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Cambodia: Model of the Nixon Doctrine

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"Cambodia is the Nixon Doctrine in its purest form."
Richard Nixon, December 12, 1971.

IT IS IMPOSSIBLE to write about political events in Cambodia from the point of view of what Cambodians themselves might be hoping for or trying to do. Much of what is happening in their country is not, strictly speaking, Cambodian politics, but the result or repercussion of American interventions in Cambodian affairs. For this reason it is inappropriate to ask what is happening in Cambodia or how the war there is developing. In 1973, the appropriate questions became: what is being done to Cambodia, by whom, for what reasons and with what consequences for the future of that state? These questions cannot be addressed without considering Cambodia's developmental situation prior to the war as well as the implications of the Nixon Doctrine for which Cambodia was declared the model. The conclusion of this examination is that American policy alone is the largest single factor in the continuation of the Cambodian war and the destruction of Cambodia's human and natural resources. Rather than providing a model of successful foreign policy, Cambodia is a human and national sacrifice to a presidential prescription for prolonged Indochina adventures.

The Cambodian war began in 1970 when Lieutenant General Lon Nol's army backed a parliamentary-Cabinet coup against Cambodia's Chief of State and former King, Prince Norodom Sihanouk. Official propaganda at the time charged Prince Sihanouk with treason for permitting Vietnamese revolutionaries to use Cambodian territory for rear base areas, supply

routes and for transit. The real motive was later revealed as simple economic and political expediency.¹ Cambodia was bankrupt after teetering precariously on the edge of collapse for four years. Bureaucratic, parliamentary and economic elites were deeply frustrated by Sihanouk's personal domination of public life. In addition, they were fearful that he neither would nor could guarantee their economic and political survival, which was threatened by rising inflation, by increasing rural insurgency, and by generalized administrative disorder, corruption and poverty. In a phrase, the coup was the logical consequence of accumulated grievances and unresolved developmental dilemmas generated over the course of Cambodia's political and economic evolution since 1954, although it might not have occurred when it did except for a specific foreign interest in its execution.

During the 1960's, three alternative routes to national development confronted the Cambodian government. The first involved a sharp reduction in foreign expenditures to curtail foreign penetration of the Cambodian market, price controls, production incentives and ideological mobilization for sustained autarchy, and industrial development. This was a difficult political policy at a time when the superpowers were competing for hegemony in the third-world states and markets. Nevertheless, its advocates believed total self-sufficiency was the only corrective for Cambodia's poorly integrated national economy, formerly one part of French Indochina, and her only hope for continued national independence.

A second developmental scheme theoretically incorporated many elements of autarchy on the sub-national level while advocating an active search for additional, foreign revenues on a state level. Prince Sihanouk, who favored this approach, urged intensive development of the tourist industry, the creation of a free

¹ T. D. Allman, "Who Tripped Sihanouk?" *Manchester Guardian*, September 6, 1971.

(French) franc trading zone in Sihanoukville (KOMPONG SON), and, in 1969, the use of multilateral development loans. His program of building up national resources while consuming foreign resources embodied two fundamental contradictions. On the mass level, he permitted limited free trade along the Cambodian-South Vietnamese border, thus removing the pressure or the incentives to produce locally what could be purchased from the Vietnamese. On the elite level, the Prince asked for a radical reform of administrative values and organization in advocating autarchic programs; at the same time, his interest in obtaining foreign assistance suggested that he was not totally committed to reform. From the point of view of the bureaucracy and the army, there was little incentive to reduce inefficiency, freeze salaries or payrolls, curtail corruption, limit expenditures and redirect resources from the tertiary to the primary sector if an "era of plenty"—foreign aid for all—was about to return. Few individuals or ministries were prepared to be the first to cut back lest they be disadvantaged in the pending scramble for foreign largesse.² The effect of the relative deprivation created by the extended economic crisis was to place private interests above those of the public.

The third possibility discussed by Cambodian elites was to seek the foreign aid required to maintain and to expand existing programs and structures and to forgo the difficult administrative reforms and policies required to generate more national resources. Hardly a program for development, this alternative masked a preference for non-development and preservation of the existing socio-economic status quo. Populist and autarchic rhetoric notwithstanding, the status quo under the Sihanouk regime favored the urban, administrative middle classes. The lack of sustained attention to agrarian and industrial sectors had, in fact, produced the inevitable economic crunch; it was unrealistic for the national administration to expect substan-

² The expressions "era of plenty" and "days of abundance" signify an earlier period of American aid in Cambodia between 1955 and 1963. The programs, nearly all defense or defense-support projects, were riddled with honest graft and fraud. After 1963, the Sihanouk regime failed to reinforce the managerial, technological and professional ideologies encouraged by the Americans or to provide economic resources for the preservation or expansion of some of these projects. Consequently, many Cambodian officials referred to this period with pronounced nostalgia as "the days of abundance." The oft-repeated wish, accompanied by fading and exaggerated memories, fathered unrealistic expectations of the nature of renewed economic and political relations with the United States.

³ See Sihanouk's report to a special national congress on August 4, 1969, in *Les Paroles de Samdech Preah Norodom Sihanouk; Juillet-Septembre, 1969* (Phnom Penh: Ministry of Information, 1969), pp. 343-352.

⁴ This is a critical factor in the policy outlook and political behavior of Cambodian bureaucrats because the civil service was organized, recruited and trained by a foreign, French colonial administration for anti-national purposes. After independence, there was no major change in personnel or in administrative procedure, only generalized expansion.

tial increases in food production and stable, low food prices without concerted investment in agricultural technology and agrarian credit programs or foreign subsidiaries. Agricultural production costs rose throughout the 1960's in proportion to soil deterioration, population increases and inflationary pressures on the primary sector. By the end of the decade, state-imposed price controls in the absence of capital investment and development affected the distribution of basic foodstuffs and produced some food shortages.

The situation ultimately accrued to the benefit of the Vietnamese (both the revolutionaries and Saigon's entrepreneurs). Rather than sell produce in Cambodian markets at state-imposed prices, Cambodian farmers and urban speculators sold produce on the open market on the South Vietnamese border. The resulting loss of export revenues to the Cambodian state is suggested by the fact that about 50 per cent of all foreign exchange revenues in 1963 were earned from rice sales. This represented 16.4 per cent of Cambodia's total production. By 1969, Cambodia "exported" only 4.1 per cent of her rice crop, and rice shortages in Phnom Penh prompted the Cabinet to make plans to import rice to feed the city. These export losses were not made up by the increased exportation of other commodities.³

Sihanouk was quick to point out to those who advocated reliance on foreign aid as a palliative for the state's poverty that no offers of foreign aid from the United States were outstanding and that reforms and sacrifices were essential for long-term survival. Cambodia's real problem was the mentality of her elite, he charged, and to emphasize this message, he threatened to cut civil service salaries. Nevertheless, and in spite of princely threats, foreign assistance was the favored solution in official Phnom Penh because it promised less coercion, sacrifice, conflict, work or responsibility and more wealth than any conceivable alternative.

Official apathy and lack of policy initiative bordering on opportunism were indications of how thoroughly Sihanouk had single-handedly managed the Cambodian state since 1954. Politicians and bureaucrats alike lacked the experience and the responsibilities of political power.⁴ Both politicians and bureaucrats were resentful of the absence of opportunities for political participation. Yet the rewards of paternalistic government through the years had become so routinized that the administration regarded them as acquired rights and essential aspects of government "service." In this context, the concept of sacrifice for the generalized improvement of the standard of living of the whole of Cambodian society or the suggestion of new authority relationships were radical, if not revolutionary, views. The progressive intellectuals and politicians who advocated the puritanical, egalitarian, hard-working and self-supporting policies of autarchy posed

a profound threat to the cosmopolitan life styles and political pecking order in Phnom Penh.

Prince Sihanouk was caught between the two groups. On the one hand, he realized that individual self-sufficiency and increased productivity would erode his traditional, patron-style political authority. On the other hand, procuring foreign monies in amounts dreamed about was tantamount to recommitting Cambodia's political future (and her monarchy) to foreign, colonial control. Of the two groups, Sihanouk apparently reasoned that the progressives were the more dangerous. The conservatives accepted the paternalistic authoritarianism of the Sihanouk regime and preferred its established order of rewards to the responsibilities of a more egalitarian, participatory society. Consequently, either in alliance with or under pressure from Lon Nol, Sihanouk eliminated the progressives from his regime, tagging them "Khmers Rouges" in the process. He then attempted to strike a comfortable balance between reform and foreign assistance as a means of resolving Cambodia's developmental crisis, but this balance was never attained.⁵

In 1969, most of Southeast Asia interpreted the an-

⁵ The creation of the expression *Khmae Krahaom* (Khmer Rouge in French; Red Cambodian in English) is an instructive example of ideological manipulation. The Cambodian progressives, posing the only fundamental challenge to the established paternalistic order, were revolutionaries in the sociological sense of the word. Rather than calling them "progressives," as they called themselves, or attempting to discredit their positions on important issues, Prince Sihanouk made the facile transformation of revolutionary into Communist. Thus he invoked the sympathy of all individuals and states which equated subversion of the established order with communism and avoided the possibly embarrassing question of whether or not the Sihanouk regime ought to have been reformed radically (subverted) or reformed only moderately, which he proposed to do and which the progressives said was impossible. A minority of the progressives were Communist. Most defended socialist and humanitarian values and, on the whole, their ideological style, essential populism and personal integrity more closely approximated the puritan revolutionary tradition in England than European continental traditions.

Cambodian officials were not alone in perceiving the nature of the progressive alternative. During my visit with a Cambodian friend in the Kompong Speu-Kirirom region in late 1971, several farmers and townspeople explained to me how the war affected their lives and livelihoods. Most of them expressed their hope for Sihanouk's speedy return to power. Because there had been no war until the 1970 coup, they thought peace would return the moment the Prince came back. One farmer remarked that his fine new water buffalo wouldn't have cost so much if Prince Sihanouk were still in power and peace restored. I asked him what the *Khmae Krahaom* stood for. He was noticeably surprised by the question, but paused thoughtfully and proceeded to characterize the progressives as very honest above all else, hard-working and anti-Buddhist. He paused again, laughed modestly and added that he could never be a progressive because he didn't want to work that hard! This was a clever way of demonstrating peasant awareness of political options. I was made to understand that peasants were both honest enough and secular enough to create a lot of revolution for any corrupt, magico-religious government or foreign power which provoked them into working at it.

⁶ The best description of Sihanouk's four years of concerted efforts to obtain international guarantees of Cambodian neutrality and territorial integrity within Cambodia's (French-defined) frontiers is Roger M. Smith, *Cambodia's Foreign Policy* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1965).

nouncement of the Nixon Doctrine as a promise, but Cambodians perceived both a threat and an invitation. The exact meaning of the doctrine, summarized with the vague formula of "helping Asians help each other," was never spelled out. This vagueness appeared to serve the dual purpose of dramatizing the end of the American combat role in Indochina while telling pro-American regimes that American money, technology, arms, prestige, and diplomatic support were indefinitely committed to Asians who would help each other carry on the war in defense of their own and the American cause. For the American public, troop withdrawals were confused with "ending the war" and "winding down the war," allowing President Richard Nixon to claim the title of "peacemaker" while continuing to wage war by long-distance proxy.

On the international level, defense of the procedural principle of not letting down an "ally" cast the United States in a kind of tough, maverick role. There were few more clever ways of negotiating from strength (and, it appears, from the implied threat of irrational military retaliation in the absence of compliance) than to continue to prosecute the war in this fashion after international consensus held that it was perhaps immoral and probably unwindable. In the best of all conceivable worlds, the Nixon Doctrine would have the last word if, in the course of fabricating an era of peace through tacit intimidation, a local military victory in Vietnam were secured. In any event, the American giant could not be exposed to any further humiliation in the course of trying to win a military victory. "Peace" could be public; war had to be clandestine. Throughout 1968 and 1969, American military analysts insisted that the principal obstacle to winning the war was Cambodia.

The sanctuaries and the increasing Vietnamese use of Cambodian territory were also a source of anxiety for Prince Sihanouk and the Cambodian government. When the initial agreements between the Vietnamese and Cambodian governments were reached, Prince Sihanouk believed that the Vietnamese revolutionaries would win the war in a relatively short time. Consequently, it was incumbent upon the Cambodians to accommodate their very powerful neighbor, and to profit from short-term Vietnamese military needs to secure an agreement in principle that Cambodian territory within Cambodia's present boundaries would be respected during and after the war. Cambodia had tried and failed to obtain similar assurances from the Saigon and Bangkok governments and from their American ally. American reluctance to acknowledge Cambodia's neutrality, integrity and independence created the suspicion that the United States either supported or acquiesced in Thai and South Vietnamese irredentist claims to Cambodian territory.⁶ Under these circumstances, prudence dictated a partial accommodation with the socialist powers, lest the con-

tinued pleas for bipolar international guarantees leave Cambodia isolated and vulnerable. Not only were the Vietnamese revolutionaries perceived to be likely to win the war; their victory appeared to be in Cambodia's national interest.

When the United States persisted in and increased its ground and aerial interventions through 1969, however, the hazards of Cambodia's 1965 arrangements with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the Front for the National Liberation of South Vietnam became apparent. The Vietnamese presence was assuming an aspect of permanence, arousing traditional anxieties over Vietnamese expansionism; free trade on the border deepened Cambodia's economic crisis; and "hot pursuit" by American and South Vietnamese forces posed a direct threat to Cambodian security and territorial integrity. Observing the increasing use of American air power in Laos and in Vietnam after the Tet Offensive, Sihanouk doubted that the Vietnamese revolutionaries could win a decisive military victory in the light of American determination not to lose. Air war and United States war by proxy called for new accommodations with both the Americans and the Vietnamese. If its foreign policy were not adjusted to prolonged war, the Cambodian government feared national collapse, economic chaos and an American-South Vietnamese invasion.⁷

⁷ Former Ambassador Chester Bowles advised Prince Sihanouk of American plans for an invasion when he was on a special mission to Cambodia for the Lyndon Johnson administration in January, 1968.

⁸ The designation "beneficiary" emerges in a French journalist's account of an interview with an anonymous American embassy expert in Saigon in August, 1969. The official is quoted as saying that the infrastructure and extent of North Vietnamese penetration in Cambodia favor the formation of a "Free Montagnard Republic" which would reduce Saigon's authority. He continued to emphasize that Prince Sihanouk was aware of the Vietnamese threat (to Saigon?) but asked rhetorically whether the Prince would have the means to force the North Vietnamese to withdraw their forces when the problem of the effective neutralization of Cambodia arose. See "Le Virus Vietnamien Menace la Paix," *L'express*, 11-17 Aout, 1969. p. 24.

⁹ These 3,800 attacks were carefully coordinated by the National Security Council in the White House, according to Henry Kissinger in testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee during hearings on his nomination as Secretary of State. NBC TV News, September 10, 1973.

¹⁰ This appears to have been unanticipated. Pre-invasion planning set no time limit on the operation and focused on ARVN's incapacity to manage the ground situation without American participation. See Peter Poole, *The Expansion of the Vietnam War into Cambodia* (Athens: Ohio University Southeast Asia Series, no. 17, 1970). There is irony in this if it is true that President Nixon viewed the Cambodian coup and subsequent events as a possible "opportunity to demonstrate to Communist leaders around the world that his hands were not completely tied by anti-war opinion in the United States and that he was able to meet force with force when necessary." See Poole, pp. 30-31. Following the discussion of the Nixon Doctrine above, I would argue that this might be the President's "cover story," leaked as it was to *The New York Times* after congressional action. The President's crisis behavior, described in detail by Poole, more probably relates to his anticipation of a dramatic military victory.

* Army of the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam).

In mid-1969, Cambodia was the "beneficiary" of the Nixon Doctrine, not yet its model.⁸ Sihanouk was powerless to constrain the secret American B-52 bombings which began on March 18, 1969,⁹ though he did manage to obtain American recognition of Cambodia's neutrality within her present frontiers, perhaps in exchange for not exposing the raids and probably in exchange for United States intelligence on Vietnamese troop movements. The bombing coincided with Sihanouk's first public criticism of Vietnamese use of Cambodian territory. Later, Sihanouk both advised and warned the Vietnamese that pushing him too hard would result in a military takeover in Phnom Penh.

At one point, Prince Sihanouk cut off the shipment of Vietnamese supplies through Sihanoukville, apparently in order to negotiate for a sort of military aid for Lon Nol's army, but this aid barely compared with the visions of guns and butter nourished by Phnom Penh conservatives, visions of "development" à la Saigon, military support for putting down rural insurgency and for evicting the Vietnamese revolutionaries from their Cambodian bases. Unknown to Sihanouk, the conspiracy against him was three months old when the clandestine B-52 bombings began. If the Prince considered manipulating United States military desires for securing diplomatic recognition and political support for his regime, it must be emphasized that the Nixon administration was decidedly unresponsive. Several years of reconnaissance missions, hot pursuits and border bombings had already informed the American military that it would be necessary to occupy the "sanctuaries" to render them useless. In Phnom Penh, the initial impetus for the coup came from members of the Khmer Krom community with close links to United States Special Forces in South Vietnam. They knew, as did the Nixon administration, that Prince Sihanouk was not about to replace one occupying army with another which he trusted much less.

President Nixon mishandled the May, 1970, invasion. By announcing it in advance he made it possible for the American public to witness the continuing and widening war via telstar. Public and congressional reaction meant that the South Vietnamese had to occupy eastern Cambodia without American ground support after June 30, 1970.¹⁰ The coup alone might not have precipitated a civil war, but the violent invasion and subsequent 17-month occupation of heavily populated areas of eastern Cambodia made it difficult to avoid. The Saigon army burned, pillaged, looted, raped and bullied the Cambodians and their countryside. The consequences of ARVN* occupation and continuing American bombings were directly realized in the increasing troop levels of Prince Sihanouk's National United Front Army. On December 4, 1971, after ARVN forces had withdrawn to South Vietnam, Lon Nol's army suffered a decisive military defeat.

The following week, President Nixon declared that

Cambodia embodied the Nixon Doctrine in its purest form. In characteristic hyperbole, the President informed his Phnom Penh and American constituencies of his commitment to continuing the war, in the first instance, and to letting Asians (Cambodians, Vietnamese and Thais) handle the matter for themselves, in the second. More profoundly, he acknowledged Phnom Penh's *raison d'être* to be more purely supranational, now more firmly in line with and dependent upon the doctrine. The Phnom Penh regime could avoid the effects and the public acknowledgement of defeat as long as the war continued in Vietnam and as long as it could hold the city. The doctrine, which first targeted Cambodia as instrumental to United States military strategy, was also able to rationalize Lon Nol's defeat. Non-victory in Cambodia and non-defeat (of the city) were acceptable because implementation of the doctrine was indistinguishable in a sense from its objective. Winning the war meant waging war. Waging war was winning it and the war to be won was always in Vietnam.

The doctrine's fundamental weakness, however, was its neglect of Cambodian nationalism. In the process of intervening in Cambodia to win in Vietnam, American-sponsored military and racial pressures on rural Cambodians produced national reaction and resistance. It was not by any means historically necessary that Cambodia should experience wide-spread revolt or revolution. Although there were conflicts in the pre-coup period, no national uprising on the scale observed since 1971 was foreseen. The Cambodian liberation forces seem to have been created by the military logic of foreign intervention.

IMPOSSIBILITY OF PEACE OR VICTORY

¹¹ The Nixon administration refused to accept Prince Sihanouk's invitation for negotiations in January and February, 1973. In addition, it continued shipping military supplies to Sihanoukville after the Paris agreements went into effect and quietly resumed American air strikes only nine days after an announced bombing halt. A careful examination of public documents suggests that a de facto cease-fire (officially ordered by all sides) did obtain in Cambodia after January 28, and that the Phnom Penh regime broke it. For some details on the implementations of the Paris Accords in South Vietnam and Cambodia, see the testimonies and supporting statements of D. Gareth Porter and Laura Summers in hearings on S. 1443 before the United States Senate Foreign Relations Committee, May 4, 1973.

¹² This tonnage represents 50 per cent more than the conventional explosives dropped on Japan during World War II. In spite of this ecological destruction, the bombing had little effect on the military capacity of the Cambodian guerrillas. See *The New York Times*, August 15, 1973. In geographical size and population, Cambodia is a rough approximation of the state of Missouri.

¹³ *Minneapolis Tribune*, September 5, 1973 (*New York Times News Service* dispatch).

¹⁴ Jacques Leslie quotes an unidentified diplomat in Phnom Penh who said, "The United States feels Lon Nol shouldn't step down unless the Cambodian government gets something in return from the insurgents. . . . In terms of bargaining, he's worth something." *Los Angeles Times*, August 26, 1973.

The failure of the doctrine was apparent when the Nixon administration made public "peace" with the Vietnamese revolutionaries in Paris in January, 1973, while refusing to negotiate with Prince Sihanouk.¹¹ After suffering diplomatic and military rebuffs, the Cambodian revolutionaries gathered their forces to cut off Phnom Penh's food and military supplies and possibly to attack the city. Consequently, between March and August, 1973, United States B-52 bombers pounded Cambodia for 160 consecutive days, dropping more than 240,000 short tons of bombs on rice fields, water buffalo, villages (particularly along the Mekong river) and on such troop positions as the guerrillas might maintain.¹² No reference to the formula bearing the President's name justified or rationalized these attacks. When it was no longer possible to use Cambodia to canonize a Nixon peace or a Nixon victory, the doctrine itself had to be abandoned. Afterward, the American Ambassador in Phnom Penh was asked whether he thought the "overall American policy objective" in Cambodia had been achieved during his three-year tenure. He responded frankly:

The Khmer Republic and its armed forces contributed significantly to the Vietnamization of the war in Vietnam and thus to the disengagement of our own forces . . . there have been between 25,000 and 26,000 Khmer (i.e., Phnom Penh) troops killed, and time was bought for the success of our program in Vietnam.¹³

The prospects for an end to the fighting in Cambodia thus seem to depend on the time required "for the success" of the Nixon administration's program in Vietnam or on the capacity of the Cambodian revolutionaries to force Lon Nol to capitulate. In the meantime, no negotiations for a compromise settlement appear possible. The United States refuses to deal directly with Prince Sihanouk or representatives of his coalition, or to bow to the requests of Phnom Penh's now discouraged conservatives, who advocate replacing Lon Nol as a step toward peace and national reconciliation.¹⁴ For their part, the Cambodian revolutionaries now say they are fighting for total victory. Approximately 90 per cent of Cambodia is already under their administration and, they argue, negotiations at this stage would attribute more political and mil-

(Continued on page 276)

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argued that the Act of Free Choice which was to take place under the auspices of the United Nations had now become legally, or at least technically, impossible. However, shortly after Indonesia's return to the U.N., various Orba authorities indicated that they would abide by the pledge. And, indeed, 1969 witnessed the implementation of the stipulation in question,²⁴ and although the outcome was hardly surprising, it could be said that the Orba government had, at least officially, honored a pledge given by Sukarno and Subandrio.

The next year was marked by two initiatives.²⁵ First, Suharto paid a state visit to the United States, where he expounded Indonesia's conception of the Nixon Doctrine at the National Press Club. Second, Indonesia sponsored a Foreign Ministers' Conference on Cambodia. Invitations had been extended to some 20 countries (only half that number attended). The conference had been intended to neutralize Cambodia. It had very little effect, but it showed that Indonesia was still concerned with nonalignment issues.

At the same time one may note that Indonesia's position on these questions was not so neutral as she wanted it to appear. This became particularly evident in the vote on Peking's admission to the United Nations. It will be remembered that to the chagrin of the American State Department many developing nations which in the past had received large sums of money from the United States failed to follow the American position with regard to the issue. Significantly, Indonesia voted for the defeated United States resolution which required a two-thirds majority for the expulsion of Taiwan from the world organization, and then abstained on the successful Albanian resolution which intended to expel Taiwan and seat the People's Republic. It is possible that the Indonesian position on the China question did not represent public opinion in Indonesia, and *Pedoman*, an Indonesian newspaper, argued that "the policies of those in power had raised questions in the minds of the people."²⁶ One may in addition point out that the diplomatic relations between Indonesia and the People's Republic have remained in a state of suspended animation (they were never officially severed).

The Fourth Summit Conference of Nonaligned Countries which was held in Algiers earlier this year offers evidence that the issue of nonalignment is by no means dead. Shortly before the Indonesian national delegation left for Algeria, its head, foreign

Minister Adam Malik, stressed the ways nonalignment could be utilized in the current climate of rapprochement in order to help the developing nations to accelerate their process of nation-building and economic development.²⁷ The economic emphasis which pervaded his speech on this occasion undoubtedly stemmed from his Orba orientation.

Although it may be too early to advance solid conclusions, the point should be made that Indonesia again runs the risk of distorting the principle of nonalignment.

CAMBODIA

(Continued from page 256)

itary clout to the Phnom Pehn regime than it has. The fate of a sovereign state lies in the balance. An American policy and American bombing have placed a small country's physical and political survival in escrow for many years to come, not for the benefit of the people who live there nor in defense of any laudable ideal.

BOOK REVIEWS

(Continued from page 271)

THE DEVIL AND JOHN FOSTER DULLES. By TOWNSEND HOOPES. (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1973. 505 pages, notes, bibliography and index, \$15.00.)

This is a detailed and absorbing account of the life of John Foster Dulles, President Dwight D. Eisenhower's Secretary of State and the architect of American foreign policy in the 1950's: the era of cold war confrontation between the superpowers, with its "agonizing reappraisals," brinkmanship, and talk of "liberation" and "massive retaliation."

Key premises of the Dullesian foreign policy were the inherent evil of communism and its inherent inferiority; for Dulles, Bolshevism was the product of the devil. By the time Dulles resigned because of illness, shortly before his death, he had "led in the building of a powerful anti-Communist rationale which gave justification to dramatic and far-flung American military deployments." When he died, "more than a million American officials, military and otherwise, including their dependents and servitors, were stationed in about forty-two countries. . . . This vast formation represented unprecedented imperial power."

Only in the 1970's, under another Republican administration, has the devil theory of communism been modified. This skillful biography will help shed light on the era of cold war diplomacy.

O.E.S.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 257-9.

²⁵ One may find both issues detailed in *Focus on Indonesia*, published by the Information Division, Embassy of Indonesia, Vol. 3, No. 7 (September, 1970).

²⁶ As cited by the *Washington Post*, December 31, 1971.

²⁷ See *Indonesian News & Views*, No. 8/73 (August, 1973), p. 5. For a report on the conference see *Time*, September 17, 1973, pp. 35-39.

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