samphan, now the President of Democratic Kampuchea. Born in 1931 of a peasant family, he succeeded in ascending the academic ladder by virtue of winning scholarships all the way up to university level in France.[29]. While the course of his political career is a matter of the greatest interest, here I wish merely to look at the economic analysis to which his own experiences and observations of Cambodian rural life led him.

He first elaborated his views in the Doctoral thesis in economics ror which he was awarded his Ph.D. degree in 1959, from the University of Paris. It is worth noting that he was a contemporary of the well-known Egyptian Marxist economist Samir Amin, whose writings have contributed greatly to the debate of the last two decades on modern imperialism and national liberation.[30]. Khieu Samphan concluded from his studies that only by self-reliance and disengagement from the international (capitalist-imperialist) economy could a backward rural country like Cambodia escape from the tortuous road to further "underdevelopment" and thus embark upon the alternative path of true autonomous national development. Naturally, this entailed dismantling the swollen tertiary ("city") sector which, from the point of view of Cambodian society as a whole, was totally unproductive and served only the foreign interests intent upon exploiting the country, accumulating and exporting economic surplus. His conclusions are worth quoting in full : [31].

> The task of industrializing Cambodia would apper above all else a prior, fundamental decision : development within the framework of international integration, that is within the framewotk of free external trade, or autonomous development. International integration has apparently erected rigid restrictions on the economic development of the country. Under the circumstances, electing to continue development within the framework of international integration means submitting to the mechanism whereby handicrafts withered away, precapitalist structure was strengthened and economic life was geared in onesided fashion to export production and hyperactive intermediary trade. Put another way, agreeing to international integration means accepting the mechanism of structural adjustment of the now underdeveloped country to the requirement's of dominant, developed economics. Accepting international Integration amounts to accepting the mechanism by which structural disequilibrium deepens, creating instability that could lead to violent upheaval if it should become intolerable for an increasingly large portion of the population. Indeed, there is already consciousness of the contradictions embodied in world market integration of the economy. *Self-conscious, autonomous development is therefore objectively necessary. (emphasis added)*

Shortly after returning to France, Khieu Samphan founded and edited a weekly paper- L'Observateur- which, until it was banned, *advocated autarkic development and economic and cultural nationalism.* It is important to note that this was in the *1950's*, allowing the revolutionaries ample occasion to elaborate their theoretical underpinnings and to consider their application to the actual circumstances of a liberated Cambodia.

Khieu Samphan was but one of a considerable number of young intellectuals who one way or another rejected the blandishments of conventional economic analysis and the promise of a "good" (i.e. lucrative and not too arduous) career. Many were, incidentally, of peasant origin, since one of the achievements of the Sihanouk period was extension of educational opportunities far beyond the circle to whom it had been available in colonial times. That there were too few jobs for them on graduation of a kind utilizing the educations they had acquired was a factor in the alienation of many from any of the factions of or aspiring to the Eastablishment (though for others it assured their adhesion to any clique- such as that led by Lon Nol-which could promise to make vacancies by removing incumbents).

Other notable Marxist scholar-politicians, both associated with Khieu Samphan, were Hu Nim and Hou Youn : all three held their Assembly seats against the rightist tidal wave in the corrupt elections of 1966; all three represented rural constituencies which they knew and nursed; and all three disappeared into the revolutionary guerrilla in 1967.[32]

In his Doctoral thesis in economics (accepted at the University of Paris in 1955), Hou Youn concludea (as paraphrashe dby Laura Summers) thus : [33]

> French-sponsored rural credit offices set up for direct assistance to peasants actually financed local usurers, merchants, large landholders and middlemen who in turn reloaned money to peasants at much higher rates. Civil servants running these offices made these official institutions more or less personal establishments for usury. Hou Yuon also reveals the distribution of profits from sales of rice exported from Saigon. (All Cambodian exports passed through Saigon until the port of Sihanoukville was was opened in 1960.) Twenty-six percent went to the producer (i. e., less than cost of production); 33.6 percent to the intermediaries (usually Chinese), 21 percent to truckers, 5 percent to mills for processing, and 14.4 percent to the government to taxes. These facts...point to the necessity of having a national credit bank which will advance loans directly to small and average producers and encourage the development of peasant-operated cooperatives.

But it is a later piece of research of his which I wish to look at more particularly here.

This is his *book Kampuchea's Peasants and the Rural Economy* (Phnom Penh, 1964) [34]. In it he develops arguments analogous to those of Khieu Samphan, on the basis of a detailed analysis of the interaction between "city" and rural sectors in the country. The flavour of the argument may be caught from this extract:

> If we consider the peasants and the consumers as flies or mosquitoes which get trapped in the web, and the merchants as the spider which spins the web, we will see that the peasants and the consumers are prey to the merchants. The commercial system, the selling and exchanging of agricultural production in our country, has these characteristics: that is, *it suppresses production, and squeezes the rural areas dry, permanently maintaining them in their poverty.* What we habitually call 'cities' or 'market towns' drain away the vitality of the rural areas. Any goods that the cities and market towns provide for the rural areas are just bait. The large rural areas feed the cities and the market towns. *The cities-the market towns with their fresh and up-to-date appearance-live at the expense of the miserable rural areas-they oppress them!* (emphases in the original)

A foot note to this paragraph explains:

> The words 'city' and 'rural' signify regions. The cities are a region containing all types of big business. The city is the focus of business activity. The rural areas are the region of the peasants. They are the focus of peasant activity. Business in the rural areas is only a branch of business activity in the cities. In this sense we can say that cities 'oppress the rural areas'. This phrase doesn't mean that 'city workers oppress poor peasants in the rural areas', or that cruel capitalists in the cities and landowning peasants in the rural areas do not oppress the workers and the poor peasants.

He concludes that "... capitalism in our country has the following important charcteristics : (1) The peasants sell cheaply and buy expensively ; (2) Buying and exchange are virtually thievery, yielding enormous profits ; (3) Cities and market towns oppress the rural areas ('The tree grows in the rural areas, but the fruit goes to the towns'). These characteristics do not support production ; they are obstacles to national economic progress."

To put the situation to rights, he argues, requires attention to two aspects : the technological and the welfare aspects,

Although the forces of production have got to be built up, it is pointless doing this if it merely enriches some big peasants and expels middle and poor peasants into the ranks of the landless "slaves". Rural problems must be solved *in the peasants' interests,* because"... to solve them without benefiting the peasants would solve nothing at all". Hou Youn recommends that the problems be tackled by means of agricultural cooperatives, which can raise capital and purchase modern machinery and other inputs without polarizing the producers into big "modern" farmers and landless labourers. He describes various possible types of cooperatives, all taking the peasant as the "key to the organisation of production". *"Unless they are organized, the peasants have no power, and do not have complete capacity to defend their standard of living. With an organization, the peasants have power, and the capacity and the opportunity to defend and build their standard of living to one of happiness and dignity".*[35] (emphasis in original). Certain cooperatives can produce means of production (tractors, tools, fertilizers, and so on) for the other cooperatives; at the time of his writing all such things had to be imported, thus making them expensive and out of the reach of all but the richest peasants, and moreover providing incomes to unproductive middlemen trading in the items. Cooperatives providing means of production cheaply to peasant organized in cooperatives, to their order and requirements, would also handle produce from cooperatives which they wished to sell, thus cutting out the middleman again and guaranteeing a fair return to the producer. Thus the peasant would buy cheaply and sell expensively, and the "thievery" of private trade would be abolished.

Hu Nim and Phouk Chhay[36] support the others in demonstrating inequality of landholding and concentration of ownership :

> Their research reveals peasants owning less than two hectares of land or 53 percent of agricultural households own only 15.83 percent of all cultivated land while the richest 4 percent of landowning families, those owning 10 or more hectares, own 21.45 percent of all cultivated land. Statistics showing landlessness are impossible to obtain but Hu Nim shows that land has been accumulated in larger holdings since 1930, indicating increasing landlessness and tenancy :

Land owned	*1930*	*1962*
Less than 5 hectares	93.70%	86.60%
Between 5 and 10 ha.	5.12%	10.40%
More than 10 ha.	1.18%	4.00%

> Partial and indirect evidence supports the thesis argued by Hu Nim and Phouk Chhay. A 1962 study of Battambang province reveals 25 percent of agricultural household heads in the province are tenant farmers... Studies of rural immigrant to Phnom Penh working as pedicab drivers and dock workers reveal many are peasants who have lost their land. Others are peasants earning supplemental income in order to keep land back in the provinces .. The rice farmer's share of both land and produce has steadily declined in recent decades reflecting both the pressures of population increase... and the inequalities of agrarian credit structures when production and living costs are steadily increasing. These circumstances are one explanation of why Koemer peasants appear to have increased consumption of substitutes for rice and meat in order to sell rice .. after 1965.

It should be emphasized that radicals like Khieu Samphan and the others were *not* "theoretical leftists". On thecontrary, they always not only stressed the importance of cadres throwing themselves into manual labour alongside the peasants, but set a personal example. They scorned material rewards and comforts, fully sharing the lives of the poor. Phnom Penh had no attractions for them, and since liberation they have continued to retain their working offices deep in the rural areas and to take their turn at field work. They thus understood and understand peasant problems infinitely better than those western scholars who now appoint themselves to pass judgement on them from afar,

3. The liberated areas, 1970-75, and planning for the food crisis of national liberation

I shall not elaborate upon the antecedents and proximate causes of the war which ensued from the fall of Sihanouk in March, 1970: everything I have read and learned subsequently serves to confirm the broad outlines of the version we gave at the time-correcting here and there in detail, to be sure, but in general amplifying and substantiating the overall thesis of American complicity.[37] What concerns us here is what happened *after* Washington had installed Lon Nol, and in particular what happened to and in these areas, which expanded rapidly until they accounted quite quickly for most of the cultivated and non-urban segment of the country, liberated by the so-called Khmer Rouge guerrilla forces.[38]

Nor shall I recapitulate here what is known about the scale of the American and American-instigated aerial bombardment of the rural areas of Kumpuchea and about the ravages of the war in general; [39] One should recall what was said above about adequate cultivation in the country-and with it "healthy and habitable" conditions – being possible only when "ordered settled agriculture" can be practiced. It is nonetheless worth recording that *between March and August 1973 alone*" ...the tonnage of American bombs dropped on Cambodia exceeded by 50 per cent the tonnage of conventional explosives dropped on Japan during World War 2". [40] Eyewitnesses have provided graphic accounts of the physical destruction wrought by the bombing - destruction calculated to impede agricultural production and to knock out of action new irrigation works laboriously constructed by the peasants. [41] Casualties were high: from February to August 1973 alone 200,000 people in the liberated areas were killed or wounded under a hail of 300,000 tons of bombs. [42] It requires no eloquence of mine to underline what all this entailed for the cadres and people locked in struggle not only to survive and overcome militarily but also to wrest an improved living from the ravaged soil.

Before attempting to assess the magnitude of the revolutionary achievement in the liberated from 1970 to 1975, it

would be as well to reiterate that what transpired in these years represented an accelerated working-out of forces long operative even if not visible to the uninitiated observer, in the country rather than a hastily-improvised response to the *coup*. Writing in 1975, Charles Meyer (a Frenchman who advised Prince Sihanouk for many years before 1970) noted: "For more than twenty years (the Cambodian revolution) germinated in the villages of the rice-growing area where, we had been told, the peasants were forever bound by their Buddhist traditions and their habit of submission to the king and his mandarins. From a Maoist point of view, the victorious Cambodian revolution is exemplary. Long before moving to action, the Marxist intellectuals were learning from the peasants. A political line was patiently worked out, rectified when circumstances demanded, and applied with a minimum of compromise, all in the context of the peasants' experience and with their participation."[43] Where the landlords, middlemen and functionaries of the traditional hierarchy (as modified by colonialism and neo-colonialism) "planted rice on the backs of the peasants'., the cadres and idealistic young people who joined them in successive waves from the anti-French war onwards lived "... very close to the people. Their first duty is to help the people when the people are constructing dikes, digging dams, building roads or houses. The Khmer Rouge in the village usually take turns to help regularly and with dedication. Also, at sowing, transplanting, harvesting and threshing, the Khmer Rouge, regularly take their turn. The peasants who are poorest receive the most help." [44]

The desire for independence, an end to foreign dominance, and re-assertion of Cambodian identity from another important strand which long pre-dates liberation. Here the submerged values which craved expression were not confined to the revolutionary camp and to the masses, for Sihanouk before he went over to the popular side and to an extent at least some of those associated with him during that period (and in particular the individuals who followed his lead in and after 1970) were responsive to the same yearning. Rejection of American aid in 1963 and the call to Cambodia to rely on its own resources, and jealous concern for the territorial integrity

of the nation (directed at both Thailand and Vietnam), can be cited in this respect.[45] Significantly, Sihanouk's hopes were frustrated by the greed of the elites - those whose conspicuous consumption in Phnom Penh derided the poverty and sacrifices of the poor, and at the same time made a mockery of Khmer culture in its slavish subservience to everything meretricious in Western material "culture". (It is worth adding the latter point, since hostile Western commentaries on Kampuchea since liberation constantly harp upon the revolutionaries, alleged desire to "wipe out a civilisation"; all reports suggest, however, that - on the contrary - one of the strongest driving forces of the revolution was the passionate desire of the people to restore traditional Khmer culture and to rescue the country from the morass of French and American influence into which it had been sucked and which had so mired it.[46])

One final preliminay point: I am not going to survey and attempt to add to such knowledge as we have of the genesis and evolution of the Communist Party of Kampuchea and of other revolutionary and left bodies and organisations which existed contemporaneously, cooperating and coalescing, "fronting" for it, or acting as its agent in one section or another of the population.[47] Such information is of very great importance, interest and relevance, of course, but I must leave its accumulation to others for the time being in order to make haste towards the objective of this paper; an examination of the broader significance of the Kampuchean revolution in the perspective of history and of the present international crisis.

Discussing the outbreak of peasant rebellion, with experienced left-wing leadership, in southern Battambang province in 1967, Ben Kiernan remarks that "... even a prairie fire needs a single initial spark, (which) the *severity* and *peculiarity* of local conditions ... seem to have provided. The first Samlaut outbreak from April to August 1967 gave the revolutionary left a strong foothold in the countryside from which they could work, and valuable experience with the peasantry upon which they were soon to capitalise. And the participation of over 4,000 villagers in the rebellion convinced many leftists in the towns that 'the people' were on the move. Increasingly they joined the maquis, bringing their talents with them.[48] Cadres

thus joining up were left no illusions or misunderstandings about the magnitude of the task confronting them, for-as Kiernan makes clear-problems of low productivity, indebtedness and landlessness were, for a variety of geographical and historical reasons, particularly acute there. As the numbers of peasants in arms and urban leftists coming over to their ranks swelled, and the extent of areas virtually in rebel hands grew, the problem of provisioning arose. In early 1968, the authorities were alarmed to uncover evidence that the rebels were able to collect and store more than ample food for their needs.[49] By February, 1968, the armed rising had spread far from Battambang-to areas where the grievances of the people here-those common to all the workers and peasants of the country.[50] The government, besides stepping up violent repression, resorted to arming urban gangs and inciting them to go out into the countryside to hunt down peasants-a move as Kiernan mentions, whose "... end result was merely to increase the isolation from and resentment of the elitist basically urban political administration, already felt by many in the rural areas".[51]

When insurrection became general in 1970, some experience in provisioning and logistics had accordingly been acquired. Peasants and cadres alike realised that rice was all. The peasants for their part were lacking in neither intelligence nor initiative and did appreciate that the rice question was at heart a question of improved irrigation. Hitherto, however, social conditions had been such that not only had they had no incentive to undertake long-term improvements in their holdings but also no institutional machinery for the mobilisation of social labour and its concerted deployment over a technically adequate area had existed.[52] Finally, the peasants knew only too well that there was no point in hoping for the government to step in on their side, however alarmed it might be by recognition that rural disaffection was now general and that that disaffection arose from precisely those grievances the right-wing elites in Phnom Penh were by now totally committed to repression and *ramassage;* we may speculate that their decision to replace elected village heads by direct government appointees in 1968 marked the point of no return for Phnom Penh - peasant relations.[53] From then on the peasant only had-and knew he only had-his own rifle and his own resources.

At least as early as 1971 the Khmer Rouge were organising peasants in the liberated zones to construct irrigation works.[54] A couple of years later, most of the Cambodian countryside was in Khmer Rouge hands. Everywhere their writ ran, the revolutionary leaders encouraged and supervised extensive irrigation projects, mobilising for this purpose the off-peak labour and the muscle-power of all able-bodied men women and young people. Irrigation made possible double-cropping, and even with American bombing and the other interferences and exigencies of war peasants in the liberated zones had had ample opportunity well before 1975 to see and experience for themselves the returns in food for the sacrifices of their labour spent on digging canals and constructing dams. (Urban dwellers re-settled from Phnom Penh in 1975 could not possibly have at once shared that outlook and it need occasion us no surprise that to begin with they required close supervision when put to work shifting earth and collecting boulders; we should bear this in mind when evaluating refugee stories, particularly those referring to the immediate post-liberation period.[55]

There are several ways of obtaining a picture of agricultural activities in the liberated areas prior to 1975. Throughout the period the "Mission du Government Royal d'Union Nationale du Combodge" (GRUNC) in Paris published a regular and detailed *Bulletin d' Information,* which frequently featured news of progress in food production. Subsequently, broadcasts from Phnom Penh and speeches and interviews given by leaders of Democratic Kampuchea have thrown further light on the intense agricultural revolution inaugurated and in part undertaken during these heroic years. Purely Western sources which are not viciously hostile and so tendentious as to be useless are few and far between. Fortunately, however, we do have one excellent source – the Hildebrand and Porter book *Camdodia: Starvation and Revolution* (Monthly Review Press, New Yook and London, 1976) – which compensates to some extent for the dereliction of the vast majority of Western scholars, "experts" and journalists reputed to have, or who themselves profess to have, an interest in Cambodia (an interest, that is, aside from being paid to read about it and to comment on it). In what follows in this section I draw heavily upon Hildebrand and Porter. But I would like to stress that their book is indispensible and should be read by everyone.

As Hildebrand and Porter stress, the revolutionaries started with a number of advantages, which may be listed here as patriotic enlistment of all social elements outraged by the US–Lon Nol putsch; the fact that the idea of Western-style private property was an alien and very recent (1888) innovation; a living tradition of cooperative rural work in such matters as irrigation construction and maintenance and communal sowing and harvesting; and, paradoxically, the sheer scale of the devastation of the countryside and dislocation of the population effected by the war itself.[56]

The first steps were to reduce rents and debts drastically; to seize and redistribute the land of pro-Lon Nol personalities; to improve poor soil by encouraging the use of animal and green manure; and to take up the slack of un-and under-used rural labour by organising cooperative work and mutual aid teams. By 1972, "groups of solidarity for increasing production" were being formed; this became the basic unit of agricultural work (replacing the family). In due course these production solidarity groups were organised into 30,000 agricultural cooperatives, as foreshadowed by a number of guerrilla leaders in their research and publications preceding outbreak of the revolution. Every effort was made to match tasks to the labour available so that no category of person was left functionless and no task was left unattended to for lack of labour. Such organisation had its reward in higher output than ever previously achieved, as even a State Department report of 1974 conceded: "As a result, production has out stripped previous individual efforts".[57]

Central to the achievement was extension of effective water control: "The overall objective was nothing less than the total transformation of the traditional agricultural cycle: by

storing water and releasing it in periods of shortage, two and even three crops a year would become possible."[58] Partly in response to the successes already scored in irrigation construction by 1972, Washington unleashed its all-out bombing assault of 1973, which went on with unrelieved intensity, employing all the most devilish devices in the American arsenal including cluster bomb units and percussion bombs, until halted by Congressional action in August. This was the period of maximum casualties, maximum damage, and maximum hardship for the people (and for the people's National Liberation Armed forces, PNLAF). When the inferno of bombing ceased, work was resumed in even higher gear, and by 1974 Khieu Samphan was able to claim that "... two rice harvests have been generalized, and the number of regions that are able to get in three harvests a year is on the increase."[59] The 1974 harvest affords us an opportunity to assess the effectiveness of Khmer Rouge rural policy, for while drought cut harvests in the few rice areas still held by Lon Nol forces to a mere fraction of normal, those in the liberated areas exceeded expectations, with two- and in some places even three- crops being successfully brought in. [60]

But a much greater test was to come: the liberation of Phnom Penh. We have seen how the three million people trapped in the besieged city had been abandoned to their own desperate devices to eke out existence in the absence of any concern for, far less any active plan for, feeding them on the part of the US- Lon Nol regime. The Khmer Rouge leaders could not afford to be so callous and cavalier in their treatment of the people. Yet the task that challenged them was an enormously daunting one. Already the war ravaged liberated areas were feeding four million plus peasant families - a number which was in process of being steadily augmented anyway and at an accelerating rate from August, 1973, onwards, both as a result of further territory being liberated and (more significantly) of people coming over voluntarily from inside the Lon Nol enclaves. In addition, the PNLAF had to be supplied with food, directly, and with arms and ammunition purchased by the export of rice (these supplies being in addition to materiel captured from the Cambodian puppet forces). On top of all

this, a substantial part of each harvest had to be put aside against the imminent reality of three million new mouths having to be fed once the capital was freed. Not surprisingly in the circumstances, the cadres "collected everything and put it in a common stock"- so that "Supplying food was... treated as a political responsibility and food was distributed according to rational principles."[61] When all existing needs had been met, the balance was allocated against the impending liberation of Phnom Penh. Each village was required to establish its collective granary, and rice stocks were moved to where they would be required; it was from these stores that the people of Phnom Penh were nourished as they fanned out from the famished city on their way to the rice fields that would sustain them from their own labours in the better times ahead. In addition, a significant dry season crop was actually being harvested as the evacuation and resettlement were taking place, despite U.S. State Department denials that such a thing could happen.[62] At the same time, care was being taken to plant light or quick rice as well as heavy or slow rice so that the first would act as a "tide over" in August and September, guaranteeing food adequacy until the main harvest became available later in the year.[63] The result was a triumph for the revolutionary forces, and an inspiration and model for all rural guerrillas - and not only for rural guerrillas, for the lessons apply equally to all involved in and responsible for feeding a population dependent upon peasant agriculture: "Contrary to official U. S. predictions, Cambodia not only did not suffer mass starvation in 1975, but at the end of the year reaped its largest rice crop ever, and this was largely due to the effectiveness of the water - control projects. Without them, Cambodia would have been in the position of begging aid from abroad or suffering food shortages and privation. With them, Cambodia, was able to nourish the additional 3 million people from Phnom Penh despite the cessation of U. S. rice deliveries. That - and not starvation - is the real Cambodian story of 1975."[64]

Hildebrand and Porter point out that the achievement was not limited to providing sufficient basic grain, remarkable enough though that was, for the variety and quality of the

diet was being simultaneously upgraded. Great emphasis was placed upon corn (maize), green beans, and bananas, so cultivated that they did not interfere with production of the "people's main strategic crop" (rice). Pig-raising, and duck and poultry keeping were likewise encouraged. Cambodia's unique fish resources were also fully exploited, some fish being eaten fresh, the rest preserved as *prahoc* (fermented fish paste). The opening of highway 3 from Kampot guaranteed salt supplies. Sugar was produced from sugar-palm trees. Chile, and citronella (lemon grass) were cultivated along roadsides. President Khieu Samphan was able to claim with dispassionate assurance in August, 1975 : "We came face to face with a thousand and one complicatad problems which we had to solve at once ... We have fundamentally solved the thousand and one problems. We have managed to supply food to both the previously liberated and newly liberated people everywhere. Of course, food is not abundant, but it is enough."[65].

The forethought, ingenuity, dedication and eventual triumph of the liberation forces in the face of extreme adversity and almost universal foreign scepticism, detachment, hostility and even outright sabotage ought to have been cause for worldwide relief and congratulation rather than the disbeiief and execration with which it was in fact greeted. But we have to understand that what the Cambodian people accomplished struck fear in the hearts of all those who at present control the "free" world's food production "business" to their own immense profit, and it is they to whom our "free" media must respond rather than to the call of truth. But if the manipulators have very good reason to distort and obscure the truth we do not. Indeed we have a clear obligation to establish and propagate it with every resource at our command.

— o —

4. Economic Development, 1975–78 and prospects

"Phnom Penh resembles a 'ghost city' ... Bills in the old Cambodian currency, the riel, were lying around the streets valueless, having landed there when the authorities blew up the state bank... All that remained of the bank was the stone portal.., There were no buses or mail or telegraph services, and only the main streets were open... Side streets and sidewalks were...blocked off, with vegetables growing on them...Phnom Penh was at least self-sufficient in food... there was only one shop in the city...".[66] So runs a composite account of the capital city of Democratic Kampuchea, as observed by the Swedish, Finnish and Danish ambassadors during a brief visit in January, 1978. On the face of it, their impressions appear to confirm the view of the new regime which most commentators in the West (including those in the Soviet bloc) hold and which they disseminate incessantly by means of the only too grateful and cooperative mass media, ranging all the way from *Reader's Digest* (circulation more than 18 million) to *Pravda* (circulation million)-namely the view that the revolutionary regime is atavistic, anachronistic, barbaric, rustic, ascetic, anarchic, cruel, irrational, and intent upon commanding a forced march back to the Dark Ages. I hope that enough has already been said to undermine such a conclusion in this and the following section (and the appendices) I attempt to complete the refutation.

I divide what follows into two periods: the first from April 1975 to roughly the end of 1976; the second from then until the present, with a comment on prospects as we can assess them from the vantage point of the present.

Despite all the exultant Western forecasts of famine and starvation to follow the alleged "bloodbaths" of liberation, the first figures for the main season harvest of 1975 were excellent, showing yields up to twice the pre-war average at over two tons per hectare, and exceptional yields of seven tons recorded where new high yield strains were already in use. [67] The total crop amounted to 3.25 million tons of paddy (2.2 of rice), permitting 250 grams of rice per meal per adult (350

for workers on the production force) - a recovery from the dark days of the late 1960's and the war to the levels recorded for the 1950's.[68] There was already sufficient rice at this stage to allow of exports to the newly-declared People's Democratic Republic of Laos to alleviate food shortages there, and by March, 1976, the Thailand National Economic and Social Board was expressing anxiety about the possible impact of Kampuchean rice exports on the Thai economy.[69]

The policies pursued by the Khmer Rouge leaders while still in the guerrilla also bore fruit in the shape of a greater diversity in the diet. Meat eating was boosted by countering Buddhist reluctance to take life and by encouraging the raising and slaughtering of livestock, particularly pigs (..."pork is alloted on the basis of one pig every two weeks for each production solidarity group of ten people"[70]).

Early visitors to liberated Kampuchea are able to corroborate what we can gather from official pronouncements. Hamad Abdul Aziz al Aiydi, a PLO representative in Peking, visited the country in February, 1976, travelling widely accompanied by leading Kampuchean figures, including Ieng Sary (Deputy Prime Minister, in charge of Foreign Affairs). In a report he wrote subsequently, he records the following impressions: "The revolutionary leaders took the initiative in evacuating the urban inhabitants to the countryside after having distributed among them all the grain on hand. Thus nobody died of hunger before the October harvest despite the multitude of acute difficulties... At the same time, the People's Liberation Army were mobilized for production... By the end of 1975 and the beginning of 1976, the government of Kampuchea was able to secure the food supply for every citizen and have a surplus. (In Feb. 1976, the government offered 50,000 tons of rice for export and sale). As a result of the successful harvest in October, the confidence of both the former and the new peasants grew as did enthusiasm to raise production and hopes to increase the per hectare yield in excess of three tons in the next harvest".[71] Former rich urban-dwellers who grumble at the unaccustomed toil are told that they can go back to the big

buildings and grand villas where they lived in the past"...but in this case they will have no rice until they die of hunger".

In February-March, 1976, the Swedish ambassador in Peking, Kaje Bjork, paid a 15-day visit. He found the Kampuchean revolution "more radical and more far-reaching than either the Chinese or the Russian revolutions",and said there were no small private plots such as those to be found in Russia, China and North Korea.[72] He added that he could find no support for refugee claims that there were still food shortages in parts of the country. Bjork, and representatives of Zambia, Egypt, Tunisia, Afghanistan and the PLO who travelled with him, had meetings with Ieng Sary, Khieu Samphan, Prince Sihanouk, and Penn Nouth (a long-time supporter of Sihanouk).

The following month, April, a Japanese journalist (Naoki Mabuchi) who crossed the border from Thailand and was detained by the authorities recorded his view that the people "all appeared to be well-fed and in good health. He concluded that photographs in Bangkok newspapers showing Kampucheans yoked to ploughs did not reflect the reality he observed of many tractors and cows in the fields. He was fed well during his captivity-thriving on a diet which was, as far as he could determine, exactly the same as that of the Kampucheans he met. A Vietnamese refugee who crossed Kampuchea from east to west in the course of February, March and April, 1976, walked about 350 miles, taking jobs in the ricefields, thus earning himself food for two or three days before moving on.He did not hear atrocity. stories until he reached Thailand: "I could not believe it. Walking across the country for two months I saw no sign of killing or mass extermination and nobody I spoke to told me of it. I still don't believe it happened."[74] This man spoke fluent Khmer, and was everywhere taken for a Kampuchean and accepted in the fields.

The Laotian newspaper *Khaosan Pathet Lao* reported on May 25, 1976, that Kampuchea had handed over the last lot, 3,000 tons, of a food present consisting of rice-made necessary by a hostile Thai gesture of closing the borders with its northern neighbour earlier in the year. Such acknowledgement cons-

titutes another kind of corroboratoin of the achievements of Democratic Kampuchea.

Another consists of refugee accounts. The general bias of these is discussed in Appendix I (below). The vast bulk emanate from rich refugees, and certainly all the ones that receive publicity in the west. Revealingly, the accounts we have from refugees of worker or peasant origin differ profoundly in point of fact and in point of interpretation. One worker who has recorded his views in exile, Peang Sophi, gives the Khmer Rouge credit for considerable skill in effecting reorganisation of production into cooperatives and in recruiting supervisory personnel.[75] He found working conditions in the fields "not especially severe" and food rations "usually sufficient" and at times "too much". On the whole he believed that "The [Khmer Rouge] theory is good". He certainly makes clear that the revolutionary regime seeks to purge the society of alien influence (such as foreign words) to restore pride in Khmer history-the converse of what the Western media have systematically been instilling in their captive Western audience.

Daspite concentration on food production and determination to survive and thrive in proud self-reliance, Democratic Kampuchea did make some provision for trade, even in the earliest days (and in addition to trade with fraternal neighbours such as Laos). The PLO visitorc ited above describes the machinery: "It is the state that shoulders full and direct responsibility for the foreign trade. Both the material income from state property and what it receives from the cooperatives through (communes exchanging surplus product with the Government) are the sources supplying Kampuchea's foreign trade. From the total production under the government disposal, a percentage is reserved for emergency use such as in natural catastrophes. The rest is exported to exchange for badly needed commodities and to acquire foreign hard currency which is also vital for the newly developing state. Kampuchea's most important export commodities are rice, rubber, wood, fish, wine and cigarettes. The needs of the country are technology and petroleum. While being anxious to improve the living conditions of its people, Kampuchea never relaxes its effort to eliminate the remnants of the old economic

system. The state is doing its utmost to achieve self-sufficiency in various aspects of economy. Imports will be very limited and nothing will be allowed to interfere with the principle of self-reliance."

It was reported in August, 1976, that Japan and Kampuchea had agreed to re-establish diplomatic links-a clear clue to trade intentions. Similarly, also in 1976, a Kampuchean trade concern was opened in Hong Kong-in the market for spare parts for machines and heavy industrial equipment, and for pharmaceuticals. US $ 450,000's worth of DDT was sold by Stauffer Chemical Co., with Washington's permission, in the same year; malaria was one of the major health problems of post-liberation Kampuchea. Rubber exports from Kampuchea were shipped to Singapore *via* Thailand. [76].

Domestic commerce – between cooperatives and between cooperatives and the state - did not give rise to money circulation: "Democratic Kampuchea sees that the safety of its economic and social plans requires the absence of local currency...Therefore, neither domestic nor foreign currency is used inside the country. This is indeed unique in the world of today, even among the socialist countries. It sounds incredible, but as far as I am concerned, I am satisfied when I compare it with the numerous diseases striking world society today as a result of running after banknotes...I was impressed by the no-money life that I enjoyed with the Kampuchea people during my visit...". [77].

Again contrary to some of the more prurient fantasies of Western *voyeurs,* such industrial concerns as could usefully be re-tooled to serve agriculture and the people were speedily recommissioned. Provision was made for these to be manned and made operative even in Phnom Penh (where rubber tyres, basic textiles, batteries, and paper were among products output of which was promptly resumed). Factories in the capital and elsewhere. revitalised, turned out hoes, sickles, threshers and pumps to promote agricultural production in large and steadily growing numbers.[78] At this time, according to Pol-Pot, the Prime Minister, there were no plans to build new

factories, instead"... we pay attention to handicraft production and to trades catering for the daily life of the people such as the weaving of textiles, towels, mosquito netting, blankets, and the making of soya sauce and fish sauce."[79]

As of 1976, various Kampuchean spokesmen summed up the situation thus; "The masses of the people even now live far better than ever before despite the destruction of the war. We do not imply there is opulence but no one goes hungry. Above all, for the first time our people feel they are the real masters of their destiny. And this is the secret of the remarkable victories on the economic front during this first year of liberation";[80] "There's more terrorism on the streets of New York than in Camdodia. No one has died of starvation since the liberation of Phnom Penh... There is sufficient rice for everybody's needs. The average ration is about a pound of rice per day";[81] "When harvest time (1975) came we obtained the necessary amount of food which, though not abundant, created favourable conditions for us to start the 1976 plan. In 1976, the situation improved. We have made special efforts to produce enough food for the people. As far as we can see, bright prospects are before us...". [82]

Now, finally, before embarking upon a theoretical appraisal of the Kampuchean "model,"[83] let us briefly bring the story as far up-to-date as possible. In the interim, numerous indications of economic progress have come to light, and visitors who have had the privilege of returning for a second post-liberation visit, such as Swedish ambassador Kaj Bjork, have been able to report visible development ("...there was more land under cultivation than in early 1976...traces of war...were still considerable, but had decreased...", he was reported as having said after his return in January, 1978 [84]). The Kampuchean authorities have themselves released more information. I have assembled this composite picture.

The cooperatives originally formed during the critical war year of 1973 in the then liberated zones cover the country, and are the basic economic, social and political units. Most have now been upgraded from village cooperatives (*Sahakor*

phum) to commune-cooperatives *(Sahakor khum)*; 20% consist of 700 to 1,000 households, 30% of 400 to 600, and 20% of 100 to 300.[85] In the cooperatives, according to the four Yugoslavian journalists who visited the country in March, 1978, life is totally communal: "Property such as bicycles, sewing machines domestic animals are held in common. . . Everything is done communally from eating (in huge communal halls) to bringing up children", Members of the cooperative receive no money; they are paid approximately a kilo (2.2 pounds of rice a day and a pair of black pyjamas a year, New wooden houses are being built in the villages. The journalists found no shortage of food in the cooperatives they visited. As foreshadowed by earlier pronoucements, the size and regularity of fields had been increased, eliminating all traces of the former haphazard jigsaw of three million fragmented pieces. Everywhere there has been enormous concentration on water control : "when there is water, the scenery is fresh, life is pleasant, humour is lively, culture is evergreen".[87] In each region, large, medium and small reservoirs have been constructed, together with several hundred kilometre of canals, and in suitable places dams have been thrown up to retain stream water; as a result of efforts in the 1977 dry season, claimed Pol Pot in his 27th September 1977 speech, an additional 400,000 hectares of farmland had been made fully irrigated at all seasons. Compared with the pre-liberation period, when-because of defective or non-existent water control[88] –only one crop a year had been possible (and even that dependent upon the vagaries of the weather), two crops a year had become general, and in some areas three crops were already being harvested. Compared with a pre-liberation average yield of round about one ton a hectare, the plan for 1978 envisages an average of 3.5, with particular parts of the country pushing much beyond this.

The prodigies of construction achieved have rested, *faute de mieux*, upon maximum mobilisation of human labour. Important in this respect, over and above the cooperatives, are the mobile brigades "The mobile brigades are composed largely on young people working in team of up to 20,000 people. The brigades travel from one construction project to another, staying in a single place only during the rainy season." [90]

Besides intense attention and effort devoted to irrigation and water conservancy and control, the productivity of agriculture has been enhanced in a variety of other ways, and its primacy has been emphasised by subordination of other sectors of the economy to its claims. In the first direction, we may note that prior to the revolution only about 10% of land in Cambodia received any fertiliser while today every cooperative makes and applies its own fertilisers (green manure, manure,compost, silt, etc.). [91] Application per hectare is rising. Effective insecticides have been prepared from poisonous plants and are applied from simple back-strapped bottles and hand-held nozzles. Seed for planting is carefully selected to promote better yields. Cooperatives have also made innovations in the tools and equipment vital to them in their work, inventing new ones and improving old ones "better suitable to the needs of the development of production", in the words of their record of achievement *Democratic Kampuchea is Moving Forward.* But although mechanical aids were becoming available, Khieu Samphan, the President, emphasised in his anniversary speech in 1977 that "The cattle and buffalo are our closest comrades-in-arms in the nation-building campaign. If our cattle work hard, we can build our country rapidly."[92]

As a result of the herculean application of people (and their draft animals), rice availability per capita was announced as 312 kilograms for the year 1977.[93] In addition, rice for export was available early in 1977 during visits to Malaysia and Singapore leng Sary had offered the two countries 100,000 tons of rice.[94] It seems certain that exports will continue and rise significantly in volume, allowing, the country, in Pol Pot's words, "...to accumulate capital to finance our national defence and reconstruction efforts".

Secondary cultivations include : corn; rubber; sugar palm; cotton; jute; coconut; sugar cane; tobacco; kapok; mulberry (for silk worms); and grass-cloth. Corn output is put at 4 tons per hectare. Rubber acreage has been increased to 100,000; yields are claimed to be among the highest in the world (and 13,000 tons of rubber were exported to China and North Korea in 1976). Cotton supplies the domestic textile industry, while jute

supplies a factory making ricebags. Fruit of many kinds(mangos, bananas, mangoustans, durians, jack fruits, ramboutans, longans, letchis, papayas, sapodillas,water-melons,citrus fruits, pineapples grape-fruits) are cultivated, and as many different vegetables (manioc, soybeans, sweet potatoes, beans, gourds, turnips, cucumbers, tommatoes, green peppers, lettuces, onions, aubergines, cabbages, spinaces, avocado-pears) : "Under the slogan 'grow, grow, grow everywhere and not to leave an inch of land', the peasants of the cooperatives of agricultural production, the workers of the trade unions, the units of the Revolutionary Army, the different organisms and services grow fruit-trees and vegetables. This movement extends all over the country. They grow in the fields, in the villages, alongside the roads, on the banks of the rivers, ponds and reservoirs, on the dikes, around the habitations, the factories and the working places, in the rural areas as in the cities where the slightest lots of land and the old empty areas have been transformed into gardens of fruit-trees and vegetables."[95] The old mansions and villas of the rich in Phom Penh were now living quarters for peasants and soldiers, the grounds also maintaining chickens and others animals.

Livestock are raised for traction and transport (oxen, buffaloes, horses and elephants) and for food and manure (pigs, chickens and ducks). Fishing is conducted collectively, in contrast with the past. Over 200 kinds of fish flourish in the fresh waters of Kampuchea, and in addition shrimps and big crayfish. "With fishes, the cooperatives make salt dry fishes, smoked fishes, fish pastes called 'Prahoc' and 'Phaak', fish sauce called 'Tuk Trei'. The wastes of fishes are used as manures for the cultures of vegetables or are transformed into fish powder for animal food. The cooperatives make by themselves different fishing tools, such as screens, dragnets, sweep-nets, bow-nets, and even boats and equipments for conserving and transporting fishes. Besides, they attach great importance to the protection and development of fishes, to the safeguard of flooded forests surrounding the Great Lakes which are favourable to fish breeding and reproduction in the high water season. Furthermore, the cooperatives develop fish breeding in the water reservoir and irrigation canals they have built. Many kinds of fishes, lobsters, shrimps, prawns, crabs

and other crustaceans as well as different shell-fishes (oysters, clams,...) lie hidden within the seacoasts of Kampuchea. .....With rice, fish is one of the main components of food of the people.....But in spite of a very important consumption, the production is well in surplus, allowing the exportation of large quantities of fresh water fishes and sea fishes, fresh or dry."[97].

The secondary sector consists of cottage industry and industry proper. The former had been well developed before the imposition of French colonialism, under which it showed the precipitous decline typical of pre-colonial industry everywhere in South East Asia under the onslaught of restrictive ordinances and unrestricted importation of Western manufactures.[98]. Today, local industry on the cooperatives caters to a whole range of needs-making tools, ploughs, harrows, carts, bucket chains, and the like, and pushing ahead into the production of winnowing machines, improved hydraulic wheels, threshing - machines, automatic choppers, of green fertilisers, power-looms, and progressively more ambitious items, registering the gradual transformation of workshops into manufactories or small factories. Cottage industry also turns out yarn, textiles, fish–sauce and soy-sauce, soap, pottery and jars, bricks and tiles, and other daily necessities.

The Kampuchean attitude to industry is best summed up in the words of Ieng Sary in a speech to the U. N. General Assembly as early as 5/9/75 : "After our total victory we extended to all Kampuchea the economic policy which had already been applied in our liberated zone.This economic policy consists of considering agriculture as the base and industry as the predominant factor. Agriculture supplies the raw materials for industry, which in turn serves to develop agriculture. Our objective is to make our country a modern agricultural and industrial country." As we saw, to begin with the victorious Khmer Rouge concentrated on resuscitating existing factories. In his 27/9/77 speech Pol Pot summed up more recent developments as follows:"In industry, our Party...adheres to the concrete conditions of the country: It pays special attention to the factories which serve agriculture and the people's livelihood. Towards this end, we have built many new factories. We have repaired

and modified existing factories which previously were dependent on foreign raw materials into factories which basically rely on local raw marerials... Our desire is to setup, consolidate and develop large, medium-sized and small industrial and handicraft networks in Phnom Penh as well as in the regions, sectors, districts and cooperatives and continuously to strengthen and expand them".

Some idea of the range of enterprises developed may be gauged from those listed and, or illustrated in *Demcratic Kampuchea is Moving Forward*. Industrial repair, construction and production is entrusted to "a new generation of men and women workers", issuing from "peasants of poor and inferior middle strata" *via* the Revolutionary Army, and organised in trade unions. The old dependence upon imported spare parts and upon foreign experts to supervise, to innovate and actually to work the more complex machines has been overcome. Working in close cooperation with the peasants, the trade unions, in refurbished and in brand new factories, turn out: new and improved equipment for hydraulic works; motor-pumps of all kinds; paddy planting machines; motor cultivators; seeders; harvesters; threshing-machines; husking-machines; winnowing-machines; and grinding machines for natural fertiliser. In addition factories produce; crepe–rubber; rubber-goods (truck and bicycle tyres, sandals, hose-pipes); jute bags; bran oil; looms; material, clothes and bedding; construction materials (cement, bricks, tiles); and household goods (utensils, pottery, earthenwares).

The small tertiary (services) sector likewise serves agricultural and is closely integrated with it (in the sense that, where possible, service workers themselves engage in food production and other agricultural pursuits). Roads and railways destroyed by the war have been rebuilt and reopened. Pochentong airport (Phnom Penh) and the seaport at Kompong Som (formerly Sihanoukville) have been reactivated. All forms of transport are pressed into service, from elephants to aeroplanes, but of course particular attention is paid to shipping of all kinds, from wooden barges to locally-manufactured all steel ships of up to 500 tons. Information is conveyed to

the people by Radio Phnom Penh, a thrice-weekly newspaper *Revolution,* and a less regular magazine.

Education, which is given high priority, is conducted in conjunction with production, in the cooperatives and factories. Pre-liberation illiteracy has been largely eliminated. Children enrol in primary schools at five years old, and are taught for two to three hours daily, the rest of the time "They are happy with driving sparrows away from the crops, tending cattle and buffalo, collecting natural fertiliser and helping to build dams and embankments and dig reservoirs and ditches according to Khieu Samphan.[99]. As education progresses, to secondary schools at the district level, work and study continue to interlock, with the latter having a major component of technical instruction (theory and technology – "in particular the technology of agriculture in the fields of rice and rubber growing, various industrial techniques and hydraulic works"); "There is as yet no college level education with the exception of medicine which is studied in hospitals in towns and in medical centres in the cooperatives.[100].

Medicine has been urgently promoted since liberation. In addition to the health problems which were a legacy from the colonial and neo-colonial periods (including drug addiction and venereal disease the new government was faced with an appalling additional legacy from the war itself-including 240,000 badly wounded people, among them 40,000 totally disabled.[101]. Heavy bombing and the ground fighting together had breached the normal restraints upon malaria, which had become rampant, particularly in the virulent forms that had appeared with the Americans in Indochina. 'Revolutionary doctors' and 'basically trained medical technicians' man a range of medical institutions, from city hospitals to clinics, and employ both traditional medicines and methods and modern: "In order to keep the masses healthy, our Party has founded the revolutionary medical crops made up of people who have undying love for the masses and a high sense of sacrifice. Medicine is produced from local ingredients found in abundance in the form of herbs and plants. Our revolutionary medical personnel deepen their medical skills while carrying out the actual work. There is a network of hospitals and pharmaceutical centres in Phnom, Penh, in the

regions, sectors, districts and cooperatives throughout the country. On an average, for 100 peasant households there is a clinic of 20 beds with three basically trained medical technicians and a shop for making herb medicines with three pharmacists. Our people's health is excellent. Various diseases, particularly the diseases handed down from the old society and diseases of addiction, have been basically wiped out. We are now concentrating on the eradication of malaria. In 1976, the first year of the four-year plan for the eradication of malaria, we have already realised 70 to 80 % of our programme objectives. We continue to strive to improve the conditions of life and health of our people, because we hope to increase our population to 15 to 20 million in the course of the next 10 years or more." [102]. "Besides, a particular importance is given to the preventive medicine and to the hygienic measures. The vaccinations against the cantagious diseases (cholera, smallpox....) are generalised and periodic. The hygienic measures have been carried out permanently. All muddy places have seen eliminated. The cattle-sheds and the animal husbandry centres are built far from housings and kept constantly clean." [103].

"Contending that the cities are breeding-grounds for parasites, the new rulers have put all their efforts into developing the countryside"; overdeveloped countries of the world as indispensable "essentials" have simply been dispensed with: television, telephones, and cars among them ("The outskirts of the city are like automobile graveyards... At Phnom Penh airport lie the remains of Lon Nol's American airplanes. Turning to rust, they are evidence... of a change in attitude toward the past and traditional values."[107]) Instead, "... Cambodians appeared to be following a strong nationalistic line with its roots in the old Khmer kingdom...".[108]

Irrational ? Perverse ? That remains to be seen.... But let us end this section with a positive assessment : "In the course of the struggle since 1970, Cambodia has developed the political consciousness of its people, begun one of the most thorough going agrarian revolutions in history, rebuilt much of the basic infrastructure necesary to a developing economy, and quickly resumed industrial production. Today it is carefully

examining foreign markets for future export earnings, for which the natural wealth of the country provides a reasonable base. In addition, Cambodia has for the first time a coherent national development plan and the organisational ability to put it into effect. The country appears confident that, in accord with (its leader's) overall aims, 'a new Cambodia that is independent, peaceful. neutral, nonaligned, prosperous, having neither rich nor poor, will certainly be built in the very near future on the beautiful land of Angkor'.''[109]

— o —

PART TWO

5. Significance of the Kampuchean Revolution in Inter-national and Historical Perspective

Those who orchestrate the chorus of vilification and scurrility against Democratic Kampuchea do not accept that they have a responsibility to let us know what they think the country might have looked like today had the Revolution been crushed; what they would do even today were they to be by some miracle vested with absolute power in Phnom Penh; and what the prospects of the country would be were either of these conditions fulfilled in contrast to the prospects that clearly open out to it now under its present revolutionary government. Yet these questions are both important and relevant, and demand answers if we are to succeed in obtaining genuine purchase and prospective upon the other kinds of questions the critics and detractors are pleased (for obvious reasons, as we shall shortly see) to prefer and are easily able (again for reasons that will become obvious) to ensure are the *only* ones ever aired in the media and, as a direct consequence, are the *only* ones ever to become the matter of widespread popular, professional and political discussion. In their default, I take it upon myself in this section, therefore, to attempt answers to the questions they themselves understandably, refuse to answer or - if pressed – answer only with reluctance and with an evasion and equivocation as revealing as anything else of the precariousness of their footing as disinterested moral champions. In doing so I hope I shall succeed in illuminating the more general aspects of the Kampuchean experience.

Now it is of cource true that there must necessarily be a considerable preponderance of speculation in tackling the issues raised by the questions listed above. But I do not think it so great a preponderance as might be supposed or such as to invalidate any conclusions here presented. We have available to us the files and the statistics, not to speak of rawer materials drawn from their human and social experiences, of all the poor third world countries that have remained within the "free world" empire.[110] There are certain common features so prevalent in the profiles of such countries that we are entitled to conclude that a Cambodia still in the

"free world" would have gone on exhibiting them too, or-if fortuitously restored to the "free world"–would again exhibit them. Nor is it mere conjecture to assume that those who would now, under different circumstances, be in power in Cambodia would be pursuing policies similar to those pursued by their kind in power everywhere. Those who, from exile, covet power do so precisely for the chance it would give them of once again inaugurating such policies. In short, a realistic appraisal of the fate of Cambodia *can* and should go beyond questions raised by the specifics of what actually happened and what actually is happening to consideration of the implications of what otherwise would have happened, and of the likely consequences of any resumption of power by those most interested in restricting discussion to the specifics, based upon our knowledge of the *general* characteristics of "free world" neo-colonial regimes.

We shall in what follows be concerned, however, with both negative and positive criteria of evaluation. By negative criteria I mean evidence that the neo-colonial way offers nothing to the people of Cambodia. By positive criteria I mean evidence that the revolution, on the other hand, opens vistas of hope not only for the people of Cambodia but also for the peoples of all other poor third world countries – and, indeed, for the peoples of the entire world. The negative crireria are of two kinds: first, evidence that "free world" neo-colonial countries are not just oppressive, unjust and grossly inegalitarian but are all without exception becoming worse in these respects and therefore hold out the promise of nothing but eventual impasse out of which the only way would appear to be revolution on the Asian pattern; and, second, evidence that thinking in this field is hopelessly confused as a result of drawing or involving false parallels with what is supposed to have been the path to what are supposed to be the good / desirable features of the good / desirable "model" societies–namely the rich capitalist overdeveloped western–style countries. [111]

The positive criteria are also of two kinds: first, evidence from other formerly poor neo-colonial Asian countries which have had revolutions comparable to that carried out in Kampuchea sufficiently long ago to afford us indications of the likely shape and course of the future three; and, second' evidence of the striking congruence between features particularly characteristic of the Kampuchean Revolution and features now appearing throughout the world in numerous guises in widely divergent circumstances, features broadly speaking antipathetic to what have been generally accepted for two or three hundred years now as indications of "progress", "modernisation" and "development", features the simultaneous independent appearance of which suggest that they reflect a deep universal underly ing shift in the whole trajectory of human history in responce to accumulation of intractable obstacles to further advance along the lines first laid down centuries ago and hitherto virtually unquestioned since-by modern Western Marxists least of all.

A number of comparative studies of alternative modes of economic development offer insights relevant to our consideration of the Cambodian case, and they of course afford both positive and negative criteria.[112]

Before going on to detailed discussion let me summarise here the case to be made. The important commodity produce by Man remains, as it always has been and always will be, food. When people have access to land and disposal of the the product of their labour they need have no fears about obtaining an adequate diet and securing a guaranteed year round supply of food. (Even natural disasters are amenable to considerable mitigation where the social structure permits and encourages cooperation among households each with securty of disposal of a normally adequate annual food stock.[113] Social scientists are currently, in fact, questioning the whole concept of "natural" disasters pointing out that in the majority of "natural" disasters it is easily-isolated *human* factors that account for the great bulk of victims and that traditional societies had far lower susceptibility to "natural" disasters than commercial ones display.[114]) Every conceivable environment from the arctic to the tropical has been made with ingenuity and patience to yield food adequacy.

There is no evidence to suggest that there has been any historical trend towards greater security of food supplies and a

better diet for the generality of the human population; on the contrary, the availabe evidence points in the other direction.[115] The fact that there has been, until comparatively recently, little concern expressed at this tendency can be explained by the illusion of security and abundance entertained by a powerful and influential minority of people, the majority of them living in the over developed rich countries or the western-style world. I say "illusion of security and abundance" because of course most people in a rich overdeveloped country like Britain would be reduced to desperate want within days were anything to interfere with the lifelines which connect them to the productive labour and edible products of the poor countries of the world.[116] Curiously, in view of the extreme vulnerability of such overdeveloped societies, and their total dependence upon the products of other societies, their pattern has often been cited as a "model" for other, poorer, societies still possessed of the capacity of self-sufficiency. More seriously, we can detect in the international system an acceleration of the trend towards food insecurity and away from popular access to land and disposal of its product. This hazardous process, which poses a grave threat to human nutrition, is most noticeable in those parts of the third world subjected to western, and in particular to American, neo-colonialism, but it is also taking place steadily in the metropolitan countries, too, including those of the Soviet bloc.

I shall document this worldwide movement, and point out that in only a handful of societies is the drift-accepted as "inevitable" and "scientific" by the majority of educated people in the overdeveloped countries and many of those they have educated or influenced in the so-called "underdeveloped" countries – being consciously combatted and a radically different policy, headed in quite different direction (back to popular access and disposal of its product), implemented. China is the best-known case, but the true *implications* of the Chinese experience are still not grasped even by many of those who are familiar with the details of their agricultural policies; some indeed, profess to see all that had been done in Chinese agriculture up to the present as but a provisional transition stage in a long march to true "modern" "scientific" agriculture along

American – pioneered lines, involving massive "transfer" (import) of "high technology".[117] There are, however, cases other than the chinese, and the Kampuchean is one of the most interesting of these. We shall see what is currently happening to some of Kampuchea's neighbours which are still subject to neo-colonial influence, and in looking at their dilemmas I shall be implicitly passing comment upon what would have happened (or would happen) to the land and people of Kampuchea had it remained an American neo-colony (or were again to become one).

Having argued that neo-colonial agricultural "development" is headed down the path to social disaster and popular hunger on a massive scale, I shall further argue that the alternative strategies pursued in Asian socialist countries are founded much more soundly and already have – as in North Korea (the Democratic People's Republic of Korea – DPRK-considerable successes to their credit, and point the direction of future developments in all parts of the world much more accurately and hopefully than American "agri-business". It will be necessary in substantiating this to dismiss the notion, often implicit in developments literature, that there is still a path open (the "second path to capitalism") to the (presumed) prosperity and security of the older capitalist countries.[118]

Finally, I shall contend that the Kampuchean policy of reducing urban population and resettling it on the land, far from being perverse and reactionary, is in line with a movement outliers of which are surfacing all over the world in forms so distinct that they are seldom seen as related and therefore seldom discussed as a significant coherent phenomenon with a common rationale-a rationale, moreover, which has evolved in response to objective socio-economic challenges for which orthodox thinking-whether of right or left-has no answers.

In the first part of what follows I owe a great debt of gratitude to the recent work *Food First-Beyond the Myth of Scarcity* by Frances Moore Lappe and Joseph Collins (Houghton Mifflin, boston, 1977), for although I had already drafted the argument for this paper I found in it countless detailed

illustrations of particular points I wished to make. Since I obviously cannot do more than skim a small part of the riches of the book I strongly recommend that it be read as a whole; I believe it helps considerably to put the Kampuchean Revolution in context.

One of the most difficult obstacles to understanding which people brought up and educated in the West, or brought up elsewhere but subjected to Western-style education, have to overcome is the often unexamined premise that "modern" ways of doing things are invariably an improvement upon ways with a longer history. This is of course, merely one manifestation of the broader assumption of "progress". I have already suggested above that there is no evidence of sustained progress historically in the direction of obtaining greater security of food supplies from year to year for the world's population such that all are enabled to enjoy an adequate diet. Two elements have to be taken into account: social arrangements with respect to access to land and technical methods of production. To take the former first, it is self-evident that never before in history has such a small proportion of people worldwise, in rich countries and in poor, had access to land for growing food; this is in itself is far and away the major reason why there is hunger on a wider scale in the world today than ever before: "People will escape from hunger only when policies are pursued that allow them to grow food and to eat the food they grow". [119]. In the rich countries and the neo-colonial "free world" countries the trend is strongly away from allowing people to grow and to eat their own food. The confusion of this process – of a shrinking of the primary sector – with progress arose only because for a handful of rich countries it was temporarily possible to "export" the primary sector by overseas expansion and imperialism and to feed the metropolitan population on the proceeds. For those in the subject countries expropriation of their primary sectors meant impoverishment, and this can *only* be overcome by their resuming control and producing for their own consumption. This, in turn inevitably entails reversal of the historic decline of the primary sector in the industrialised countries, too.

Hard though this logic may be for some to swallow, questioning the *technical* superiority of "modern" "scientific" Western ways of doing things sticks in even more throats. Yet, time and time again, when we're dealing with agriculture, we are driven inescapably to the conclusion that the assumption of "progress" is just as insecurely founded as it is in the case of confusing hypertrophy of the secondary and tertiary sectors with "progress". Some Western "experts" have been humble enough to acquire understanding and wisdom through experience with peasant agriculture, but it is not to be thought that a majority will ever do so, for the majority are employed precisely, whether by food corporations directly, of by the ostensibly inter-governmental international agencies such as the U.N. Food and Agricultural Organisation which have-in effect-become pressure groups for the giant food corporations,[121]. to "sell" agri-business and thus to ensure the profits of the corporations. The whole history of the Green Revolution-but one of several case studies that could be taken-testifies to the pseudo-"efficiency" of "scientific" as opposed to traditional agriculture.[122]. Not that the spuriousness of many scientific claims should come as any great surprise in the sphere of agriculture, to the mastery of which human intelligence has been most seriously applied for thousands of years-thousands of years during which, whatever else has occurred, human intelligence has not improved; in any case, the peasant whose livelihood and in the extreme case his life depend upon his insight and skill is less likely to take chances and make mistakes than a white-coated laboratory assistant who goes home after work to eat food bought with his guaranteed salary from the local supermarket. Lappe and Collins give a number of telling specific examples of the brushing aside of peasant wisdom and experience in the haste to apply profitable "scientific" agricultural methods,[123]. but there is an important general point that should be made in this connection.

The efficiency of a given system of agriculture can be measured in a number of ways. Defenders of Western-style agri-business naturally use economic criteria that show their performance in the best light, and leading the way. In particular, they emphasise productivity per farm labourer (field

worker) employed, where obviously mechanised agriculture has the advantage, measured by the value of output per man engaged in producing it, for it is precisely to substitute for human labour that mechanisation has been resorted to. But even on their chosen ground, their case is weaker than they suppose or at least admit. For a start, with modern agri-business it is grossly misleading to isolate only the actual farm labourer as producer of the output, for between the field worker and the consumer there are many others whose labour is equally necessary to bring the product to the table (lorry drivers, workers in packaging factories, assistants in supermarkets, oil miners merchant seamen, and many, many more); when allowance has been made for all those intermediate and ancillary employees, the achievement diminishes markedly in impressiveness. Again, we must always bear in mind that the *ultimate* test of the efficiency of an agricultural system must embody as one of its essential criteria the satisfaction of consumers of its products in the system, and there are many cases of modern agri-businesses with high value output per man employed which contribute *nothing* to feeding those put out of employment by mechanisation (and little, be it said, to those employed on the machines) this commonly being the case in poor third world countries where big corporations take land formerly used for subsistence production and convert it to mechanised production of luxury crops for export; Lappe and Collins once more give several striking examples[124].

But we should be chary of accepting the yardstick chosen by agri-business in the first place. When one shifts the criterion to production *per unit of land* (rather than per employee) a very different picture emerges: "Small farms, even very small farms, of less than an acre, have proved to be more productive per acre than larger farms in every part of the world...".[125] It is obviously sensible, where population is abundant in relation to land, to measure productivity per acre, and"...increasing productivity per acre is often not a matter of a 'modern' machine but of intensive and careful farming by people who have a living stake in the production. According to an International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) study of lowland rice farming, there is no significant difference in yields between farms using a tractor and those

using a buffalo. Even more striking was the conclusion that in Japan, in 1960, highly mechanised farms had no higher yields than those farmed with a hoe."[126] (It is worth mentioning, for those enamoured of the miracles of modern scientific agriculture that the world average yield of paddy has not shown significant improvement over the past fifty years[127]) But there is one measure of agricultural efficiency which stands on its own for unambiguity and finality: the measure of energy produced (in the form of human food [output] for energy consumed (in the form of human labour, mechanical power, fertiliser, etc.) [input]: using this footrule, the idea that there has been "progress" historically simply evaporates. Since it is crucial to understand what is at stake here to follow the rest of the argument it is worth devoting a few moments to the matter.

Human beings derive their energy from food. Food is made available thanks to the ability of plants to convert solar electromagnetic energy into chemical energy. When Man was restricted, or restricted himself, to the original carrying capacity of the soil-hunting and gathering what naturally flourished around him-population densities and numbers had to be low, but the energy put into securing enough food was also low compared with the energy derived from its consumption. It has been calculated, for instance, that the energy efficiency of hunting/gathering by Kung bushmen in the Kalahari is 7.8 (energy out/energy in); for comparison, the energy efficiency of U K milk production (Friesians) is 0.374.[128] As human numbers grew, however, it became essential to raise off-take (yields) per unit area of available land. This could only be done by stepping up the energy *input*. This was achieved by resorting to settled agriculture, the one system at the level of technology accessible, capable of sustaining substantial numbers of people over prolonged periods without intermission from a limited area of land. But settled agriculture is energy-expensive, in that a great deal of human energy (and the energy of drought animals supplied in some part with food grown for the purpose by their human owners[129]) is needed in preparation of the fields, in planting them, in keeping them free of weeds, and in bringing in the harvest-not to speak of the energy expended in threshing, milling and cooking the resulting grain (and taking for granted

the energy-demanding need for settled housing, ploughs and other tools, cooking utensils and the like).

World population was enabled to grow over the period from the inauguration of settled agriculture by geographical extension of the technique until most parts of the globe suitable for its introduction and maintenance had been colonised. It is noticeble that large areas – such as Australia and North America – nontheless remained sparsely settled, primarily by hunter - gatherers. This is to be explained mainly by the absence or paucity of indigenous leguminous (air-nitrogen-fixing) plants. Even in more favoured areas, such as the western seaboard of the Euro-Asian land mass, agricultural development was stalled until means were found of deliberately sowing leguminous plants, in order to make possible the raising of crop yields generally. The great breakthrough in the key British Agrarian Revolution was the introduction and mastering of "Dutch" clover (introduced from Flanders towards the middle of the 17th century [130].).

At this point we must draw the distinction between food and food *stuffs.* The first category consists of those protein-rich nutriments available for human consumption such as many meats and some plants, notably the leguminous group including peas, beans, and lentils, and also-though mainly indirectly via grazing livestock - the clovers and alfalfa (lucerne). The second includes the cereals, root crops, sugar, oils and fat. The latter by themselves cannot sustain life, and it is the leguminous crops that are at the core of all self-sufficient agricultural systems (that is, agricultural systems independent of imports and capable of growing all the food required by resident population).

Now the enormous rise in the world's population, and in the living standards of a minority of it, since the British Industrial Revolution (itself dependent upon the preceding and accompanying agricultural revolution), was made possible by greatly raising food production. This in turn was made possible by applying to food production stored carbon (i. e. the fossil fuels) in a great variety of ways, ranging from the direct (such as using coal and oil as the raw materials for fertilisers) to the indirect (such as replacing draught animals by tractors,

trucks, trains and steamships*)*. The need to do so arose, at the most basic level, from the following circumstance. By extending the role of leguminous plants in agriculture, farmers increased the natural capture and utilisation of air nitrogen and thereby the production of protein. But the additional *bulk* of the food take-off was not, and could not be, provided by the additionally harnessed nitrogen; it had to come from soil the nutrients of which had been correspondingly and proportionally supplemented by deliberate application of phosphate, sulphate, calcium and a variety of trace elements. None of these could be made available without expenditure of the fossil fuels. Leaving aside the use of coal and oil in transportation and other auxiliary roles, the key consideration to grasp is that-in order to maintain the carbon/ nitrogen (C/N) ratio- as nitrogen input, via the leguminous plants, went up so too had the input, of carbon via fossil-fuel based fertilisers. (The opening-up of Australia and North America were eventually made possible by introducing leguminous plants and by transforming the soil through importation and application in bulk of several additives - a form of necessary therapy which continues.)

Since the fossil fuels are in finite supply, there have been numerous attempts to demonstrate that alternatives exist. This *may* be true with respect to supplying energy for machines (though it appears increasingly unlikely); it is certainly *not* true with respect to supplying energy for human beings. To be sure, air nitrogen can be fixed by man-devised mechanical processes, but the cost in fuel is high. The needed electricity might in time be supplied by nuclear power plants, but even these incur a fossil fuel cost in construction and maintenance. [131]. There is a more fundamental objection. It is the non-leguminous plants which utilise air fixed nitrogenous fertiliser (the legumes having no need for it), and they do so to manufacture more starch, sugar and fat – not protein - and only when the nitrogenous fertiliser is supplemented by earthy substances embodying sulpher (which is, in some respects, a fuel itself, and is in any case oblained for agricultural purposes by using carbonaceous fuel) and calcium.

We can now say something about the distinction between "economic" and "energetic' efficiencies. *Economic* efficiency is measured by the monetary value of the output per unit of input (land, labour or capital); *energetic* efficiency is measured, on the other hand, by relating the out put in terms of the energy produced to the input of energy used. In the former case, the higher the (value) output per unit of factor employed the greater the economic efficiency; in the latter case, since output can never be greater that input (because of the Entropy Law), efficiency is measured by the closeness of input to output. But in practice we expect some energy inputs-such as solar radiation-as free goods, and we may then measure energy efficiency by comparing fossil fuel and/or food input against output. To illustrate the disparity in the two measuring systems let me give an example. British agriculture is, in economic terms, one of the most efficient in the world, giving excellent yields per man employed and per acre farmed. But when we examine it from the energetic point of view a very different picture emerges. For British agriculture as a whole, calculations (1968) suggest an energy efficiency (energy output, energy input) overall for unprocessed produce of 0.34, and for processed of 0.20 - or, to put it another way, for every 100 units of energy that go into the system something between 20 and 34 units of energy can finally be obtained as food energy. In contrast, the energy efficiency of shifting rice cultivation carried out by Dyaks and Ibans in Borneo is between 14.2 and 18.2 – that is, for every 100 units of energy that go into the system something between 1,420 and 1,820 units of food energy result.

What has all this to do with Cambodia and the revolution there? Put simply, we may say that - properly viewed - there was *no alternative* to carrying through a total redemployment of population and its resettlement on the land, quite apart, that is, from the immediate pressures of feeding the millions liberated in the urban enclaves. In the short term there were no exports-whether primary commodities or manufactures - which could be speedily built up and relied upon to sell in sufficient quantity and at adequate prices to guarantee commercial purchase of

the needed food; the "aid" avenue had been rejected as unacceptable on the grounds of perpetuating dependence and threatening freedom of action in defining and implementing domestic programmes for the future. In the middle term, the need to give priority to an export sector upon which all else hinged would have fatally interfered with the perceived need to start at once laying a sound subsistence agricultural base, *from which in due course* exports in excess of home requirements would become naturally available: *"With food self-reliance, trade become an organic outgrowth of development, not the fragile hinge on which survival hangs.* Agricultural exports should come only after the agricultural resources are in the hands of people first meeting their own needs. Only after food production has been diversified and people are feeding themselves can food trade play a positive-role. Clearly no country can hope to 'win' in the game of international trade...as long as its very survival depends on selling one or two products every year. A country simply cannot hold out for just prices for its exports if it is desperate for foreign exchange with which to import food. Once the basic needs are met, however, trade can become a healthy extension of *domestic need* instead of being strictly determined by *foreign demand.*"[132]. Any attempt to build up manufactured exports would pose insuperable domestic problems, and besides would be otiose in a world of creeping protectionism; "It is too soon to tell how far or how fast protectionism will develop, or whether it will eventually lead to a fragmentation of world trade into a new system of trade and currency blocs. *One thing seems clear, however; those Third World countries that are counting for salvation on an expansion of industrial exports to lhe advanced capitalist world are doomed to disappointment.*"[133]. In the long term, the problems of underdevelopment cannot be solved without *"general disengagement from the international capitalist system"*[134]. as I argue below, and this disengagement, to return to the starting point, can best be effected surgically at an appropriately traumatic moment such as that offered to the Kampuchean leaders by the rout, collapse and flight of American power in the early months of 1975.

Lappe and Collins devote much space to documenting the *cul de sac* which confronts third world countries who opt or are enticed down the road to commercial agricultural "development". Let me extract a few illustrations before saying something about Kampuchea's neighbours in particular. "Africa is a net *exporter* of barley. beans, peanuts, fresh vegetables, and cattle (not to mention luxury crop exports such as coffee and cocoa), yet it has a higher incidence of protein-calorie malnutrition among young children than any other continent. In Mali, peanut exports to France increased notably during the years of drought while production of food for domestic consumption declined by 1974 to one quarter of what it had been in 1967. Mexico now supplies the United States with over one half of its supply of several winter and early spring vegetables while infant deaths associated with poor nutrition are common. Half of Central America's agricultural land produces food for export while in several of its countries the poorest 50 percent of the population eat only half of the necessary protein. (The richest 5 percent, on the other hand, consume two to three times more than is needed.)"[135]. "Once it is manipulated by people, nature loses its neutrality. Elite research institutes will produce seeds that work perfectly well for a privileged class of commercial farmers. Genetic research that involves ordinary farmers themselves will produce seeds that are useful to them. A new seed, then, is like any other technological development; its contribution to social progress depends entirely on who develops it and who controls it."[136]. "Fewer and fewer people control more and more of farm production. A pattern of increasing monopolization of agricultural land moves ahead in India, Bangladesh Mexico, the Philippines, Colombia-in virtually all countries where officially subsidized 'modernization' now means that high returns stem from the sheer amount of land one can control not from how well one farms...As control of land tightens and more tenants are evicted, the number of landless labourers mounts. *In all nonsocialist underdeveloped countries 30 to 60 percent of rural adult males are now landless.*[137].

"In country after country, where agricultural resources are allowed to be sources of private wealth, the drive to increase food production has made even worse the lives of the poor

majority, despite per capita producton increases...Land values go up, forcing tenants and small farmers off the land. Rents increase. Payments in money become the rule, yet money buys less food. The control of farmland becomes concentrated in fewer hands, many of whom are speculative entrepreneurs, not farmers. Even communal lands ... are appropriated by powerfull individuals such as chieftains or caciques for their private gain at the expense of the welfare of the community. Corporate control, often foreign, extends further into production. Peasants are trapped into debt bondage. Poverty and inequality deepen. Production totals, not the participation of the rural population in the production process (livelihood and nourishment), become the measure of success for agricultural planners. Quantity and market values, not nutritive value, become the goal of agricultural planing ... much of the foreign exchange earned ultimately gets spent on (the) food and consumer 'needs' (of the small class of better-off urban dwellers). Zaire is a typical example. There, export agriculture has led to the decline of food production to such an extent that 30 percent of Zaire's foreign exchange now goes to buy imported foodstuffs. The staple foods of the people are in very short supply, but imported meat is still available for those who can pay... The Dominican Republic is another case in point, In 1974, the very year that the world price of its export commodity, sugar, soared 400 percent, the Dominican, Republic came close to a trade deficit because export earnings from sugar were squandered on luxury items for the small urban elite."[138]. "Over half of the 40 countries on the United Nations list of those most seriously affected by the food crisis of the 1970s depend on agricultural exports for at least 80 percent of their export earnings."[139].

Diets "...evolving independently in different parts of the world had a common, nutritionally sound base. Combining corn and beans in Mexico, or rice and lentils in India, or rice and soyabean products in Japan, was no accident. These combinations created more biologically usable protein than is the diet centered on only one food. When eaten together, the two foods, because of contrasting amino acid patterns (the building blocks of protein), make up for each other's weaknesses. Thus, if

Green Revolution grain displaces legumes in the traditional diet, not only does the overall protein intake fall, since legumes have two to four times the protein content of grain, but just as critical, the *balanced combination* of grains and legumes that improves the biological usability of protein is also undercut, Yet cropland planted in legumes continues to shrink. Since the early 1960's the legume acreage in India alone has declined by two and a half million acres...Between 1956 and 1971 the average daily consumption in India of legumes declined by about 31 percent. On Java, the cultivation of soybeans, virtually the highest protein food in the word, is giving way to the government's promotion of Green Revolution rice and its enforcement of mandatory sugar quotas... (the knowledge embodied in the Green Revolution would have been discovered without the sponsorship of the research by the Ford and Rockefeller foundations, but their sponsorship forced a particular *choice* of direction:)...It was a choice to come up with seeds that produce high yields under optimum conditions. It was a choice *not* to start by developing seeds better able to with stand drought or pests. It was a choice *not* to concentrate on improving traditional methods of increasing yields, such as mixed cropping. It was a choice *not* todevelop technology that was productive, labour-intensive, and independent of foreign input supplly. It was a choice *not* to concentrate on reinforcing the balanced, traditional diet of grain plus legumes...our fascination wlth science prevented us from tackling the incomparably more difficult problems of social organisation and the agricultural practices of real farmers. For the majority who are hungry, 'miracle' seeds are meaningless without secure access to land, water, tools, storage, and a market. What the Green Revolution has taught us is that the problem of world hunger will not be solved in any research institute." [140].

Throughout the "free world" portion of the Afro-Asian-Latin American world the statistics tell an unambiguous and unarguable story of rural impoverishment and nutritional deterioration : of more and more peasants severed from all connection with the land; of the gross underpayment and maltreatment of poor labourers; of the alienation of land to big landowners and foreign corporations (and of their exemption from in any case phony and fraudulent 'land reform' measure); of uncontrolled urbanisation and "slumification"; of growing inequalities economically between rich and poor (inequalities greater than anything ever experienced until recently in the entire history of the presently developed countries, and bereft of even the threadbare "justification" of making a high rate of saving possible[141].) But there is another important point which we have to note and stress : all this might, at a stretch, be tolerated if, somehow, it was going to lead *ultimately* to Western-style prosperity-*and if that prosperity itself included as one of its boons the much-vaunted "freedom from hunger".* But it does not do so. Let me substantiate this point before going on to deal with the more general fallacy embodied in the idea of a "second path to capitalism" later in this section.

In the United States after over two hundred years of "development" "... there are still over 20 million malnourished Americans . (and...the income of the poor in America is declining. According to the Department of Commerce, the number of poor Americans increased by 2.5 million in 1975 alone to total 26 million now...A 1972 Labor Department study reveals' a slow but persistent trend towards inequality' in the United States for the period 1958-1970. The poorest 20 percent of the country receives only 7 percent of all income whereas the wealthiest 20 percent rec›ives almost 60 percent of all income... in the United States over the last twenty years 1900 farms, most of them small, have gone out of business *each week*, largely under the weight of the ever more pervasive big business control of our food system ..in the United States the largest 5.5 percent of all farms operate over half of all farmland while the bottom 40 percent of all farms operate only 4.5 percent... the question is whether the United States has a model that could *ever* ... (serve) for the hungry countries. If the U.S. model of development is not achieving these ends at home, how can we expect it to work abroad?."[142]. To complete this case it should be added that "Contrary to popular notions, the industrial countries are the major food importers; not the underdeveloped countries. In 1974, the United States ranked third among the world's leading food importers, close behind Japan and West Germany. And over two-thirds of our imports come from underdeveloped countries."[143]. The U.S. exports

food "(largely destined to satisfy the increasing taste for meat of the world's well-fed) when millions of Americans are undernourished(.) The Select Committee on Nutrition andHuman¡Needs of the United States Senate found that recently rising food costs have produced 'statistically significant declines' in per capita consumption of protein and many essential vitamins and minerals. Nutritionists testified before the same committee that it is not possible to obtain a balanced diet on food stamps-yet over 20 million Americans must rely on the Food Stamp Program."[144]

But perhaps it may be thought more appropriate and convincing were we to seek parallels closer home as far as Kampuchea is concerned. Where better to start, than the Philippines? The Americans have had a free hand there now (in 1978) for 80 years to experimeat with their "model" for "developing" a poor third world country. What is there to show for this controlled case study? Is the Republic of the Philippines such that other poor third world countries are overcome withe admiration and envy, queuing up themselves for the privilege of becoming American colonies so that they too might enjoy the blessings and benefits of the American "model" of economic development for poor countries? Far from it: and for good reason, for the Philippines is one of the poorest and most dependent countries in the third world today.

The top 100 corporations in the Philippines accounted for one-third of national GNP in 1974; of the 100, more than half were directly controlled by fcreign interests, while most of the rest were in the hands of the Marcos oligalchy.[145] The 1973 Marcos Constitution virtually underwrote an "open door" guarantee for foreign investors for the foreseeable future; it"... blurs the definitlon of public agricultural lands by new classifications, to the extent that there are now nolands specifically reserved for Filipino nationals, Even worse, by means of presidential decrees and letters of instruction, the country's natural resources have been served up on a silver platter to the multinational corporations...The ban on foreign investments in rice and corn industrids has been lifted...Foreign investment is also allowed in commercial banking... This type of banking

for formerly available only to Filipinos... In other areas, the nationality requirement (formerly 60% Filipino ownership) has been reduced or totally dispensed with... Marcos has also overturned the 'anti-dummy' law and the Supreme Court's ruling whtch formerly restricted foreign representation on the board of directors of Philippine companies. He has also sanctioned the unrestricted repatriation of US dollars out of the country through a central bank circular allowing up to 100% profit remittances by US multinationals... And, most important... Marcos has also guaranteed that there will be no expropriation of foreign businesses while he is president."[146]

One example of buccaneering exploitation of the openings made for the foreign investor serves to illustrate some of the themes raised by Lappe and Collins : "...a recent Presidential Decree requiring all companies with 500 or more employees to provide rice for their own workers has given an excuse for large American firms to buy up huge rice plantations, for in excess of their needs. Stanfilco (Castle & Cook) has recently been reported to have bought a 1,300 hectare rice farm in eastern Mindanao, and is producing a *surpius* of around 13.5 million kilograms of rice per year *beyond* what is needed for its own employees... the land purchase has also contributed significantly to unemployment. Whereas rice production in the Philippines is normally labor intensive, requring several persons per hectare, Stanfilco's farm is fully mechanised and is operated by only 100 workers, one worker per 13 hectares!"[147] It should be added that official statistics show that over 40% of the work force is either unemployed, underemployed or partially employed.

With the economy in the hands of multinational corporations whose employment needs are disproportionately small, unemployment is a major problem in both rural and urban sectors. Inflation further compounds the problem for the masses of the people. The end result is a picture of poverty unrelieved by indications of imminent or even eventual alleviation : "Since, 1972 the consumer price index has risen by almost 80 pelcent and workers in industrial establishments in

the Greater Manila area have seen their *real wages* drop by an astonishing 40 percent between 1972 and 1974 and by over 55 percent between 1969 and 1974... Rural income distribution has deteriorated faster than in urban areas. Between 1957 and 1971, the income share of the poorest 20 per cent of rural families declined from 7 per cent to an abysmally low 4,4 per cent, The richest 20 per cent of rural families, on the other hand, increased their share from 46,1 per cent to 51 per cent in the same period. In 1971, about half of all rural families had incomes below that required to provide adequate nutrition and other essentials of life. Of all the families in the Philippines with less than minimum needs budget, over 80 per cent are in the rural areas. Per capita consumption of rice, the Filipino peoples, staple, food went down from 89.5 Kilograms in 1965 to 70.8 Kilograms in 1973, Total consumption of meat, poultry and fish has also decreased. The caloric intake of the poorest families is estimated at oniy 88 per cent adequacy while that of the richest surpasses adequacy by 25 per cent.''[148] (For comparative data on South East Asian diets see Appendix III.)

Lest it be thought that these conditions are compensated for by the existence of democratic freedoms and the absence of political and social violence, it ought to be stressed that hand in hand with pauperisation of the mass of the people and alienation of national resources has gone the imposition of a domestic policy of repression and terror. Since Marcos seized power in 1972, the strength of the military has been steeply increased, the number cf political prisoners multiplied severai times, locally elected officials replaced by regime appointees, the judiciary and media curbed, all-out war waged agalnst dissenters, corruption allowed to flourish right up to and including (notably) the President's own family and entourage, and private hoodlumism condoned in defence of the riches and privileges of elite. In response, the New people's Army, military wing of the reconstituted Communjst Party of the Philippines (CPP), is waging pepole's war throughout the archipelago, and implementing its revolutionary land reform programme in graduated stages in accordance with its strength from place to place.[149] It is unrealistic to

suppose that Marcos, or anyone else representing the Social class precariously perched on the pennacle of the pyramid, can long survive accelerating social polarisation, American support not withstanding.

Only considerations of space inhibit extended discussion not only of the Philippines case but also of others which might be adduced, and notably the case of Indonesia where, since the Suharto *coup* of 1965-66 (carried out with American blessing and connivance), U. S. military and economic planners have had an opportunity again to put their development ideas unhindered into practice. For want of space here, I restrict myself to drawing attention to relevant recent work. But it is important to look at another example: Malaysia. Malaysia is considered one of the great success stories of third world development in the "free world", and we ought, therefore, to appraise it.

The third Malayasia plan (1976-80) states that 68.3% of Malaysia agricultural households live below the poverty line-that is, their income in cash and kind is insufficient for "minimum subsistence"; the great majority of these rural poor are agricultural labourers, small farmers, and plantation workers. About 60% of all farmers rent some or all of the land that they cultivate. Rents are high, and competition for going holdings fierce – much land is reserved for foreign corporations and the Malay aristocracy. Introduction of higher - yielding varieties of rice have brought benefit principally to owners of land, not to the tenant majority; whose rents are merely adjusted to mop up whatever increase in annual production the "green revolution" (and double - cropping) may have made possible. Official figures demonstrate that between 1957/58 (when Malaysia became independent) and 1970 income distribution actually became more skewed, with the share of the most prosperous 20% of households going up from 49.3% to 55% while that of the poorest 20% slumped from 5.8% to 4.0%.[152] Unemployment has been estimated at from 750,000 to 1,000,000.[153] Occasional incidents that reach the world's press - such as the Hamid Tuah - led land seizures in Bangalore in 1969 and the Baling peasant riots in Kedah in 1974 (protest-

ing near - famine conditions in the "rice bowl of Malaysia") - reveal the reality behind the myth. [154]

Malaysia provides a paradigm of the Lappe and Collins thesis: "Several years ago the government of Malaysia, in one of the most ambitious settlement schemes ever undertaken in Asia, transformed hundreds of thousands of acres of jungle into new settlements growing oil palm and rubber for export. It seemed to work. The settlers were able to improve their homes, buy some consumer items. and even save for their children's education. Then, in 1974, the entire situation changed. Recession in the industrial countries sent the price of rubber and palm oil plummeting. With no alternative crop to rely on, settlers' incomes also dropped sharply. Today none of the newly cleared land is being settled. A member of the Malaysian parliament observed that: 'All our land - development eggs have been put in two baskets - rubber and palm oil. There is no diversification, we grow too little of our own food. Everythying is for cash, and when the world prices that we do not control drop, it is our people who suffer'," [155]

Again, in corroboration of the *Food First* diagnosis, the 1977-78 rice crop disaster in Malaysia has been attributed to the following familiar factors: inadequate water control provision: hasty introduction of HYV ('miracle') rice; and the landlessness of the majority of peasant farmers. "Ironically," notes a commentator; "it is the government's introduction of HYV rice that has partly contributed to the abandonment of the off - season crop. The HYV rice...will produce high yields only under ideal conditions. Unlike the hardy traditional rice, which has evolved through thousands of years of natural selection, HYV rice is a delicate plant that is very vulnerable to disease and requires a lot of nutrients and water. The absence of an essential element e. g. optimum irrigation, may cause HYV rice to produce even less grain than traditional varieties. The introduction of HYV rice to Malaysia...in the sixties - the 'Green Revolution' - was intended by the World Bank and the local ruling elite to stave off the 'Red' (i. e. communist led) Revolution by increasing rural productivity and thereby incomes without the need to undertake land reform, which has been

strongly resisted by big land - owning interests entrenched in the government. However, without land reform, the root cause of peasant poverty - land hunger arising from unequal distribution of land - still remains. In fact, the present crisis will throw this root problem of tenant farmers into clearer perspective...the padi crop disaster will push afflicted farmers, especially poor farmers, even deeper into the clutches of rural moneylenders...Soon he will be borrowing money to repay the interest on his original loan, and before long his 'credit worthiness' runs out with the result that he has to sell his farm to repay his debts. He then joins the *approximately 10,000 families made landless every year.*" [156].

In these circumstances, figures of per capita GNP - and Malaysia (at US $ 680 per capita in 1974) has the second highest figure in South East Asia - are really unhelpful at best, meaningless at worst. Malaya under the British was set firmly on the way of dependence and integration in the world economy. [157] No real effort was made to encourage food self-sufficiency - energy and expenditure was concentrated on the plantation and mining sectors. Only the inter - war depression directed attention to the illogicality and danger of relying upon imported rice when the potential existed for self - reliance, given appropriate policies. During the war, a vast "squatter" problem built up as unemployed labourers migrated to the jungle fringes, cleared land, and adapted themselves to the life of subsistence farmers. It is highly significant that after the war the British government, returning to re-occupy the country in order to exploit the rubber and tin, was forced to use military strong-arm tactics to round up and incarcerate these people in order to compel them to work again for bare wages. The Malayan Communist Party (MCP) had immense support from the Malayan masses immediately after the war, and after reversals in the 1950's has come back strongly so that today it again challenges the authorities and their foreign backers. It is inconceivable that in the confrontations ahead the MCP should fail to consolidate steadily among the growing majority of impoverished rural and urban workers taunted by the luxury of the elites self – nominated to rule them,

Geography dictates that what happens in *Thailand* will have a decisive influence at least upon the *pace* of revolutionary develpoments in Malaya. Thailand, of course, shares a border with Kampuchea, and with Laos, and the evolution of the struggle of the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) is in turn closely tied up with the solidarity of their parties with its own. As we have recently publlshed an extensive analysis of the situation in Thailand -economic and military-strategic-we will content ourselves here with the observation that class struggle and social polarisation have already passed the critical point there; the outcome is certain, even if the timing is not. [158]. But It should be said that Thailand from the 1950's was yet another test case of the American "model", and from its experience we ought not to hesitate in drawing wider conclusions about regional prospects.

The argument of the last few pages, condensed though it has had to be, suggests strongly that Kampuchea's South East Asian neighbours are-each in its own fashion-caught in the same *kind* of dilemma, call it what you will, as came to a head in Kampuchea in the late 1960's and early 1970's. However "efficient" and "modern" their governments and eilte sectors appear to be, the further they go along the path of "development" upon which they have embarked the more irresolvable and insoluble become the problems afflicting the majority of their urban and rural peoples. Unable to take the steps which alone would begin redressing the gross inequalities and injustices of their societies, these governments have no option but to resort ever more severe and arbitrary repression, and to call more and more upon the financial and military support of the imperialist powers, principally the USA and Japan, but with the EEC (and West Germany particularly) coming more into the picture. As the choice sharpens, even middle-class support begins to slip away from the increasingly brutal and foreign-supported ruling elites and to go over to the guerrilla which increasingly emerges not only as the champion of economic and social justice but also as the guardian of indigenous culture and values. [159]. Once the momentum of this process has built up to a certain critical level whether imperceptibly by increments each largely unnoticed at the time (as in Malaya), or dramatically by a vast quantum leap

(as in Thailand after the right-wing *coup* of October 1976)-success for the guerrilla is assured (in the absence of suicidal errors in tactics and/or strategy).

Summing up his protracted visit to the ASEAN countries (Malaysia, Thailand' Singapore, Indonesia, and the Philippines) and South Korea in 1977, the vastly experienced Russell Johnson had these observations to make: "Dictatorship and the repression of independent thought and action is now the way of life throughout the ASEAN countries and South Korea. I am concerned as an American citizen at the complicity of my own nation's government and business enterprises in the all - inclusive tide of repression and militarization we witnessed in the nations of Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore,, Indonesia, the Philippines, and South Korea...I observed at first hand from 1961 until the end of the fighting in Vietnam. Laos and Cambodia the contribution to the morale and strength of the revolutionary forces made by the repressive and corrupt practices of the ruling elites, backed by American advisers and arms. If there has been one 'lesson of Vietnam' it is this. Yet one feels in Thailand and the Philippines, in particular, and to a lesser extent elsewhere, that the whole Vietnam scenario is being run through again in slow motion. One hesitates to predict the final act with absolute certainty, but the cast of characters and the plot are hauntingly familiar...the overall effect of the present economic structure is to increase the gap between the wealthy elite and the great majority of the people...A ten-year survey of economic llfe in rural Asia just completed by the Asian Development Bank Concludes that'...in most of the bank's developing country member countries, most people are eating at a nutritional level below that required for normal health'...Many skills and crafts,a diversity of cultural and religious expression, and a cooperative spirit and basic democracy within the village are the legacy of the past to the present generation. This legacy is already being lost as the homogenization of the population increases, a key agent being telivision to control thought and train obedience to the law of the corporate world : consume, consume, consume... the injustice we have have seen on this journey is the outcome of a system, of a certain set of values and goals in which production, not poetry – or justice - or equality

- is put first ... Criticism of the regimes in Southeast Asia ... has been almost silenced within the countries ... There is, in addition, an increasing effort to exclude foreign journalists and observers who might reveal something of the truth ... security organisations within the ASEAN countries have co-ordinated this information with the assistance of the CIA global computer in Frankfurt, West Germany ...".[160]

Nevertheless, clear though the impasse of these regimes may seem, many Western commentators persist in at least professing to believe that their difficulties are but the birth-pangs of what will be in time full-grown new autonomous capitalist economies and societies.[161] (It is very doubtful whether the elites in "free world" South East Asia share this view, even though they may pay lip-service to it : the evidence suggests on the contrary that they are perfectly aware of the impermanence of their tenure of power and command over national resources and are accordingly determined each to make as much in hard cash and assets as fast as possible in order to be able to retire in due course with the guaranteed life - style of a President Thieu or a General Lon Nol ...) I shall therefore spend a little time explaining where the theoretical fallacies implicit in this profession of faith seem to me to lie; we have had a look at the reality,[162]

The first point to make is that the first round of industrial revolutions - that is, the industrialising process involving the now rich (OECD, broadly speaking) countries - were greatly facilitated by the existence and easy accessibilty of cheap inanimate energy in the form of the fossil fuels (initially coal, subsequently petroleum). It is self-evident that cheap energy is now a thing of the past. This difference alone, it seems to me, would be quite enough to vitiate the invoked parallels implied in much arguement about second paths to capitalism or "second waves" of industrial revolutions. Apart altogether from the major shift in cost structure involved, we ought not to forget that the *agricultural* revolutions which took place concurrently with the first wave of industrial revolutions rested upon utilisation of the fossil fuels - to begin with in a way roughly parallel to the way they were being simultaneously

harnessed for industry (i. e. for power, traction, and so on), but latterly in a highly specific way (i.e. as a direct input in the form of fertiliser, etc.). The original industrialising countries were able not only to call upon their own domestic resources of the fossil fuels, but also to search the world for supplementary stocks. In contrast, the countries which are being nominated today as "new wave" industrialising-via-capitalism models are still being scoured for their precious fossil fuels by the richest capitalist powers intent on maintaining as long as possible their energy hegemony; indeed, American policy is now based upon trying to convince poorer capitalist countries not to make the "mistake" of becoming dependent upon thy fossil fuels, but to instal instead sophisticated "alternative energy" technology (fortuitously available for sale by the USA, Japan and the EEC countries).[161] Fossil-fuel based necessities, iike fertilisers, will be made available, :oo, of course-by courtesy of Western-controlled enterprises (such as the oil majors and the giant agri-multinationals). A picture less like the original capitalist scenario it would be hard to fabricate!

But this is only one-albeit a vital one-of the many important distinctions which, taken together, invalidate the supposed parallel. Let us just more or less list some others. In the first model, poverty was in due course, to a considerable extent, "exported" : home labour was permitted a share in the benefits of development at the expense of labour in the colonial and semi-colonial world then controlled by the initially industrialising countries. Where can "new model" capitalist countries "export poverty" to ? They do not have, nor can they obtain, colonies (ifself a major difference-the major economic one if we take the theory of imperialism-as I believe we must do- seriously) Might they "export poverty" back to the rich countries (by undercutting rich country home manufactures and thus throwing their workers out of emploment, *either* by grabbing their markets with cheap imports *or* by attracting investment away from where wages are high to where they are low- i.e. in the "new model" countries) ? But this is obviously a very different process from that involved in earlier imerialism-colonialism, for to work *it means constantly maintaining a poverty at home*

greater than any to be found abroad– orherwise the undercutting advantage will be lost.

So, the advantage that eventually accrued to "first model" countries from a move upward in the purchasing power of their own consumers seems unattainable by "second path" countries. The advantage was a complex one, but it rested upon two basic features, both *necessarily* missing from countries attempting to develop via capitalism today. The first was the existance of imperialism. The second was development of a powerful independent labour movement. In no "free world" Afro-Asian-Latin American country today can we even begin to discern the faintest traces of the beginning of autonomous labour movements along "first model" lines : the only real equivalent, in fact, is significantly the guerrilla movements of these countries (which have, of course, their clandestine support in such above ground "labour" organisations as are permitted to exist). Nor is this surprising, in view of the ways by which these countries *have to* maintain such competitive edge as they possess or can prise open, Two consequences follow: the first is that there can be no start made to reducing inequalities, to mitigating social, economic and political abuses, or in any way to blunting class conflict (which therefore must evolve towards the critical point about which we spoke above; the second is that local production, which must of course be for profit (we are talking about a capitalist path to economic development,) has to mirror not popular domestic demand but foreign demand and the demand of the local elites, which in turn entails a gross distortion of the pattern of investment and fixed capital formation in the direction of luxury and semi - luxury consumer goods (and inappropriate capital goods which mirror "needs" far removed from the true needs of the generality of the local people. Indeed, as we have noted, "second path" capitalist development generates urban and rural unemployment and pauperisation on a hitherto unprecedented and unimaginable scale.

Just as there now exist formidable obstacles to "exporting Poverty" as in the original development model, so it would apper *out* of the question for currently developing countries

to "export" their primary sectors, as the now rich countries succeeded in doing in their time. Able to export their primary sectors (by opening up vast and hitherto underused tracts of the world and by diverting colonial labour and land to export crops), the originally industrialising countries were able to concentrate domestic labour in the sectors with high value added (manufacture and services)- in, be it noted, a general international dispensation the rules of which were drawn up and enforced by them. (Since much of my book *The Wealth of Some Nations,* Zed Press, London, 1977, is devoted to consideration of this and related problems, I would like to refer the reader to the appropriate sections there for further discussion of this.] It is naive to the point of the wilful obtuseness to elect to see in the South Korean pattern (let us say) an analogue of this earlier pattern; Seoul does not control the prairies and padis from which grain must now be bought and imported nor can it influence its price. Besides, the overall context has now changed fundamentally, with a reversal under way of the historical relation which, between 1873 and 1973 roughly, prevailed between the industrial and the primary sectors. If today you can no longer export your primary sector, but yet still wish to have the advantage of cheap food for your urban workers, you have no option but to intensify the exploitation and the poverty of the domestic rural sector (which necessarily remains very much larger than it ultimately became in the old order of development) and to face the inevitable socio-political consequences, as sketched above.

Again, one of the prime characteristics of the originally-industrialising countries was their intense chauvinism and jealous exclusivism. The Germans mounted protection against the British ;the Japanese sought to exclude foreign investment; the French, Dutch and British each in their one way used political authority to reserve economic advantage to their own nationals in their colonies (and at home); the United States early perceived how Washington could be harnessed to further the cause of Wall Street. But what do we find today ? Much of the capitalist development that *is* taking place in the "free world" countries of the third world *is in the hands of corporations of the rich*

world. The legislation governing their activities is, moreover, either directly drafted by, or at least subject to the approval of, the governments of the rich countries. The contrast with the circumstances prevailing in 19th and early 20th centuries hardly be more complete. How, in modern circumstances, a poor third world country is expected to overcome by capitalist methods but hamstrung by lack of sovereignty the vast differences in initial conditions to attain full competitive equality (differences of which I have barely scratched the surface) with the long-established rich countries is beyond my capacity to envisage. It is all too easy to see, on the other hand, how *dependent "development"* suits capitally the interests of all concerned-except the poor masses of the third world. But a "second path to capitalism" ?-if by that is meant the achievement of societies like those of the presently rich countries-never. It is not in practice in process of being realised anywhere, and it is theoritically inconceivable, given the contrasting circumstances.

Having satisfied ourselves on that account we are now confronted with the question of what the prospects are for Kampuchea, having decisively rejected the road we have concluded to be a dead-end, with the kind of programme for which its leaders *have* opted. It is as well to state flatly here that the experiences of the Soviet Union and of the Eastern European satellite states are irrelevant as possible intimations of Kampuchea's future: their "model", too has been rejected.[163] So, for guidance, we are willy-nilly restricted to paying attention to the other, longer-standing, Asian socialist experiments: China, North Korea, and North Vietnam.

Of China so much has been written that I am going to content myself again to indicating a recent publication, which also has bibliographical references down to 1976 (after which time, of course, problems of interpretation of Chinese policy arise).[164] But it is worth quoting one judgement for its peculiar pertnence to Kampuchea's position: "How relevant is the Chinese way ? There surely can be no doubt that for the world's peasant multitudes the countryside of China would be like a millenial vision. Chinese experience indicates that 'the

peasant's attachment to his land' is circumstantial; that what he cares about is not ownership but livelihood, and that once convinced that it is the way ahead he will co-operate. Success in 'co-operativisation' promises to resolve the basic agricultural contradiction, evolving large-scale mechanised farms which are still worked with the close attention and intricate husbandry traditionally associated with small farms. Some Western agronomists, convinced that only small-farm economies can maximise yield, hold up Taiwan as an example. But similar areas in mainland China, for example Chekiang province. have already equalled Taiwan's yield of over 7.5 tonnes per hectare-and the Shanghai district's yield is 40 per cent higher. The potential for further increases in production must be greater on the communes, where mechanisation is still low, than in Taiwan's sophisticated but fragmented system. If this is the answer for the world's peasantries, the social vessel of escape from the rising tide of famine-Mao's ark, if you like-where is the gangplank? There is little in rural China that was not envisaged in the Indian community development scheme of the 1950's but the benefits there of credit and technique were as water on sand; the landlords and rich peasants sopped them up. If the barrier to increased productivity lies not in ignorance but in the purposeful resistance or monopolisation of benefits by the powers in the traditional village hierarchy, then it is not to be bypassed by a proliferation of research and agricultural institutions. *The Chinese first shattered and levelled that pyramid of social power and built their new communities on its rubble. There may be another way, but it is yet to be found.,'*[165] (emphasis added)

Those who have read recent speeches by Kampuchean leaders will be aware of a closeness and similarity in their analysis of the rural situation to that pioneered by the Chinese too marked to be mere coincidence or convergence: [166] they have clearly studied the precedent (although of course not committed to imitating it, except selectively, where appropriate). However, the initial steps taken to 'shatter and level the pyramid of social power' in the Kampuchean case - whether primarily by free choice or preponderately by the dictation of circumstances - were obviously much more drastic and radical

than in the Chinese. We may speculate - as indeed some South East Asian left - wing thinkers have already done - whether the Kampucheans might not thereby have saved themselves much trouble in future. A recent book [167] has documented at length the tenacity of preference for, and prestige of, the urban areas, urban life, and urban work among the Chinese population even today and has described the difficulties the leaders have had in implementing their important "Up to the Mountains and Down to the Villages" policy. The expressed goal of transforming urbanites into 'new-style, cultured peasants' is, to be sure, one that runs counter to so much that is entrenched in our thinking that it initially beggars acceptance and strains credulity. Even the author of the book in question, Thomas P. Bernstein, fails to see that there is a lot more to it than merely 'economizing on the costs of urbanization' and getting round a (presumed temporary?) 'inability to provide jobs for urban youths'. The more thorough-going de-urbanisation in Kampuchea than in China surely marks a further step in registering and recognising the increasingly apparent *obsolecence of cities*.

As the world economy became functionally one under imperialism, and as world trade expanded, a number of national cities throughout world grew far beyond the point that would have been justified by a selfcontained national economy. Reversion to self-sufficient, agriculture-based, national economies abolishes their justification (such as it was). Moreover, greater familiarity with the real costs of domestic communications made necessary to pander to a "primate city" and of regional improverishment have served to illustrate the dysfunctioning of urbanisation (not to speak here of the multiple and seemingly insoluble social and economic problems thrown up inside big cities as such). It is strange that with so much disillusion with the city in the rich Western countries themselves there has been so little sympathy with and understanding of Kampuchean social policy'.

I have decided not to make any comparison between the first years of Democratic Kampuchea and the experience of the DRV (Democratic Republic of Vietnam - North Vietnam)

between 1954 and 1975.[168] This is not because there are not interesting and instructive parallels, but because it is increasingly evident that particularly since 1975 - Vietnamese development is to be pursued along much more orthodox lines than is the case with any of the other Asian socialist countries. It is orthodox in two related senses: first, in accepting Russian-style planning and priorities; and second: in accepting the need for world economic interdependence and for reliance on international trade. This is not in the least to denigrate the tremendous achievements of Vietnamese agriculture during the war, nor to fail to acknowledge that the Vietnamese themselves have, since 1975, come to emphasise food production and food self-sufficiency more and more as time goes by. [169] The fact remains, however, that there is obvious, in the following official pronouncements, long-term objectives of a "traditional" economic development kind that are at odds with the proclaimed objectives of the Kampucheans: "The more quickly agriculture develops, and the more advanced and modern it becomes, the more favourable conditions it will create *to shift part of its labour force to other economic branches such as heavy and light industries, communications and transport, circulation and distribution of goods, and so* on..."[170] (emphasis added);"... we must try *to elicit support and assistance from and expand co-operation with the fraternal socialist countries on the basis of Marxism - Leninism and proletarian internationalism. We must try to promote economic relations with the Third World countries and all other countries*...This is a law governing the development of the international situation...the fraternal socialist countries and friendly countries near and far as well as many other countries want *multiform economic co-operation* with the Socialist Republic of Vietnam *in the interests of each side concerned.* This is a very great advantage. the possibilities of which we must fully assess and turn into reality...".[171] (emphases added) "... (among our objectives)...To *quickly develop the sources of export goods to help purchase new technical equipment and materials* for agriculture, forestry, fishery and for industrial development. We must endeavour to achieve in a few five year plans a basic change in our agriculture along the line of large-scale socialist production *with a constantly rising level of centralisation,*

specialization and collectivization, with a more modern material and technical foundation...''.[172] (emphases added)

Vast divergencies in outlook also mark Vietnamese and Kampuchean views on such matters as oil exploration, foreign investment, foreign aid, and development of tourism. [173] Without necessarily registering a preference, I can nevertheless restrict myself by observing that what we are concerned with here is the relevance of the *Kampuchean* model, not the more traditional one of which the Vietnamese is a variant (and I can, without contradiction, wish the Vietnamese every success in the course they have chosen, while recording my view that there are pitfalls in it which they may have overlooked or minimised-see what I have to say below about North Korea).

When one turns to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK-North Korea) one is immediately aware of the much greater degree of congruence and congeniality between its development trajectory and that of Democratic Kampuchea.[174] And indeed this is not merely a matter of observation and of comparisons conducted by third parties, for the leaders of the two countries have themselves stressed the closeness of their respective views on development problems and policies. Their joint communique issued after Pol Pot's visit to Pyongyong (4th-8th October, 1977) said : ''Both sides stressed that only when communist and workers' parties establish guiding theories and policies to meet the specific realities of their own countries and carry out the revolution independently and in accordance with the efforts of their own people can victory be won, and that final victory in the world revolution can be attained only through the victories of the revolutions of each country.''

The DPRK is, of course, the birthplace and home of the *Juche* (self-reliance) policy associated with Kim Il-sung.[175] From an early stage in its development, North Korea has rejected any form of integration with or participation in any form of international division of labour within the socialist community. In this it flatly repudiates the Soviet view, arguing instead that''... as long as boundaries remain between States while communism has not been realised on a world-wide scale, the material and technical foundations of socialism should be built by each national state as a unit. This naturally amounts to building a comprehensive independent economy.''[176] The successes that have attended this policy are well known and well attested to. Nonetheless, in the last few years a great deal of publicity has been given to the DPRK's debts to Western industrialised countries. Close examination of the circumstances, however, reveals that North Korea's experiences in this respect *strengthen* rather than invalidate the theoretical foundations of its economic policy.

When, in the early 1970's, Noth Korea sought to take advantage of international trade conditions which were initially highly favourable (aggressive salesmanship of high technology by Western manufacturers in a tightening world market; steep rises in the prices of the non-ferrous metals the DPRK had for sale), it was-like many others-caught by the fall in raw material prices which followed the oil price rise-induced recession in the capitalist countries. At the same time, the Soviet Union suddenly raised its own oil prices at short notice, thus embarrassing all its customers, including North Korea. Thus caught, Pyongyang certainly encounted some payment difficulties, but such is its basic economic strength and soundness that there is no question, nor has there ever been, of its subjecting itself to the humiliations most countries have had to in similar circumstances (begging international agencies for loans, opening its accounts to Western ''experts'' and bankers, and the like). ''Thus,'' concludes a recent study, ''the situation of the DPRK cannot be compared to the debt problem of the capitalist Third World...'When considered closely...the North Korean case proves to be (thus far, at any rate) the exception that proves the rule, and a model even in its mode of default.' In other words, the recent experience of the DPRK shows that even a country which follows a basic path of economic self-reliance may get into difficulties if it opens itself too widely to the mechanisms of the world market. However, having a relatively strong independent socio-economic base, North Korea is certainly able to resist economic pressures. In the meantime, that country's present difficulties-which should not be exaggerated - can well serve as a warning

to others against the inherent dangers of an exclusively outward-looking strategy of development within the global system of the capitalist division of labour." [177]. This is something the Kampucheans cannot fail to have taken note of, even if it merely confirmed conclusions they had already independently arrived at.

The great merit of the North Korean example, as compared to that of the European socialist countries, is that its all-round achievements have been based upon secure agricultural self-sufficiency. It can feed its own population from its own rather limited agricultural resources (though before the second world war what is now the DPRK had been a food deficit area). Other necessities of life - from consumer goods of the simplest kind to complex capital goods like diesel engines, machine tools and electronics-are manufactured at home from its own resources of manpower and raw materials. There are no joint enterprises; there is no foreign investment; no foreign aid is sought or accepted; and the idea of tourism is not entertained. Making all allowances for the undeniable specific features of the Vietnamese pattern, it is in obvious respects closer to the European socialist one than it is to the DPRK one whereas the opposite is true as far as Kampuchea is concerned.

It must be remembered in this context that, like Vietnam and Kampuchea in 1975, North Korea emerged in 1953 at the end of the Korean War devastated. What has been accomplished since then is an astonishing tribute not only to the energy initiative and creativeness of the Korean people but also to the essential correctness of their *juche* line. Ignoring for this purpose questions of political organization (including the cult of the individual), no non-"free world' country that I have visited (including China) has impressed me more in terms of its all-round economic achievements. Were Kampuchea to succeed as well, in straight-forward material terms, it would, by the end of the century, be a prosperous, self-sufficient, balanced agricultural-industrial power of a new kind, too: the foundation-food and *juche*-has been accepted and is being laid.

I may suitably begin my final remarks with a quotation from Samir Amin: "Though the capitalist system has united the world, it has done so on the basis of unevenly developed nations. The socialist system is a system of socialist nations, and will probably long continue so. It will be superior to the capitalist system only if it approves national policies that give priority to autocentric development, this being the condition for eliminating the impact that the fact that nations exist has upon the economy: the latter must continue to be 'inter-national' until it becomes a truly 'world' economy. *Only when all nations have reached the same level of development will it be possible for a new doctrine of specialization to be worked out.* Any attempt to construct this doctrine too soon, on economistic foundations, while the problem of the inequality of nations is still with us, can only serve to justify practices similar to those followed by the 'central' capitalist countries in their relations with the periphery. And any attempt to construct it on other foundations can only be utopian, the essential conditions that would make possible specialization that is *not* unequal being absent as yet." [178]. (emphais added)

I have no quarrel with the general point, but would query use of the word "specialization" where "differentiation" is more what I would have In mind for the future. (The context of Samir Amin's comment does not make it clear whether he would regard this as a quibble or as a substantial point signalling that there was some disagreement or difference in emphasis between our views.) *Differentiation* is based upon differences in the endowment (geographical, historical, etc.) with which societies have to grapple in order to wrest their livelihood (some grow rice, some wheat, and so on); there has therefore always been differentiation from the earliest times and I hope there always will be. *Specialisation* signifies something quite distinct, for it implies conscious and positive initiative to overstep limits set by circumstances-or, rather, accepted as tolerable and sensible in the circumstances. Division of labour(specialisation)is, in Adam Smith's famous dictum, limited by the extent of the market.[179]. Only when commerce reaches beyond the confines of the self-sufficient subsistence community can speci-

alisation be carried further than that degree which would naturally spring from the different dexterities of people in tasks all would to some extent have to undertake (spinning, sewing; skinning, and so on). The arguments for specialisation are well known, and its consequences familiar to us all. Less prominence has until recently been given to the arguments against, but the propositions supported in this paper do constitute an indirect contribution to the adverse case.

Once specialisation has proceeded to a certain point, whole communities may find themselves, because of some fortuitous or fostered advantage (local deposits of clay suitable for potmaking; transmission of skills inside and between contiguous families), working full-time on one line of product, dependent upon exchange to obtain the basket of commodities needed for maintenance of daily life. The basket will be bigger than would otherwise have been obtainable (or the transition would not have been worth while and would not have been undertaken), but there has been a clear loss in security, for - if isolated for whatever reason -the community would find it difficult to revert to providing its own subsistence (and impossible in the short run, given the time that must elapse between planting and eating the harvested crop, for instance).

Specialisation proceeding further, whole countries find themselves dependent in this sense. Of course in the modern world inter-dependence is, in effect, universal (though there are still a few *strictly* self-sufficient subsistence communities to be found). Buf it should be noted that there are important differences of degree and one crucial difference in kind. The greater the participation in international commerce, the more dependent an economy obviously is, and *vice versa*. The difference in *kind* turns upon the nature of the specialisation : countries specialised in manufacturing are clearly more vulnerable to interruption of commerce for whatever reason than countries specialised in production of primary commodities including food (for even plantations growing commercial raw material crops can more quickly and readily be converted to food production than can industrial estates). But the conditions under which international specialisation was eventually carried to its

present point were such that the rewards for specialisation in manufacturing were so much superior to the rewards for specialisation in primary production that little thought was given to the factor of security.[180]. Nor did any consideration that the process not only removed from direct contact with subsistence production those powerful enough to levy tribute on others entrusted with it on their behalf but also those lacking such power (thus ensuring their pauperisation) impede its progress.

Curiously enough, specialisation *reduces* differentiation. There are two important reasons for this. The first is that economies of scale dictate concentration on mass production of fewer and fewer more and more standardised "lines": the same shirt sits the shoulders in hot humid Singapore as in the Shetland Islands. The second is that natural advantages and disadvantages need no longer constrain consumption: the unsuitability of northern Europe with respect to local production of rice and grapes need no longer, thanks to technical innovations, prevent Norwegians and Finns from subsisting, if they choose, on vindaloo and Rioja. The apparent benefits mask real losses which are beginning to assert themselves in the rich overdeveloped countries in the form of the individual and group expression of opinion and exercise of choice in favour of traditional, handicraft, do-it-yourself, etc., products and production (and, in parallel, in favour of local languages, dialects, customs, folk-lore, and the like), and in the poor underdeveloped countries in the growing strength of revolutionary anti-imperialist movements dedicated to opting out of the doubly-impoverishing international commercial system and to re-building local society in accordance with local values and local traditions and on the basis of local resources and specifically local potentials. The significance of the Kampuchean Revolution in this context will not at this point in the argument be lost on readers. But before summarising what has been said specifically about Kampuchea, let me air a few speculations at a high level of generality and abstraction.

That there is a crisis of a kind and of proportions not experienced hitherto in modern Western civilisation is generally accepted. Disagreement begins with interpretation and-where

felt appropriate - prescription. But interpretations offered as alternatives may not be in fact be incompatible and irreconcilable. It may merely be a matter of the aspect to which attention is drawn. For instance. economists and technocrats may isolate the mode of production while historians and statesmen focus on the institutional frame work and military-strategic considerations. One author is concerned to "... replace the old onwards and upwards Victorian view of progress with a more realistic account of cultural evolution. What is happening to today's standard of living has happened in the past. Our culture is not the first technology that has failed. Nor is it the first to reach its limits of growth. The technologies of earlier cultures failed ag ain and again only to be replacad by new technologies. And limits of growth have been reached and transcended only to be reached and transcended again."[181] Another seeks to elucidate the parallels between the decline of the Roman Empire and the present crisis of the American Empire in order to draw helpful inferences for the future deployment of US power [182] Not surprisingly, since the great majority of commentators on the perceived crisis are not only citizens of the West but also dependent for their livelihood upon selling their comments to those who control, along with the media, much of the wealth of the West, both diagnosis and recommended cure concentrate upon the crisis of the West as *world's* crisis, and therefore pessimism and optimism are largely determined by whether, on the basis of diagnosis, a pessimistic or optimistic prognosis is felt justified by conditions and developments *in the West.* Can the *West* transcend the contradictions now multiplying from the seemingly autonomous evolution of modern technology ? Can the *West* halt or siginificantly delay the crumbling of the frontiers of empire in order to save the metropolitan heritage? (and I include the Soviet bloc in the "West" in this context.) [The occasional Western commentator sees the technico–econo-mic crisis of the West and its coming political fragmentation as good things precisely in *enabling* new and more vigourous developments to burst through elsewhere- as in revolutionary Asia; Kampuchea in particular has been mentioned in this context by a few who adopt this line.[183]]

The perceived or felt failure of Western civilization to satisfy human aspirations has, however as the crisis has deepened, provoked such far-reaching criticism and scepticism that it is worth at least raising the question whether there is not some convergence, even if unpremeditated, independent, and unconscious, between some of the most radical critiques to have emerged in the West and the actual radical practices of some of the revolutionary movements battering at the gates. As soon as the question is posed in this way it really answers itself in the positive, though- to be sure- it is necessary to be sensitive to the variations that take place to ideas related at root when they have been filtered through very different intellectual and physical environments and experiences. The scorn and contempt of revolutionary peasantry for the neocolonial city can certainly be matched with the parallel questioning in the West of the vaule of what has been achieved by desperate accumulation of surplus in the form of modern urban civilisation.[184] Rural re-deployment in East Asia can certainly be matched with the actual flight from cities in the West and voluntary reversion to more "primitive" technologies.[185]. The idea of the frantic development of commerce as parasitic and wasteful can also be duplicated in the two spheres.[186]. And so one might go on.

If we suggest the ideas are-as well as being superficially similar or comparable - related at root we are also suggesting that they have a common cause or causes. This would appear to be so. For if a significant number of presently neo-colonial third countries to opt-as it seems they must-to reconstitute autonomous balanced economies the overdeveloped rich countries will sooner or later be *forced* to do the same. Rising energy costs will contribute to the same tendency, both by further exacerbating global recession and by tipping the economic scales steadily in favour of more labour-intensive self-sufficient agricultural systems *both* in the overdeveloped *and* the underdeveloped countries (and thus eroding the internationally negotiated surpluses which permit various kinds of specialisation - this country in advanced manufacturing, that in plantation agriculture, yet another in entrepot services and component assembly, and so on). They are also related in another sense, namely that

while there may appear to be some plausible justification for ostentatious consumption, overblown tertiary sectors, and other such phenomena of overdevelopment in countries where, by and large, the general mass of the people is at least comfortably above the poverty line, these phenomena when transferred to the poorer countries (as they are-to satisfy the urge for "modernisation" to attract foreign "experts", etc.) where they have no possible "justification" provoke intense popular anger which it is hard at first to equate with the minority intellectual dissent in the West.

That line of thought inspires another. If dissent from "development" is but a minority movement in the West, it is hardly surprising that it hardly exists in the underdeveloped countries among the enclave elites at least and in the same form. This is often taken as proof of the fact that these concerns are luxuries which can be indulged by rich middle-class Westerners but which can have no part in the intellectual baggage of busy practical third world leaders striving to raise the miserable living standards of their people from a poverty now unknown in the rich world. That argument lacks plausibility for several reasons (one is obvious: "free world" neo-colonial leaders are not known for expressing concern for the welfare of their peoples far less for doing anything positive about it), but two aspects are of interest. First. Westerners still out on colonial-type missions are the least likely people in the world to be troubled by doubts as to the value of capitalist development, though, come to think of it, it is perhaps even less likely that those prepared to collaborate with them in the neo-colonies ever pause to doubt or reflect. Second, the choices being harsher, starker, more demanding, in the poorer countries, those with doubts do not express them by retiring to the equivalent a little farm in Wales and by writing "conservationist" or "alternative lifestyle" articles for the "underground" press, but by going over to the *actual* underground - the guerrilla - and by fighting to expel the baneful and alien economic and cultural influences.

It is hardly surprising, then, that whereas trends reflective of the great sea-change in the world economy and polity now under way are now readily perceptible in *both* the overdeveloped West *and* in the practice of Peasant revolutionary movements in power and in opposition, the neo-colonial third world countries, almost alone now, continue to operate to the dictates of impulses which have long worked themselves out elsewhere. Thus, it is *only* in "free world" third world countries that cities continue to grow in size, that movement *from* the land continues to take place, that "free trade" is worshipped and welcomed with open arms, that capital-intensive technology manufacturing meretricious consumerist trinkets is seen as the height of "modernisation" and "development", and so on, Conversely, the Marxist guerrillas of Kampuchea and elsewhere in Asia have been "learning from the peasants" and listening to them in turning against rhe cities and all they represent. And in the overdeveloped countries, the most advanced sections of the left have aligned themselves in a comparable way-most strikingly, of course, with the peasants of Japan against Narita airport, a battle of such significance that it would be hard to exaggerate its importance for the interpretation of modern trends and symtoms. [187].

If all this may seem bewildering to the orthodox economist, what is he to make of the growing opposition to trade *as such* which is emerging? Trade has for so long been seen as the prime engine of growth and all that is good that such a development must be viewed at first glance as shocking and almost against Nature. But let us stand back a moment. As long as it was possible to subscribe to a view of world history which saw progress in time as parallelled by at least an overall progress in wealth, welfare and other goals accepted as desirable, the somewhat peculiar relationship between trade and material progress was not adequately analysed. Trade begot capitalism/industrialism and capitalism/industrialism begot trade; as long as trade kept up its tempo of secular expansion, the health, wealth and happiness of Mankind prospered, but when trade seized up – as in the 1930's and the 1970's- dire setbacks threatened. Even today, when the upwards-ever-upwards

philosophy of historical progression is more and more frequently and damagingly queried, there are economists who "impediments" to the further growth of international commerce, in whatever form (whether it be protectionism in advanced capitalist countries or autarky in backward revolutionary ones), as detrimental to the prospects of the "world economy". This is the view which, for Instance, in forms the US Council of Foreign Relations high-powered 1980's Project. Such concern in that quarter should, however, alert us to the possibility that it may be some partial advantage which is at risk in the perceived possibilities of a contraction in the volume of international trade and of that contraction becoming ungovernably cumulative.

And undoubtedly this is the the case. Mao Tse-tung, in a 1919 article in the short-lived *Hsiang River Review*, wrote: "what is the greatest question in the world? The greatest question is that of getting food to eat." This is a universal truth. Human groups have succeeded in answering it in an astonishing range of environments, from the ice-bound to the sun - drenched, from floodied padi fields to arid deserts, from the deep seas to high mountain sides. *All* have been capable of food self-sufficiency and the overwhelming majority have actually been so; it is only in historically very, very recent times that some - the overdeveloped industrialised countries - have *chosen* not to be. But even today there is not a single country in the world which could not be self-sufficient if it chose to be. 188. The same considerations really apply to the most basic of other everyday requirements, such as clothing and shelter. We may say, then, that international trade is absolutely irrelevant to the greatest question in the world, or - to put it more pointedly - to the greatest economic questions in the world.

Trade began with the exchange of luxury items by rulers and ruling groups. It underwent an apparently permanent quantitative shift and qualitative change only with the expansion of the Western powers from the 15th century onwards. As

the volume of trade grew, items which are normally thought of as essentials began to enter more and more into international exchanges - items such as grains, textiles, and fuels. But it should be noted that if our first proposition is correct such traded items only become entitled to the description "essentials" by a kind of courtesy extension of the epithet - on the grounds, that is, that they are by sight, smell, texture (etc.) indistinguishable from true (non-traded) essentials; countries importing them only did so from *choice* - it was never essential for any country to import "essentials" since it might readily have satisfied its own essential needs from its own resources. A moment's reflection enables us to reassure ourselves that this is still the case. A major part of existing trade consists of the inter - change of virtually identical non-essential articles and others more properly characterised as rubbish (private cars, TV sets, electric tooth-brushes, etc.). But there is, nevertheless, also a trade in *true* essentials: in - notably - proteins and hydrocarbons *essential to the involuntary exporters.* Equity and humanity, however, obviously require the elimination of such trade, the more so since the importing countries convert much of the traded items (essentials *in situ* for nutritional and agricultural adequacy) into useless rubbish ("convenience" "foods", plastic artefacts' etc.).[189] In fact, how far have we *really* moved from the archetypal trade between white man and "native" of "glass beads and mirrors" for gold, ivory, and their later-day equivalents. (if anything, the exchange had become *less* rewarding for the "native" gold and ivory could be spared better than oil and fish, while beads and mirrors did less harm than high-velocity rifles and baby milk powder),

It may be urged that the growth of world trade has nonetheless brought enormous benefits, and that more trade will go on meaning, as it has in the past, more benefits. We need to consider two questions here: first, have the benefits of expanding trade been generally and fairly spread? and, second, have rising trade and rising welfare (even of a section of theworld community) necessarily correlated positively? The answer in both cases is negative, more obviously so in the

first than in the second. As far as that part of the third world with the economic history of which I am most familiar is concerned - South East Asia - I can simply assert that the welfare of the generality of the population diminished as a consequence of exposure to and articulation with world trade, and that adequately meets the first question, whether one holds that, overall, the imperialist powers on balance gained more than their colonies lost or less.

The second requires an even broader historical canvas if we are to put the matter into proper perspective. In terms of the *essential* of life, particularly food, many cultures have enjoyed higher standards than those of the richest overdeveloped countries today. Hunter-collectors had high protein/low carbohydrate diets, such as only the richest strata in the world enjoy now (and then only if they exercise common sense and deliberate restraint) and won with much greater efficiency and much less trouble than we now have to go in order to duplicate it (for a relatively tiny minority). There was virtually no trade, and no necessary trade, between hunter-collector groups. We may, in fact, stand the implied relationship between trade and living standards (properly understood) on its head and argue that increased trade entailed falling living standards for *most* people caught up in the process. At our end of the historical time scale we can see this clearly enough inthe impoverishment of third world diets entailed by their exporting high-quality protein sources and importing low-grade (carbohydrate, food-*stuff*) grains.

There can be no doubt, therefore, that Kampuchea's revolutionary leaders are justified in their general rolicy of seeking self-sufficiency as the essential base from which to tackle the problem of poverty. The only alternative, indeed, would be for Kampuchea (and other third world countries in an analogous position) to seek to invert the whole system put in place historically by the now rich countries of the world by forcibly reversing the roles thus established. But this - aside from its practicality – would not be a good option, in either sense (moral or rational) : even the richest countries of the world today are still disfigured by poverty and gross inequalities,

I do not think there can be much doubt that when time has lent prespective to our view, the Kampuchean Revolution will appear more and more clearly as one of the most significant early indications of the great and necessary change beginning to convulse the world in the later 20th century and to shift it from a disaster-bound course to one holding out promise of a better future for all. In the meantime we can surely rejoice that the people of Kampuchea are assured now steadily rising living standards while those of their still "free world" neighbours continue to deteriorate. That deterioration is not in itself of course a cause for rejoicing, but we may infer from the juxtaposition that the lesson will not long be lost upon the as yet unliberated peasants.

— o —

FOOTNOTES

1. See Appendix II, below, for a discussion of Cambodia's historical and 'natural' boundaries, and of the background to recent frontier problems.

2. Khieu Samphan completed his doctoral thesis on Cambodia's economy and problems of industrialisation in Paris in 1959. It is to be published in English translation, undertaken by Laura Summers, by Cornell University Press; an edited selection from this appeared as 'Underdevelopment in Cambodia' in the September - November, 1976, number of *Indochina Chronicle*. For Khieu Samphan's comments on feudalism see pp. 10–11 of that.

3. See, for example, 'Leonid Sedov: La Societe' Angkorienne et le Probleme du mode de production Asiatique', pp, 327-43, in C. E. R. M.: *Sur la 'mode de production asiatique'* Editions Sociales, Paris, 1969.

4. See David L. Elliott: *Thailand-Origins of Military Rule,* Zed Press, London, 1978; a condensed summation of his argument can be found in his article "The Socio-economic Formation of Modern Thailnd', *Journal of Contemporary Asia,* Vol. VIII, no.1, 1978.

5. There had, of course, always been *some* trade: see for specific mentions O. W. Wolters. *Early Indonesian Commerce,* Cornell U. P., N. Y., 1967, pp 126–7, 137; G. Coedes: *The making of South East Asia,* Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1967, p. 103. It is interesting, however, that '... available sources give practically no information about the commercial activities of the country...' (Coedes : ibid), and that it was '...intensive agriculture made possible by the well-planned irrigation system...', that guaranteed prosperity and was most intimately associated with the country s traditions.

6. The standard work-D. H. Grist's *Rice* (Longman, London, 5th ed , 1975, p. 488)- gives the following yields of clean rice in kilograms per hectare:

Cambodia	930
Thailand	1,240
Philippines	1,120
Indonesia	1,500
West Malaysia	1,970
Republic of Korea	3, 300
Japan	3, 680
Spain	4, 060
Australia	4, 800

7. C. F.:'... three times as many Frenchmen were employed in 1937 to run Indochina, with a population of 30 millions, as Britons to run India, which had more than ten times the population, so that France's policy came to look as if it had been dictated as much by a desire to find employment for the sons of her own middle classes as by any political wisdom in furtherance of the joint interest of colony and metropolis.' (D. J. Duncanson: *Government and Revolution in Vietnam,* OUP, London, 1968, p. 103) Nguyen Khac Vien records that 'The French door - keeper at the University of Indochina earned three times as much as a Vietnamese professor.' (*The Long Resistance, 1958 - 1975,* Foreign Languages Publishing House, Hanoi, p.49). The metaphor (of 'outdoor relief') is, of course, Marx's.

8. In Burma, output per capita of cleaned rice fell from 0. 34 meric tons (average of 1920 - 24) to 0. 31 (average of 1930 - 34.) Output expressed in quintals per hectare (cleaned rice) fell from 10. 3 (1910 - 14) to 10.0 (1920 – 24) to 9. 4 (1930-34); source : A. H. Fenichel & W. G Huff: *The Impact of Colonialism on Burmese Economic Development,* Mc Gill University, Montreal, 1971, p. 45. In Thailand, the average yield of paddy fell from 4.88 piculs per rai in 1906–9 to 4.50 in 1921–24, 3.91 in 1930-34 and 3.13 in 1940-44 (J. C. Ingram : *Economic Change in Thailand 1850-1970,* Stanford U. P., Stanford, 1971, p. 48). At the same time as yields were falling, the percentage of the harvest sold and exported was rising, to compensate for falling rice prices on world markets. In Burma rice exports rose from 407,000 tons in 1921–25 to 687,200 in

1931-36 (from roughly 50% of the harvest to 65%), and in Thailand from 58,000 to 90,700 over the same period (from 39% to 48%); see Cheing Siok Hwa : *The Rice Industry of Burma*, University of Malaya Press, Singapore, 1968, p. 209, and J. C. Ingram : op. cit., p. 53. 'From 1920 to 1940 (in Thailand), the export percentage rose from 39 percent to 50 percent, and at the same time population steadily increased and yields declined. As a result of these trends the retained rice per capita fell during this period from 2.8 piculs to 1.7 piculs of cleaned rice. The 'normal yearly requirement' of celaned rice has been estimated at 2.4 piculs per capita, so that ... the domestic population reduced its consumption of rice far below the 'normal' level in the decade of the 1930's. (J.C. Ingram: op. cit., p. 52) (For a consideration of acceptable levels of diet in South East Asia see Appendix III, below.) The fact that Thailand was not formally a colony does not detract from the argument that it was colonial economics that brought about this disastrous state of affairs in the region: *economically* Thailand was almost as 'colonial' as its neighbours. In Vietnam, '...so important was the export market to the French that, according to French sources, the total amount of paddy left in the country for individual consumption fell from 262 kilograms in 1900 to 226 kilograms in 1913 to 182 kilograms in 1937. (Ngo Vinh Long: *Before the Revolution*, M.I.T. Press, London, 1973, p. 124) Vietnam's tribulations culminated in the horrendous famine during which, in the course of the few months from the end of 1944 to the early part of 1945, two million people died *in Tonkin alone* (Ngo Vinh Long: op. cit., p. 130).

9. 'The peasants had never liked the city that has been the seat of French colonial power. They grew even more hostile when...it became the citadel of the new mandarins, who adopted a Western life-style of great luxury in contrast to the to the dire poverty of the rural peasants.' (Charles Meyer: Rebuilding Cambodia: A Daring Gamble', New York Times, 16/5/75)

10. We have attempted elsewhere to give a brief impression of the divergence between myth and reality in pre-revolution Cambodia: see M. Caldwell & Lek Tan: *Cambodia in the Southaest Asian War*, Monthly Review Press, New York, 1973, chapters I and III.

11. This view is faithfully reflected in the Human Relations Area Files volume on *Cambodia.* (HRAF Press, New Haven, 1959). It is perhaps unfair to the authors to parade its weighty pontifications now, with the advantages of hindsight: it is, nevertheless, extremely salutory to see how wildly misled foreign 'experts' can be when they pass judgements on a country of which they can have only the most superficial impression, peering into it as they do *de haut en bas.* It is a very noticeable feature of most Western 'experts' on South East Asian countries that they suffer from the additional disadvantage –apart from their sheer foreign-ness–of having not the slightest inkling into the attitudes, values and aspirations of those on the 'other side' (from them) of the class struggle, *even in their own societies;* their inability to perceive, comprehend and articulate the attitudes, values and aspiarations of the South East Asian poor is in the circumstances surely understandable ! It does not, of course, excuse their pomposity, certitude and self-righteousness, nor lessen their guilt in consiously sustaining the *status quo* in the region.

12. The agricultural achievements of North Korea (the Democratic People's Republic of Korea - DPRK) are poorly served by the existing literature. Two recent books serve to introduce the subject : Ellen Brun & Jacques Hersh : *Socialist Korea,* Monthly Review Pess, New York 1976; and J. Gittings & G. Mc Cormack (eds.) : *Crisis in Korea,* Spokesman Books, Nottingham, 1977. During a visit to the DPRK in the summer of 1977 I saw for myself the advanced condition of agriculture and the rural areas, and I intend to record my impressions in due course. Curiously, Kampuchea, and North Korea have close relations, and North Korea is believed to be supplying some aid to Kampuchea.

13. The debauching influence of US 'aid' on Cambodian society and the Canbodian economy may be gauged from the following: W. Burchett: *Mekong Upstream,* Foreign Languages

Publishing House, Hanoi, 1957; W. Burchett: *Second Indochina War,* Lorrimer Publishing London, 1970; Chery Payer*The Debt Trap,* Monthly Review Press, New York, 1974; and the essays by M.L. Burstein anb W. F. Beazer in M. Allingham & M. L. Burstein (eds.): *Resource Allocation & Economic Policy,* Macmillan, London, 1976.

14. HRAF: op. cit.. p. 243

15. G. C. Hildebrand & G. Porter : *Cambodia: Starvation & Revolution,* Monthly Review Press, New York, 1976, p. 31; M. Caldwell & Lek Tan: op. cit., pp. 295-7.

16. G. C. Hildebrand & G. Porter: op cit., pp. 31-2.

17. G. C. Hildebrand & G. Porter; op. cit., chapter I *passim.*

18, See G, C. Hildebrand & G porter: op. cit., p, 111, fn. 16.

19. *US/Indochina Report,* 16/9/76, p.3.

20. For further reading see the Bibliography in HRAF : op. ct., pp. 307-17 ; for a list of bibiographies see M. Caldwell & Lek Tan : op.cit., p. 52, fn.1. See also : David P. Chandler : *The Land and People of Cambodia,* J.P. Lippincott Coy.; N. Y., 1972 ; Tan Kim Huon : *Geographie du Cambodge,* Imprimerie Ramsey, Phnom Penh, 1961.

21. Testimony of David P. Chandler to the Congressional "Human Rights in Cambodia" Hearing, 3/5/77, U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1977, p. 13.

22. For those subsequent to arrival of the French see M. Caldwell & Lek Tan : op cit., chapter I; see also English text of Prime Minister Pol Pot's 27/9/77 speech marking the Communist Party of Kampucheas's 17th anniversary (SWB, 1/10/77) for his characterisation of early peasant rebellions.

23. Charles Meyer: 'L' Insurrection Nationale de 1885-86', *Etudes Cambodgiennes,* no. 10, April-June 1967, P. 26; c. f. Ieng Sary, speech at the 18th National Day of Kingdom of Cambodia: 'Our slogan in the economic field is : 'rifle in one hand to kill the enemy, hoe in the other to do productive labour'', *(Journal of Contemporary Asia,* vol. 2, no. 1, 1972).

24, English text of 27/9/77 speech, P. 5.

25. M. Caldwell & Lek Tan : op. cit., pp. 25-26,285–7.

26. The works of G. D. H. Cole remain today as they have for so long been invaluable doorways to the history of the labour movement. See, for example, his *Short History of the British working-class Movement 1789-1947,* Allen & Unwin, London, 1948; see also E. P. Thompson : The Making of the English Working Class, Penguin, London' various editions.

27. Much of the available material is surveyed in T. M. Carney: *Communist Party Power in Kampuchea (Cambodia): Documents and Discussion,* Cornell University Southeast Asia Program, Data paper, no. 106, January 1977; see also the English text of the Pol Pot 17th anniversary speech.

28. We discuss this in *Cambodia in the Southeast Asian War, Passim;* for cogent, succint and up to date analysis of the consequences of the application of Western 'development' ideas see: R. Johnson: 'The Nature of the New Asian Powers – and the U. S. Stake in, 'Stability', *Peacework,* December 1977; Kim Yong Book & P.J. Harvey: *People Toiling under Pharaoh,* CCA/URM, Tokyo, 1976; and AMPO: *Free Trade Zones & Industrialization of Asia,* PARC, Tokyo, 1977.

29. See Ben Kiernan: 'Khieu Samphan: Cambodia's Revolutionary Leader', *Dyason House Papers,* Vol. I, no. 5, June, 1975.

30. Samir Amin is perhaps best known in the English speaking world for his books *Accumulation on a World Scale,* two vols., Monthly Review Press, New York, 1974, and *Unequal Development,* Monthly Review Press, New York, 1976.

In his book *L'Imperialisme et le Developpement Inegal*, Editions de Minuit, Paris, 1976, he interestingly devotes a chapter to Cambodia; this has been translated into English and published in *News from Kampuchea*. Vol. I, no. 5, December 1977. Khieu Samphan refers in his own thesis to Amin's 1957 thesis 'The Structural Effects of International Integration of Pre-capitalist Economies'.

31. See *Indochina Chronicle*, Sept.-Nov. 1976, P. 25,

32. Both Hou Youn and Hu Nim also gained Ph.D.'s: the first for work on agricultural credit, the other for a thesis on 'Les Services Public Economiques au Cambodge' in the Public Law Faculty, Royal University on Phnom Penh.

33. Laura Summers: 'The Cambodian Liberation Forces', *Indochina Chronicle*, July 1, 1972, P. 5.

34. Translated from the original Khmer by Boua Chanthou, unpublished TS.

35. it will be recalled that immediately after the liberation of Phnom Penh the outside world learned that the Kampuchean Revolution was being led by the mysterious Angkar (Organisation).

36. Phouk Chhay was president of the General Assembly of Khmer Students from 1967, joining the National United Front of Kampuchea (headed by Sihanouk) in 1970; he had a doctorate in political science from the University of Phnom Penh. Hu Nim became minister of Information in Sihanouk's Royal Government of National Union; Hou Yuon became Minister of Interor, Communal Reforms and Cooperatives, Since liberation in 1975 there have been persistent remours of their disappearance or deaths, but these have, up to now, always eventually been rebutted one way or another (see, for instance, *News from Kampuchea*, Vol. 1, no. 2, 1977, p. 27; Patrice de Beer: 'Cambodia's radical secrecy', *Le Monde* English section, *Guardian Weekly*, 4-12-77. The quotation in the text is from Laura Summers: op. cit., p. 5.

37. See M. Caldwell & Lek Tan: op. cit.; among works published subsequently, I should mention the following:

38. I use the epithet "so-called" in no derogatory way but simply to indicate that the dascription "Khmer Rouge" (Red Cambodians), applied to them first notably by Sihanouk when he was still ruler in Phnom Penh and therefore opposed to them, came to be the generally used appellation in reporting of the 1970-75 war and of its immediate aftermath; Sihanouk himself continued to use it on occasion after joining forces with the guerrilla. But in Cambodia itself the revolutionaries were known generally as *Angkar Padevat* (the "Revolutionary Organisation") or just as *Angkar*. For the record, it should be noted that, before his deposition, Sihanouk used also to refer to the "Khmer Viet-Minh" - hinting at both an allegiance to Hanoi *and* a continuous existence dating back to the anti-French armed struggle. Other appellations worth listing here are Khmer Issarak. Khmer *Sanai*

(add to footnote 38 the following :)

Ben kiernan records that "During the 1960's, the Cambodian Communist Party was known colloquially as the *Kanapak Mongkol*, or Party of the Plough'. ("Social Cohesion in Revolutionary Cambodia", *Australian Outlook*, vol. 30, no. 3, Dec. 1976, p. 378).

39. Between 1969 and 1973, more than 500,000 tons of bombs were dropped on the Cambodian countryside. To put this in perspective,

40. Ben Kiernan: "Social Cohesion in Revolutionary Cambodia,', *Australian* (add to footnote 40 the following :)

It should be noted that the area of Japan is 369,881 sq.kms, while that of Cambodia is 181, 035, and that Japan had *some* anti - aircraft guns and other defences (such as fighters).

42. Total casualties of the fighting are hard to compute: the attempt to arrive at an accurate estimate is bedevilled by all the complications and distortions which becloud the "mass-

acres" controversy (see Appendix I, above). The official Kampuchean estimates were given by Hu Nim, Information Minister, in a communique of 31/3/76, as follows:

— in the liberated zones, around 400,000 killed, including men, women, children, the old babies and bonzes;

— in the zones provisionally held by the enemy, a roughly similar figure (400,000);

— 240,000 wounded, of whom 40,000 totally disabled;

— in all, therefore, a total of more than one million killed and wounded.

Given the difference in population between the two countries at the respective periods, therefore, the war in Kampuchea was as bloody as that in Korea twenty years before N.Y.T., 16/5/75.

44. The quotation is from an opponent of the Khmer Rouge who having visited their areas left their ranks to warn those in Phnom Penh of the challenge posed by them to the established order; see Ith Sarin : *Regrets of Khmer Soul,* Phnom Penh, 1973, cited B. Kiernan: op: cit., p. 379.

45. See M. Vickery: "Looking Back at Cambodia", *Westerly*, no. 4 Dec. 1976.

46. Jon Swain (Sunday Times, 18/4/76) is among the more hysterical in this vein in his article "Combodia is convulsed as Khmer Rouge wipe out a civilisation"; it is hard to catch accurately the screeching tone of this disgraceful piece of tendentious reporting. It is clear that the revolutionaries did strive to eliminate influences that were *truly* alien, what they dubbed "facist and corrupt US style" : "Since our victory, our revolutionary Army, who are very strong both physically and morally, have erased this bad memory from the minds of our youth, replacing it with our real culture, civilisation and customs, which are the heritage of our ancestors from the time of Angkor". (Phnom Penh Radio, 14/5/75, cited B. Kiernan : op. cited., p. 378). A young girl from the liberated areas told Chou Meng & Shana Tarr *(News from Kampuchea,* vol. 1. no. 1, 1977) : "... the revolution aimed to retain those aspects of traditional culture that are good ...,, and made it clear that Khmer culture was important. So much one would have thought was self-evident even from the trickle of information that escapes to the West through the dense curtains of news suppression, inversion, and perversion, that have been laid in layers since liberation by the Western media, the Western: "experts" the very *flag* chosen by Democratic Kampuchea speaks volumes ! Radio Phnom Penh constantly broadcasts"... songs and folk tunes known to generations of Cambodians, The songs are sung to the accompaniment of reed oboes, wooden xylophones, two-stringed Oriental violins and other traditional instruments ..', The songs invariably portray an idealized peasant-led society ... One lyric goes :

There was an old saying : We farm with water,

We make war with rice.

It fits the present time perfectly,

We should drive to plant every inch of ground.,'

(*International Herald Tribune,* 13-14/11/76.)

47. See footnote 27, above. See also: B. Kiernan: "The Samlaut Rebellion and its Aftermath, 1967-70: The Origins of Combodia's Liberation Movement", part I, Working paper no. 4 of the Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University, Melbourne, 1975.

48. B. Kiernan, of cit., P. 44.

49. B. Kiernan : "The Samlaut Rebellion and its Aftermath, 1967-70: The Origins of Cambodia's Liberation movement ", Part II, working Paper no. 5 of the Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University, Melbourne, 1976, pp. 1, 7, 12.

50. B. Kiernan : op. cit., p. 21.

51. B. Kiernan : op. cit., p. 26.

52. For the derisory French efforts see G. Porter & G. Hildebrand: op. cit., p. 60, and for the almost equally inconsequential US attempts the same authors, pp. 61-2.

53. B. Kiernan : op. cit., p.13.

54. B. Kiernan : "Social Cohesion in Revolutionary Cambodia", Australian Outlook, December 1975, vol 30, no. 3, p. 382,

55. B. Kiernan : op. cit.. pp. 382-3. As early as a year after the freeing of phnom penh a Vietnamese refugee was able to cross Cambodia from east to west on foot, working as he went, without seeing a sign of coercion (see *Financial Times,* 30/1/78).

56. "We could develop production because the agrarian structure - all the old agrarian structure - was destroyed in the war." (Cambodian diplomat, cited G. Hildebrand & G. Porter op. cit., pp. 70-71. See also B. Kiernan : op. cit., pp. 382-3

57. Cited G. Hildebrand & G. Porter :op. cit., p.73.

58. ibid

59. G. Hildebrand & G. Porter: op. cit., p. 75. They comment : "This was the first widespread dry season production of rice in Cambodia in nearly six hundred years", adding in a footnote the following significant information "When the Chinese traveller Chou Ta-kuan visited Angkor in 1296, he found the peasants cultivating two and three crops a year, which was possible because of the well developed water-management system. These rice crops in turn were the foundation of the power and prosperity of the old Cambodian empire, which then included South Vietnam and much of Thailand and Laos. In the following century wars with the Thai brought the neglect and destruction of the hydraulic system.

60. G. Hildebrand & G. Porter : op. cit., pp. 75-6.

61. G. Hildebrand & G. Porter : op. cit., p. 77.

62. G. Hildebrand & G. Porter : op. cit.' p. 79.

63. G. Hildebrand & G. Porter : op. cit., p. 81.

64. G. Hildebrand & G. Porter: op. cit., pp. 78-79

65. B. Kiernan : op. cit., p. 385.

66. *New York Times,* 23-1-78.

67. G. Hildebrand & G. Porter: op. cit., p. 85.

68. G. Hildebrand & G. Porter: op. cit., pp. 85-6; for a discussion of dietary criteria see Appendix III.

69. *Financial Times,* 12-3-76.

70. G. Hildebrand & G. Porter: op. cit., p. 86.

71, Unpublished typescript; *parts* of this typescript appear in *News from Kampuchea,* vol. I, no. 4, pp. 32-39.

72. *International Herald Tribune,* 8-3-76.

73. *Guardian* (London), 29-4-76.

74. *Financial Times.* 30-1-78.

75. See O. P. Chandler (with B. Kiernan & Muy Hong Lim) : *The Early Phases of Liberation in Northwestern Cambodia : Conversations with Peang Sophi,* working Paper no. 10, Centre of southeast Asian Studies, Monash University, Melbourne.

76. *Indochina News Chronicle,* vol. 1, no. 10, Dec.1976.

77. See fn. 71 above.

78. Harish Chandola. "Cambodia begins new life", *Holiday,* 27.6-76.

79. *Vietnam Courier,* 52, Sept. 1976, p. 6.

80. A spokesman of Democratic Kampuchea in Paris quoted by *Guardian* (N.Y.) correspondent, 28-4-76.

81. Thiounn Prasith, Kampuchean Ambassador to the United Nations, *International Herald Tribune,* 26-4-76; one pound=454 grams (see Appendix III).

82. Pol Pot, in *Vietnam Courier,* 52, Sept. 1976, p. 5. C. f. : "The size of the 1975 wet season harvest makes ... exports already feasible in 1976...The 2.2 million tons of rice reaped in the first postwar years, less 1 million tons needed for domestic consumption and the amount needed for seed, will free for export five or six times the volume of the prewar period. This year (1976 ... water control will have been established over a total cultivated area of 3 million hectares. In addition to careful seed selection, the use of natural fertilisers – compost, animal manure, river silt, anti-hill earth; and cave soil-is being encouraged. These measures are expected to produce 5 million tons of rice for export in the near future." (G. Hildebrand & G. Porter : Op. cit., p. 88). For comparison, production in the peak pre-liberation post-1945 year (1956–57) was 1.5 million tons, of which about 230,000 tons were exported HRAF op. cit., p. 198.

83. Since what has happened in Kampuchea will undoubtedly be widely studied and pondered by leaders and cadres of other peasant movements, it is possible to speak of the Kampuchean model, but we ought to bear in mind that Kampuchea's leaders tirelessly reiterate that (to quote a recent formulation "...only when communist and workers' parties establish guiding theories and policies to meet the specific realities of their own countries and carry out the revolution independently and in accordance with the efforts of their own people can victory be won..." (Joint communique by the DPRK and Kampuchea on the visit of Pol Pot to Pyongyang, 8/10/77).

84, *New York Times,* 23/1/78.

85. Figures from the 27/9/77 speech in phnom Penh by Pol Pot celebrating the 17th anniversary of the founding of the Communist Party o fKampuchea.

86. *International Herald Tribune,* 24/3/78.

87. See *Democratic Kampuchea is Moving Forward,* Phnom Penh (?), 1977. p, 12.

88. In 1974: only about 3 % of Cambodia's cultivated land was irrigated; today all but the most unsuitable land has been opened to irrigation, improvements in which go on all the time (see G. Hildebrand & G. Porter : op, cit., p. 62 *Ta kung pao,* 20/1/77 and 29/12/77;*Democratic Kampuchea is Moving Forward).*

89. In his 17/1/78 speech in Phnom Penh commemorating the 10th anniversary of the founding of the Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea, Pol Pot called on the people "to impetuously fulfil the 1977's plan of 3 tons and 6 tons per hectare and the 1978's plan of 3.5 tons and 7 tons per hectare"; in the absence of further clarification it is hard to know what to make of this - it has been suggested that the first figure in each case is for yield per *planting*, the other, higher, one for total yield over the year of two or even three harvests. A Combodian friend, however, suggests that the first figure is the average yield and and the other for most favoured districts - perhaps serving the double purpose of acting as an ideal towards which other areas should aim.

90. *International Herald Tribune*, 24/3/78.

91. G. Hildebrand & G. Porter : op. cit , p.62; according to them, the total fertiliser used in Cambodia before the revolution would, if spread out over all the fields. have given only an average of 5 kg. per hectare (compared with the 800 kg. average of Japan); according to *Democratic Kampuchea is Moving Forward,* application of natural fertilisers now averages 10 *tons* per hectare (pp. 14, 15).

92. *International Herald Tribune,* 19/4/77.

93. The figure was made public in a number of speeche s: for instance that by leng Sary at the 32nd Session of U. N. General Assembly, 11/10/77 : for an assessment of the figure see Appendix III.

94. *Le Monde*, 21-22/8/77.

95. *Democratic Kampuchea is Moving Forward*, p. 22

96. *International Herald Tribune*, 24/3/78.

97. *Democratic Kampuchea is Moving Forward*, p. 29.

98. See S. A. Resnick: "Decline of Rural Industry under Export Expansion", *Journal of Economic History*, vol. XXX, no. 1, 1970.

99. *International Herald Tribune*, 19/4/77.

100. Ieng Sary, U.N, 11/10/77; Ieng Sary, *Der Spiegel*, May, 1977.

101. Communique of the Minister of Information and Propaganda, Hu Nim, 31/3/76.

102. Pol Pot, 27/9/77.

103. *Democratic Kampuchea is Moving Forward*, p. 49

104. *New York Times*, 23/1/78 *International Herald Tribune*, 24/3/78.

105. *New York Times*, 23/1/78; even the country's leaders are apparently still dispersed "well away from human habitations" (*Le Monde*,21-22/8/77)

106. *New York Times*, 23/1/78.

107. *International Herald Tribune*, 24/3/78.

108. *New York Times* 23/1/78.

109. G. Hildebrand & G. Porter: op. cit., pp. 93-4.

110. No understanding of specifics of Cambodia is possible without some acquaintance with the conclusions of modern scholarship on American imperialism. Two recent books in this field: L.H. Shoup & W. Minter: *Imperial Brain Trust*, Monthly Review Press, N.Y., 1977; Noam Chomsky: *'Human Rights' and American Foreign Policy*, Spokesman Books, Nottingham, 1978.

111. Including Japan, and to some extent and for some purposes Russia and the countries of Eastern Europe; the Soviet bloc countries certainly *strive* after the living standards attained in the Western capitalist countries proper, but they are far from attaining them in practice; moreover, they do not have many of the freedoms which, whatever their limitations in coverage, are regarded at least as positive features of the Western capitalist countries proper.

112. See, for instance: J. Gittings & G. McCormack (eds.): *Crisis in Korea*, Spokesman Books, Nottingham, 1977; *Journal of Contemporary Asia* Special Issue on Korea, vol. V, no. 2, 1975; T. J. Byres & P. Nolan: *Inequalities between Nations-Inequality: India and China Compared 1950-70*, The Open University, Milton Keynes, 1976; Frances V. Moulder: *Japan, China and the modern world ecnomy*, CUP, Cambridge, 1977. I do not intend to elaborate on the significance and relevance of these various contrasts here, but it is perhaps worth making a few points. Most treatments of the very striking contrast between North Korea (the DPRK) and South Korea (the ROK) concentrate upon elements-the military balance, comparative industrialisation - which are really of little or no long-term relevance; what will count in the long-run is the all-round balance and self-sufficiency of the respective economies, and here the DPRK so obviously out-achieves the ROK that there is no strict comparison, for while the North might well serve as a model for how to attain food self-reliance, the South could equally well be cited as an extreme example of neo-colonial food dependency. The comparison between present-day China and present-day India has obvious relevance to the Combodian case, for again China, having had a peasant revolution, has established food self-reliance and a sound guaranteed diet for all, while India, not having had such a revolution, not only remains dependent upon food imports but signally fails to provide an adequate diet for all. Finally, the comparison undertaken by Frances Moulder of 19th century China and 19th century Japan may not immediately appear of great relevance until it is recalled that two important elements in Japan's success in contrast to China's failure is development is and from

the 19th century were, first retaining the agricultural surplus inside the country for application to domestic purposes, and second, preventing foreign investment from taking over control and disposal of local resources ("retaining the agricultural surplus inside the country for application to domestic purposes" does not, of course, necessarily mean *not exporting;* if the *proceeds* of exporting are applied to local development purposes the surplus is obviously retained; if, on the other hand, agricultural surplus product is disposed of by an elite which spends the proceeds on importing luxuy consumer goods produced abroad, the surplus is obviously not retained for application to domestic purposes.)

113. The post - 1949 Chinese experiense is highly significant in this respect, but one could cite innumerable other instances such as the survival of the self-reliant Rangpur villages in Bangladesh during the 1974 famine: "In the Rangpur district, one of the hardest hit in Bangladesh, 80,000 to 100,000 people died of starvation in only a few months. But in the self-reliant villages...no one died of hunger. These villages *refused* government assistance and instead collectively arranged for food contributions from anyone with a surplus. The food collected went to those without food, in exchange for work or other repayment collectively agreed upon." (F. M. Lappe & J. Collins: *Food First,* Houghton Miffin, Boston, 1977, pp. 397-8.)

114. See T. G. Cannon: "'Natural' Disasters and the Third World", in N. Smith, M. Forbes, & M. Kershaw (eds.): *Geography, Social Welfare and Under development,* Journal of St. Andrews Geographers Special Publication No. 2, n.d...

115. See, for oxample, R. G. Wilkinson: *Poverty and Progress,* Methuen, London, 1973; M. Harris: *Cannibals and Kings,* Random House, N. Y., 1977. Historically, there appears to have been a secular *increase* in natural, disasters-see P.O. Keefe, K. Westgate & B. Wisner: "Taking the naturalness out of natural disasters", *Nature* 260, April 15, 1976.

116. This is the broad theme of my book *The Wealth of Some Nations,* Zed Press, London, 1977.

117. Such an interpretation is explicit or implicit in the countless media prominence of what are universally seen as "pragmatic" "modernizers" in post Mao China It is, as it always has been also the orthodox Trotskyist position: in this view, the only solution to the problem of providing an adequate diet to the rural peoples of Asia is "...the extension of revolution to the industrially advanced countries of the world and the establishment of a revolutionary regime where the workers...can be inspired to undergo the difficulties of making sacrifices in order to lift up humanity as a whole" (T. Kerry: *The Mao Myth,* Pathfinder Press, N. Y., 1977, p. 68). I myself have to confess that I have never understood *how* workers in advanced countries can help food producers in poor countries: peasants can readily do without everything coming out of a factory, but even the most politically - conscious workers in the world need the food grown by peasants! Historically, the "sacrifices" have been (necessarily!) made by the peasants to the benefit of workers; this situation still broadly prevails worldwide.

118. It is perhaps confusing to use the phrase "second path to capitalism" because of Marx's specific usage of the term (*Capital,* Vol. III) and subsequent debate (surveyed in Stephen Resnick: "The Second Path to Capitalism", *Journal of Contemporary Asia,* vol. 3, no. 2, 1973). All I mean by it in this context is a Path to autonomous national capitalism distinct from the first with its dependence upon colonialism and imperialism. Much naive development literature seems to assume that numerous other third world countries can follow a Japan-type development strategy without imperialism and without Japen's early wariness of foreign investment; it is this assumption I query in querying the validity of a "second path to capitalism". It is extremely doubtful, in my opinion, whether any business and political leaders in either the over-developed neo-imperialist rich capitalist countries or in the poorer neo-colonial thirld world countries believe in this "second path" :both groups are interested in profits and if these

can best be realised by perpetuating dependency in the poorer parts of the empire then dependency will be perpetuated. In any case it is ludicrous to suppose that a Brazil or a South Korea or an Indonesia could *ever* develop, along US-Western European lines, to the point where it could seriously challenge *as an equal* the power of those who took the "first path". Besides, as I argue in the text, the idea that the "second path" leads to the same goal as the first, or could so lead, or is in the samedirection or covers same ground, is fallacious.

119. F. Lappe & J. Collins: op. cit., p. 200.

120. H. Girardet (ed.): *Land for the People*, Crescent Press, London, 1976.

121. The FAO Farm Mechanization Working Group includes representatives of Caterpillars Tractors, John Deere, Fiat, FMC, Massey-Ferguson, Mitsui, British Petroleum, and Shell, while its Integrated Meat Development Working Group has as key members the U.S. giants Ralston Purina and Rockefeller's Arbor Acres (see F. Lappe & Collins, op. cit., pp. 152, 277.)

122. There is now an enormous bibliography on the Green Revolution: see F. Lappe and Collins: op. cit., Part V and references to pp. 111–178 See also Kathleen Gough: "Green Revolution in South India and North Vietnam", *Monthly Review*, January 1978; Kathleen Gough's reservations about

Vietnam are interesting both because Vietnam has chosen an "orthodox" development strategy, compared with Kampuchea, and because she can only see one way out of the dilemmas this orthodox mode pose for Vietnam - revolution in the USA (and India !) (the Trotskyist "solution"; Ms. Gough has been influenced by Fourth International currents of thought and analysis).

123. See, e.g., their pp. 138–142, 149-50.

124. See, e.g., the Mexican case, F. Lappe & J. Collins: op. cit., pp. 254–8

125. F. Lappe & J. Collins: op. cit., p. 145; for an interesting plea by a member of the British Communist Party for small-scale farming, based on an analysis of the history of agriculture in the West and in the Soviet bloc, see Jack Dunman: *Agriculture - Capitalist & Socialist*, Lawrence & Wishart, London, 1975.

126. F. Lappe & J. Collins: op. cit., p. 146.

127. D. H. Grist: *Rice* Longman, London, 1975, p. 485; where yields have gone up-for instance in the Asian socialist countries as a result of liberation of the peasant-they have been balanced out in the world picture by falling yields - as in neo-colonial third world countries outside favoured "Kulak" enclaves.

128. See G. Leach Energy and *Food Production*, IPC Science and Technology Press, Guildford. 1976.

129. Draft/animals of course originally dovetailed into the *gestalt* of subsistence production - eating what human beings couldn't eat and transforming it into food humans could eat (milk, meat); at a more intensive stage, special pasture had deliberately to be cultivated for their support, and at this point, depending upon specific cost-benefit factors, different systems made different decisions on the question of how much meat protein could be afforded (i. e. how much vegetable foodstuff could be spared from human consumption to support animals). See the interesting discussion of this point in M. Harris: *Cannibals and Kings*, Random House, New York, 1977.

130. For a good brief account see B. A. Holderness: *Pre-Industrial England-Economy and Society 1500-1750*, J. M. Dent & Sons, London, 1976, pp. 61 et sed.

131. The case against nuclear energy proceeds upon the two legs of *practicality* and *security:* the first has *not yet* been proved and the second *cannot* be: "...with the industrial-scale use and disposal of long - lived radio isotopes we have moved into a completely new-and possibly terminal - dimension of hazard. What is involved is very much more than the fami-

liar and temporary inconvenience of terrorist takeover or a blitzkrieg with enhanced death role. It is the inexorable accumulation of watse for which no foolproof means of storage has yet been devised, and possibly may never be. The period of undisturbed storage will have to run into thousands or tens of thousands, of years; an unforeseen accident at any time in that period willhave irremediable consequences, likely to remove the prospect of survival of higher forms of life in that area for many thousands of years and, if repeated, over the entire globe. It means the not biologically unfamiliar extinction of a species by its own toxic products..." (G. J. Dutton, Professor of Pharmacological Biochemistry in *The Times*, 3/4/78. That there already have been nulear waste accidents is revealed by Zhores Medvedev in his book *Hazards of Nuclea rPower* (with Alan Roberts, Spokesman Books, Nottingham, 1977). The case against electricity as such is argued in D. Hayes: *Rays of Hope*, Norton & Co., N. Y., 1977.

132. F. Lappe & J. Collins: op. cit., p. 376; emphasis in the original.

133. "Review of the Month", *Monthly Review*, February 1978, p. 7; emphasis added.

134. Cheryl Payer: "Joining the Oligopoly", *Monthly Review*, February 1978, p. 52.

135. F. LaPpe & J. Corlins: op. cit., p.15.

136. F. Lappe & J. Collins: op. cit., p. 123.

137. F. Lappe & J. Collins: pp. 127, 129.

138. F. Lappe & J. Collins: op. cit., pp. 131-2, 201-2.

139. F. Lappe & J. Collins: op. cit., pp. 157

140. do 141-2.

14.1 "... in the countryside, the landlords. moneylenders, and merchants who apporiate so much of the surplus generally do *not* reinvest it; rather' they tend to spend it on imported luxury goods and expensive consumer items manufactured in foreign-style factories that use up large amounts of capital and provide little employment. Even when they do invest... it is invariably abroad or nonproductively, for instance, in hotels, bars, restaurants, rental property; taxis and the like." (F.Lappe & J. Collins: op. cit.. p. 385).

142. F.Lappe & J. Collins: op. clt., p.350.

143. F.Lappe & J. Collins: op.cit., p.214.

144. F.Lappe & J. Collins: op. cit., p.244.

145. Kim Yong Bock & P. J. Harvey: (eds) *People Toiling Under Pharaoh*, URM/CCA, Tokyo, 1976,p.43.

146. S. P.Bayani: *What's Happening in the Philippines?*, Far East Reporter, November, 1976.

147. Kim Yong Bock & P. J. Harvey :(eds) op. cit., p.60.

148. W. Bello & S. Rivera (eds).: *The Logistics of Repression*. Friends of the Fflipino People, New York, 1977, P. 115,79.

149. S. P Bayani: op. cit,.

150. See M. Caldwell (ed.): *Ten Years' Militay Terror in Indonesia*, Spokesman Books, Nottingham, 1975; M. Caldwell &E. utrecht :*Indonesia Since 1800*, Zed Press, London, 1978; M.Caldwell: "Oilin South East Asia", in E. Utrecht (ed.):

151. FUENSSO :*20 Years After Merdeka*, London, 1977, p.15.

152. C. Hirschman: ":Economic progress in Malaysia- How widely has it been shared?", *UMBC Economic Review*, Vol.X, no.2, 1974, p. 5.

153. Syed Hussein Al-atas: "The Second Malaysia Plan 1971-75- A Critique", cited in FUEMSSO: op. cit., p. 10.

154. For a full analysis of the Malayan economy see M. Caldwell & M. Amin (eds): *Malaya- Model of Neo-colony*, Spokesma Books, Nottingham, forthcoming.

155. F. Lappe & J. Collins: op. cit., p. 185. In fact, the life of the settlers was never as rosy as is sggested in the authors'

account: see "The Plight of Federal Land Development Authority Settlers in Malaya", Journal of Contemporary Asia, vol.-3 No. 3. 1973; and "Rubber: The People's True Story", Journal of contemporary Asia, vol. 5, no.3, 1975.

156. See *FUEMSSO News Service*, vol. 4, no. 2, 1/2/78.

157. See M. Caldwell & M. Amin: *Malaya–The Making of a Neo–colony*, Spokesman Books, Nottingham, 1977.

158. A. Turton, J. Fast & Caldwell (eds): *Thailand – The Roots of crisis*, Spokesman Books, Nottingham, 1978.

159. "A cadre of the Socialist Party of Thailand, committed to parliamentary procedure but attacked as communist by the government, (said): 'The Communist Party of Thailand has tried for 35 years to recruit intellectuals – the results: only one Ph. D. from Japan and one 'incomplete' from Thammasat University. Now (since the October 1976 *coup*), without lifing a hand, they have thousands of them." Russell Johnson: "The Nature of the new Asian Powers and the US Stake in 'Stability' ", *Peacework*, December 1977. The cadre in fact rather underestimates CPT success prior to 1976 (see reference in footnote 158).

160. All quotes from Russell Johnson: op. cit.,

161. Nor is this view restricted, as one might imag ine it would be, to ardent academic proponents of the merits of capitalism; a school of left-wing theorists is also persuaded–or has pursuaded itself–that capitalism has the legs to make the running... (see for example, *New Left Review*, no. 81; but in fact mechanical Marxist and Trotskyist analysis *must* lead to this kind of conclusion).

162. I claim no originality for what follows. Indeed the argument will be familiar to most readers from such systematic accounts and analyses as those of S. Amin (*Accumulation of a World Scale*, MR Press, N.Y., P974; *Unequal Development*, MR Press, N. Y., 1976).

163. Leaving aside the specific historical particulars which totally and irrevocably alienated Kampuchea's leaders and the Russian and East Europeans (see M. Caldwell & Lek Tan: op. cit.), and the continuing circumstances which sever ties and sympathies today, it seems safe to conclude from the Chinese experience that *any* poor third world country must inevitably be led to conclude that Soviet experience is totally irrelevant to its problems. (China was, when sought to benefit from Russain advice and example, much nearer in time and important circumstances – e.g. size – to Russia at the time of the Bolshevik revolution than any other Third world country on its liberation ever subsequently was or could be.)

164. See M. Caldwell & N. Jeffery (eds.): *Planning and Urbanism in China*, Pergamon Press, Oxford, 1977. For recent economic analysis see articles by J, Perry and R. Berger in Eastern Horizon, vol. XVII, no. 1, January 1978.

165. Neville Maxwell: "China shows how the tide of famine can be turned", Sunday Times, 8/12/74.

166. Compare, for instance, the analysis of classes and contradictions in Pol Pot's 27/9/77 and Mao's on the correct handling of contradictions among the people.

167. T.P. Bernstein: Up to the Mountains and Down to urbanism the Villages, Yale U. P., New Haven, 1977; see e.g., pp.4–5.

168. Without attempting a bibliography here, I would particularly recommend attention to the articles of the Alec Gordon, including "The 'Green Revolution' in North Vietnam", Journal of Contemporary Asia, Vol. 4, no. 1, 1974, and "Role of Class Struggle in North Vietnam", Monthly Review, January 1978.

169. See, e.g.. "Agriculture in Vietnam – CPV Central Committee Resolution", Journal of Contemporary Asia, vol. 7, no. 4, 1977.

170. "The Situation in Vietnam - Pham Van Dong's Speech at Hanoi Meeting on Ist September, 1977", *Journl of Contemporary Asia*, vol. 7, no 4, p. 567.

171. ibid, p.571.

172. See reference, footnote 169, p. 576,

173. Vietnamese negotiations with foreign oil companies, including western ones, are regularly covered in *Petroleum News Southeast Asia* (monthly, Hong Kong); the Vietnamese law concerning foreign investment has been published and widely discussed (for text see *Vietnam Courier,* no. 62, July 1977); economic aid has been sought from many sources, but of course particular emphasis has been put upon the aid promised them by the USA during the peace negotiations-aid to which the Vietnamese are more than entitled and which we should all support them in demanding; tourism has been actively developed since the liberation of Ho Chi Minh City (formerly Saigon). Kampuchea condemns all foreign investment,' rejects all aid, and prohibits tourism.

174. There are also, of course, notable differences in emphasis; I hope shortly to undertake a detailed comparison of the two countries.

175. The best single reference in English is: E. Brun & J. Hersh: *Socialist Korea,* Monthly Review Press, N. Y., 1976.

176. E. Brun & J. Hersh: "North Korea-Default of a Model or a Model in Default?" *Monthly Review,* February 1978, p. 21.

177. E. Brun & J. Hersh: op. cit., pp. 26–7.

178. Samir Amin: Accumulation on a World Scale, Monthly Review Press, N. Y., 1974, vol. I. p. 64.

179. Adam Smith's celebrated Wealth of Nations was first published in 1776 and has been re-issued in countlese editions since. A good introduction to it is to be found in A. Gray: The Development of Economic Doctrine, Longmans, London, 1931, and several editions since.

180. It is vital to read in this context Arghiri Emmanuel,s Unequal Exchange, NLB, London, 1972. Useful evaluations of Emmanuel's thesis are to be found in E. Mandel's Late Capitalism, NLB, London, 1975 and M. B. Brown: The Economics of Imperialism, Penguins, London, 1975.

181. M. Harris: op. cit., p. x.

182. E. Luttwak: The Military Strategy of the late Roman Empire, MIT Press, N.Y. 1977. It is interesting that those who people the most prestigious and semi-official US "think-tanks" - and those who appoint them and listen to their advice-now accept the analogy with the end of the Roman Empire which they (or those in comparable positions then) rejected with ridicule and vehemence when we in the anti-war movement put it forward during the height of the Vietnam war in the mid-1960's; not only does the Establishment now accept the analogy, it is trying feverishly to learn what lessons it can from it in order to cushion its own decline (and fall) !

183. See, e.g., L. S. Stavrianous: The Promise of the Coming Dark Ages, W. H. Freeman & Co., San Francisco, 1976.

184. The work of Ivan Illich are well known in this respect. Two quite different perspectives which are also of interest and relevance are to be found in the book Social Limits to Growth by F. Hirsch (Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1976) and in the periodical Zerowork; a Marxist journal critical of the elitist bias built into all attempts to appropriate the surplus – whether undertaken by capitalists or by the leaders of "vanguard parties".

185. Back to the land movements are now widespread in most parts of the over-developed world; a British manifesto is: H. Girardet (ed.): Land for the People, Crescent Press, London, 1977.

186. The similarity in tone between some of the comments I have quoted from the Kampuchean Left and some of those expressed in Western "anti-development" literature is striking: see, e.g., "Waste Production and Overdevelopment", Journal of Peace Research, vol. XIV, no. 4, 1977, by Dag Poleszynski.

187. For an account of the Narita struggle see the special number of AMPO, vol. 9, no. 4, 1977, entitled "Sanri-zuka: 1966 – 1977 – The People Live", (obtainable from P.O. Box 5250, Tokyo International Japan).

188. Such neo-colonial anamolies as Singapore and Hong Kong are not exceptions: Singapore is part of the country of Malaya and Hong Kong is part of the country China.

189. See N. Georgescu – Roegen: The Entropy Law and the Economic Process, Harvard U. P., Cambridge, mass., 1971.

★★