

# CHINA AND INDOCHINA

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In reality, China has had exceptionally close ties with the three Indochinese countries within the wider framework of its long and deep involvement with the peoples of Southeast Asia. Until the final breach between the two countries in 1978, there had been over half-a-century's close and continuous association between the Chinese and

the Indochinese peoples in their struggles for national liberation. Particularly after the establishment of the People's Republic in 1949, the Chinese provided the struggles for national independence and reconstruction of the Indochinese peoples with every kind of support, political and material, that does not quite fit the image of a perfidious and tight-fisted China now sought to be broadcast by the propagandists and apologists for Hanoi.

## China and Vietnam

The friendship and co-operation between Chinese and Vietnamese revolutionaries began in the 1920s, and Vietnamese communists often turned to their Chinese comrades for sympathy and support in the 1930s and 40s. The Democratic Republic of Vietnam, set up in 1945, presently found itself battling French armed forces for Vietnam's national independence, and after 1949 it began to receive extensive and varied military assistance from the Chinese that was to play a vital part in the eventual defeat of French colonialism in 1953-54. According to one well-researched account, through-

out the summer of 1950 "at least 20,000 Viet-Minh troops were trained and equipped by the Chinese in Yunnan and Kwangsi and returned to Vietnam". The Chinese continued to supply the Vietnamese with massive quantities of arms, so that by early 1951 the Viet-Minh could claim that "it already had a regular army of more than 300,000 men and a militia of more than 2,000,000," in large part equipped with Chinese weapons. (1) Nor was China's support limited to military assistance alone. In 1955, China gave Vietnam a \$325 million loan "for reconstruction of North Vietnam after the cease-fire with the French". (2)

Some years later Vietnam's struggle for national liberation was to be resumed in the southern half of the country, being this time directed mainly against the armed forces of U.S. imperialism. In this new phase of struggle too, particularly in the 1960s, China gave Vietnam massive amounts of military and economic assistance. The extent of military assistance was recently hinted at in a Chinese publication as follows:

From January 1965 to March 1968, China dispatched to Viet Nam support forces of over 320,000 men to undertake air defence, engineering, railway and logistics work. In a peak year, China's support forces totalled more than 170,000. (3)

China's economic aid was almost equally unstinted. According to one source, between 1955 and 1964 China provided Vietnam \$352 million in 'non-military' aid. That figure went up to \$1,491 million over the next 10-year period from 1965 to 1975, while for the period between 1976 and the final cut-off of Chinese aid to Vietnam in mid-1978 - a period during which the relations between the two were steadily deteriorating, as will be seen later - the total stood at \$719 million. (4) At the time of the aid cut-off it was reported from Beijing that Chinese aid to Vietnam "had totalled \$10 billion over the past 20 years". (5) And just recently, at a press conference in Canberra in April, Chinese premier Zhao Ziyang claimed that:

Over the 28-year period, from 1950 to 1978, China gave Viet Nam about US\$20 billion in aid, 93 per cent of which was given gratis. (6)

Even in the absence of a detailed breakdown of aid statistics, particularly as between military and non-military aid, these are indeed very considerable sums of money, bearing in mind China's own limited resources. Even more striking, this aid continued to be given in the midst of serious political and ideological disagreements between Chinese and Vietnamese leaders over the utilization of these funds, whether in the waging of the war of liberation in the South or for the building of socialism in the North, as well as over such contentious issues as the nature of "modern revisionism". The Chinese made no serious attempt to bend the Hanoi leadership to their own point of view by threatening to withhold aid; at any rate, not until after the liberation of South Vietnam under Hanoi's direction in 1975, when a "punitive" element first appeared in China's aid policy (see below).



China's relationship with Cambodia (now Kampuchea) was almost equally intimate, if not of such long standing as its relationship with Vietnam. It was a measure of Chinese "pragmatism" in the matter that whereas in Vietnam's case its support for the struggle for national liberation was symbolized by a nationalist-communist, Ho Chi Minh, in Cambodia's case it was personified by an anti-communist nationalist, Sihanouk, and that China's support for one was to be given as freely as for the other (making due allowance for differences of size and need between the two countries). Ever since the Geneva Conference of 1954 on Indochina, China had made a major commitment to Cambodia's independence and neutrality which it underwrote with a programme of economic and military aid; and political and diplomatic support for Sihanouk was to become the linch-pin of that policy, and has remained thus, from that day to this.

As in the case of Vietnam, this Chinese commitment was to become particularly pronounced throughout the 1960s in the wake of Cambodia's sharpening confrontation with US imperialism. The chief threat to Cambodia's neutrality during this period emanated from the US, but the chief threat to its independence came from America's client regimes in Bangkok and, in particular, Saigon. But since Sihanouk also feared for his country's independence from Hanoi (whom in any case he expected eventually to become the "master" of all of Vietnam), he also looked for Chinese support for Cambodia's independence against any threat from that quarter. He believed, or at any rate hoped, that "the Chinese not only respected Cambodian territorial integrity, but would also use their influence in Hanoi to keep the Vietnamese Communists out of Cambodia". (7) He was more than prepared for an informal trade-off between Cambodia's exclusion of an American military presence that China wanted, and China's securing Cambodia's independence against Vietnamese domination (Northern as well as Southern) that he needed. In this way Cambodia's independence and neutrality

were bound together, and China was a staunch champion of both through its support for Sihanouk.

Sihanouk paid China his first official visit in 1956, the very same year that Cambodia became the beneficiary of the first grant-in-aid (\$22.4 million) by the Chinese People's Republic to a non-communist country. After that he was a frequent and much prized visitor to the Chinese capital. In December 1960 a treaty of friendship and non-aggression was signed between the two countries. In the 60s, as Cambodia came under growing American military and economic pressure, it drew closer to China and was in receipt of considerable amounts of Chinese military and economic aid, which remained undiminished even during the disruptions of the Cultural Revolution in China. China's aid was the subject of frequent and effusive praise by Sihanouk, for it was seen to be aid without strings given without any attempt at exercising "leverage" over Cambodia's internal and external policies. Chinese military aid, in particular, was given primarily with a view to making Cambodia more "self-reliant" and better able to defend itself against neighbouring aggressors, without any escalating future commitments and without any demand for bases or facilities on Cambodian territory for use against third parties. (8) In all this Sihanouk found China a welcome contrast to the US, and indeed a welcome counterweight. It was hardly surprising, therefore, that when the Americans finally engineered his overthrow through Lon Nol's coup in 1970, followed by the invasion, occupation and destruction of his country by American and South Vietnamese troops, he took up residence in China.

### China and Southeast Asia

China's many-sided assistance to the Indochinese peoples' struggles in the 1950s and 60s would seem to have been given without any conscious attempt to exert control or "leverage" over the recipients. But that is not to say that it was wholly selfless. The support and assistance were given because in thus helping to advance and defend the national independence of the Indochinese countries against colonial rule and big-power domination China hoped also to secure its own national interest. From the Chinese point of view, there was indeed a very satisfactory blending of national requirements and internationalist principles. China's support for the Indochinese struggles was but a particular aspect of its general policy towards the whole Southeast Asian region.

The overriding objective of Chinese policy towards Southeast Asia has long been to secure that the region should not come under the sway of any hostile foreign power or "presence" that could under any circumstances threaten China's own security and independence, nor should a local or "regional" power become so powerful as to threaten the independence either of China or of the countries of the region, thereby significantly altering the regional balance of power. In this way China has long sought to ensure that Southeast Asia is not turned into the "sphere of influence" of any foreign or regional big power. It is on this basis that the Chinese state consistently supported the struggles of the region's countries and peoples for national independence. These struggles were supported regardless of whether they were led by bourgeois nationalists, communists, or even by feudal "traditionalists", and regardless of whether their target was



Chinese view of US during the Vietnam war.

colonialism, imperialism or "hegemonism".

In the period following the winning of political independence, Beijing's chief preoccupation has been to ensure the neutralization of Southeast Asia, the touchstone of which has been the absence or scaling-down of extraneous military ties, particularly with the big or superpowers, against the possibility of such ties being used as a springboard for military aggression and expansion against particular countries in the region, or against China itself. This has been the enduring theme of China's foreign policy, and its various phases are to be distinguished primarily on the basis of whom China thought to be the "main enemy", that is to say, the main power threatening both China's security and the independence and neutrality of the Southeast Asian states.

(The definition of the "main enemy" was in turn the basis on which the tactics of the "international united front" were worked out.) Before and during the second World War Japan was identified as the main enemy. But for much of the 50s and 60s the main enemy, in China's view, was the United States; and China's policies towards particular countries were determined primarily on the basis of the position each took vis-à-vis the US.

### Soviet hegemonism

In the 1970s, however, there was to be a sea-change in China's view of the main enemy, a role that came increasingly to be ascribed to the Soviet Union and for which "hegemonism" increasingly became the codeword. It marked a fundamental shift in China's appraisal of the over-all world



situation and resulted in a far-reaching re-appraisal of all its international policies and alignments, with the position towards hegemonism becoming the touchstone for China's relations with foreign countries. The change was mooted in 1969 when the two superpowers, the US and the Soviet Union, were first lumped together as the joint enemies of the world's people; the two became, under the new classification of the three worlds, the new "First World".

By the mid-70s, however, hegemonism was unequivocally and without qualification declared to be the main enemy, with the Soviet Union now seen as decidedly the more dangerous and more ambitious of the two superpowers. The Chinese believed the Soviet Union to be embarked upon a global strategy of world domination and felt the imperative need to build an international united front in opposition to hegemonism. Towards China itself, the new Soviet policy was believed to be one of military encirclement and diplomatic isolation. By the late 70s the menace of Soviet hegemonism, both to China's security and to the world's people, was rated so highly as to warrant an informal strategic alliance, almost, with the other superpower. It was in this general context that in the early 70s China studiously began to break out from the self-imposed isolation of the Cultural Revolution period and embarked, among other things, on a cordial cultivation of ASEAN states, and in 1978 it carried out a spectacular "normalization" of relations with two of the previous main enemies, Japan and the U.S., though normalization was scarcely the right word to describe the very close and intimate relationship that seemed to be taking shape between China and the other two in the new, "trilateralist" phase of Chinese foreign policy.

The manner in which the menace of Soviet hegemonism was defined and accordingly the tactics of the united front deployed were affected by the highly unstable political situation within China during much of this period, with fairly acute contradictions obtaining between the Right, the centre and the far Left of the Party leadership. By the beginning of 1975 the Right wing of "modernizers" led by Deng Xiaoping appeared to be in the ascendant. Then, for a period in 1976, the far Left "Gang of Four" seemed to be on top, from where they suffered a mighty crash in October. Next, during 1977, the "radical" centrists around Hua Guofeng appeared to be in control. In 1978, however, the Right finally established its ascendancy both in personnel and policy, and the pursuit of the "four modernizations" at home and of "anti-hegemonism" abroad were laid down as the "strategic" goals for the Chinese leadership and people for the next 20 years and more. During this uncertain and volatile period the goal of "anti-hegemony" was on occasion pursued with an excess of zeal, particularly in respect of some socialist states and a number of Third World national-liberation and revolutionary struggles, and without due regard to the circumstances of particular countries or movements.

### The growing friction

It is against this background of China's strategic reappraisal of the global situation and its pursuit of an "anti-hegemony front" directed against the Soviet Union that the deterioration of Sino-Vietnamese relations that occurred

throughout the 70s, and particularly after 1975, has to be seen. A certain loosening of the close relationship between China and Vietnam had begun to manifest itself as far back as the latter half of the 60s. This was linked to the US decision in 1965 both to upgrade its war of intervention against South Vietnam and to carry it forward right into the North. The massive escalation by the US of its war against the Vietnamese people obliged Hanoi to turn to the Soviet Union for heavier types of weaponry to meet the American onslaught, and as a result, the Vietnamese leadership was willy-nilly drawn closer to the Soviets' military, diplomatic and ideological options. Nor were the Vietnamese communists too impressed with the Cultural Revolution in China (and with the Chinese critique of "revisionism"), if only because of the occasional disruption of the military supplies needed for Vietnam's defence that came in its wake. From 1965 onwards China and Vietnam thus began to grow apart, if only because Hanoi and Moscow were moving closer.

After 1970 yet another note of friction was introduced into the relationship between Vietnam and China over the leadership of the Indochinese communist movement and, in particular, over the direction of the revolutionary struggles going on in Kampuchea and Laos. One commentator speaks of "a direct competition between China and Vietnam for the control of the revolutionary movement in Indochina, a control that Hanoi considers its own". (9) Under a sort of informal "division of labour" that went back to the days of the Comintern, the revolutionary movement in Southeast Asia had been seen to be primarily a Chinese "responsibility" and that in Indochina a Viet-




Gat in Manila Chronicle, 15 1

US view of the impact of the Cultural Revolution on Chinese support for Vietnam

name's responsibility. That arrangement worked well enough as long as the various Communist Parties were operating within the same ideological framework. But once the framework began to dissolve, as it did as a result of the open split between Soviet and Chinese communists in the 1960s, so the division of labour began to break up, with a fair amount of "poaching" tending to occur in the established ideological "spheres of influence".

The Vietnamese communists had always kept a very tight control over their comrades in Laos and Cambodia. This situation was profoundly unsettled by the events of 1970s, first by the Lon Nol coup against Sihanouk and the invasion of Cambodia by foreign troops and then by the hosting by China, in the glare of international publicity, of a summit conference of the three Indochinese peoples, which the Vietnamese would have preferred to have seen held in Indochina itself. More seriously, after 1970 the revolution in Cambodia began to develop under its own steam which the Vietnamese were unable fully to control or influence. It seemed to be getting out of hand (unlike the situation in Laos), and the "new" Kampuchean communists began to forge closer links with the Chinese which the Vietnamese presumably found disturbing.



### The strategic split

There was, finally, the great strategic divide that began to open up between China and Vietnam over the danger of Soviet hegemonism and was to cast its long shadow over all aspects of Sino-Vietnamese relations. The strategic split was crystallized during the period of just over 2 years, from the signing of the Paris peace accords early in 1973 to the final collapse of US power in Indochina in April-May 1975, and came to be focused upon Southeast Asia itself. The Chinese saw the accords as an inevitable winding down of America's power in Indochina and in the region as a whole and - in the light of their global reappraisal - were increasingly to be exercised at the prospect of Soviet penetration of and expansion into Southeast Asia as an integral part of the Soviet "global strategy".

Chinese warnings on the subject were uttered with resounding clarity in an article in *Peking Review* in August 1975. (10) The article was an attack

on the old Soviet proposal for an "Asian collective security system" which the Chinese had always seen as a ploy for Soviet "encirclement" of China. It was said to be "designed to serve nothing but the Kremlin's policies of aggression and expansion".

For years the Soviet social-imperialists have been scheming to secure military bases in Southeast Asia. Motivated by their quest for sea supremacy, they have sent large numbers of warships to sail between the Pacific and the Indian Ocean in a show of force which threatens the peace and security of the Southeast Asian countries ...

Countries in Southeast Asia have long discerned Soviet social-imperialism's machinations to supplant U.S. imperialism and establish hegemony in Southeast Asia. They are keeping their vigilance sharp. They are determined to prevent a situation in which the tiger is let in through the back door while the wolf is repulsed at the front gate.

Only the Vietnamese, so the Chinese implied, could not see what was crystal clear to everyone else.

It was not just that the Chinese could not get the Vietnamese to share their assessment of the menace of Soviet hegemonism and the need to join the "anti-hegemony front". But even more seriously, the Chinese came to believe that so far as Southeast Asia was concerned, Vietnam - far from helping to stop hegemonism - was likely instead to be the vehicle for the Soviets' penetration of the region. As the Chinese saw it, this was likely to take the form of the Soviet Union's pandering to Vietnam's desire for hegemony over Indochina and for that purpose giving it every military, economic and diplomatic help. In return, the Soviets were likely to secure strategic footholds, in Indochina first and then through it in Southeast Asia as a whole, which were certain to change qualitatively the balance of power in the Soviets' favour against China, as well as against other powers and states in the region. "Peking, looking ahead to the Communist victory in Vietnam, foresaw a Soviet-backed effort to promote a cohesive Indochina bloc under Hanoi as a counter to Chinese influence. Thus, China would seek to promote as much independence as possible for Cambodia and Laos." (11) It would have been possibly in that context too that, "In 1974 China dramatically improved its position with the Khmer Rouge leaders inside Cambodia." (12).

### Bilateral issues

The full impact of the deteriorating relationship between China and Vietnam began to be felt after the final liberation of South Vietnam in 1975 over a number of bilateral issues between the two countries. The last serious attempt to resolve the differences amicably was made in June 1977, when Vietnamese premier Pham Van Dong visited Beijing for talks with Chinese leaders. On the occasion of the Dong visit a senior Chinese vice-premier, Li Xiannian, handed the Vietnamese visitors a memorandum outlining China's position on the main issues dividing the two sides. The



memorandum, which was made public by the Chinese in March 1979, gives a useful overview of the problems then under contention. (13)

The document began first by complaining of certain "anti-China" statements made latterly by some responsible Vietnamese officials and ended by complaining of the way in which the "Vietnamese comrades" were impairing Sino-Vietnamese friendship "by making use of historical problems". But these were essentially symptoms of the mounting strain in Sino-Vietnamese relations, rather than their causes. The memorandum then dealt with a number of territorial issues in the broadest sense, including the question of the ownership of the Paracels and Spratly islands in the South China Sea. It next dealt with the citizenship status and situation of the Chinese residing in Vietnam. On these various issues the Chinese referred back to certain arrangements that had been agreed between the Communist Parties of the two countries between 1955 and 1958, and complained that the Vietnamese were now going back upon them. This the Vietnamese duly denied.

The history and specific details of these disputes are less important than the fact that they came to be caught up in and magnified by the deteriorating political relationship between the two parties, which was in turn bound up with the strategic split. The territorial issues were generally reckoned to be relatively simple and trivial, and even the question of the ownership of the Paracels and Spratly islands - the most contentious of the territorial issues - only became critical when their economic and strategic importance came to be perceived. The economic importance was linked to the prospect of off-shore oil, which after the 1973 Middle East war made the South China Sea islands more interesting for the companies and countries looking for petroleum. For the Chinese, however, it was almost certainly the new strategic conjuncture that mattered more, and the prospect of the Soviet Union gaining access to these islands via Vietnam. It was in that context that the Chinese army evicted South Vietnamese troops from the Paracels by force in January 1974, a move that did not please North Vietnam. Hanoi, in its turn, evened matters the following year by seizing a number of the Spratly islands in April in the dying days of the Saigon administration.

### Economic aid

If in the matter of the South China Sea islands strategic considerations took precedence over the economic ones, even in the handling of purely economic questions strategic considerations were not wholly absent. The Li memorandum made only a passing reference to the question of economic aid, and explained that both because of the "interference and sabotage" by the Gang of Four and of "natural calamities" the Chinese were "in no position to provide new aid to the Vietnamese comrades". But that surely was not the whole truth. There is every reason to suppose, first, that the Chinese would have had serious political reservations about the type of economic development strategy that the Vietnamese proposed to pursue after the liberation of the South and the reunification of the whole country. It was, in one word, very much a Soviet type of development strategy, with an emphasis on the development of heavy industry that would hardly have been com-

patible with the line of the "four modernizations", and for which the Chinese in any case lacked the necessary resources to help the Vietnamese with.

Even had the Chinese been better predisposed to accede to Vietnamese requests for further aid, however, there was still the by now familiar 'anti-hegemony' business. In October 1975 a top-level Vietnamese delegation led by Party secretary Le Duan visited the Chinese capital to thank China for past support and help and to request continued Chinese economic aid. According to one account:

China's leaders demanded that Vietnam agree to an 'anti-hegemony' clause (obviously aimed at the Soviet Union) in the joint communique. The Vietnamese refused. Thereupon, the Vietnamese were informed that China would no longer provide Vietnam with grant assistance, despite a pledge by Premier Chou En-lai in June 1973 to continue the grant programme for five more years ... (14)

Kampuchean leader Khieu Samphan, who had visited Beijing only a couple of months before, had readily agreed to the anti-hegemony clause included in the communique that was issued at the end of his visit, and had returned home with offers of Chinese aid. No communique was issued when Le Duan left. He took his entourage straight on to Moscow, where he was promptly granted all the aid that he wanted, and some more. The Soviets were only too pleased to take advantage of the growing breach between Hanoi and Beijing, and to provide Vietnam with every kind of economic and military aid designed to bind that country ever closer to the Soviet bloc.

At the same time the Chinese, while refusing to undertake new aid commitments towards Vietnam, fully honoured their past obligations and kept a large number of aid projects going in Vietnam. As Li Xiannian pointed out in his memorandum nearly 2 years later, "over 2,000 million yuan earmarked for our aid to Viet Nam remains unused, and more than a hundred projects for complete sets of equipment are yet to be constructed". (15) There was no "sabotage" of China's economic aid, nor any economic reprisals against Vietnam, for its strategic or ideological misdemeanours, contrary to the claims of Vietnamese propaganda since. The Chinese aid was not finally stopped until over a year after the Li memorandum, by which time Vietnam had joined COMECON and was busily persecuting and expelling its "Hoa" (Chinese) residents in large numbers.

### The Hoa issue

The manner in which the Hoa issue eventually came to a head in 1978, together with the final rupture between China and Vietnam, was determined largely by the decisions and actions of Vietnamese rulers. The evidence does not quite match the picture that Hanoi's propaganda likes to paint of Vietnam as a hapless victim of foreign hostilities and conspiracies. An independent but sympathetic student of Vietnamese affairs has noted that while there has been some sabotage by foreign countries, "the difficulties that visit Vietnam today indeed result to an important degree from the policies and decisions undertaken by the country's own leaders. Both the expul-



"Boat people" reaching Malaysia

sion of the Hoa people and the invasion of Kampuchea, for instance, have been policies deliberately arrived at, whatever [the] foreign provocations." (16)

Even a summary account of the policies pursued by Vietnam's leaders since 1975 will show that they have been the authors of their own misfortunes. In 1975-76 they approached the issues of national reunification and socialist construction within Vietnam in a way that greatly exacerbated the country's political and economic problems. In 1977 they turned their attention to securing a firm grip over their two smaller neighbouring countries - without force if possible, by force if necessary. In July Laos was brought under Vietnam's protection by means of a 25-year-long treaty of friendship and cooperation; in December the less accommodating Kampuchea was subjected to a massive military on-

slaught. In 1978 the rulers in Hanoi kept on waging their wars of "liberation", against the Hoa at home and against Kampuchea abroad; but in order to make sure of success in the latter enterprise they mortgaged their country to the Soviet Union, and only thus were they able to "liberate" Kampuchea by mounting a massive military invasion in December/January 1979.

In all this the hate campaign against China, and the campaign against the Chinese residents in Vietnam, became the vital link. A seasoned propagandist for Hanoi is closer to the truth than perhaps he realises, in stating that from about the spring of 1978, "Vietnamese policy towards the Hoa was based primarily on security considerations, in anticipation of possible war with China". By then, as a result of "the new strategic analysis", the Vietnamese leadership had

decided to identify China clearly as the main and immediate enemy of the Vietnamese revolution, begin a major military buildup and reorient the economy toward defense needs, and draw up plans for a military offensive to overthrow the Pol Pot regime and replace it with his Kampuchean opponents. (17)

This last project, which involved the overthrow of the government of an independent neighbouring country, does not sound particularly "defensive", but in any event it helps one to see that the anti-China - and its collateral anti-Hoa - campaign was politically and ideologically necessary to the success of the "new strategy".

The "Chinese threat" was a propaganda invention of Hanoi's to justify Vietnam's annexation of Laos and Kampuchea. There was little hard evidence to support the wild and unsubstantiated allegations of Chinese sabotage and instigation. It was difficult to see how the Chinese could be "instigating" Democratic Kampuchea to attack Vietnam or the Hoa to flee the country, since in each case it amounted to the cutting of one's own throat, and neither the Kampuchean nor the Hoa would have been so dense as not to notice this. There may have been some ill-advised Chinese pressure on Vietnam, over the issue, for example, of "anti-hegemony", and a failure to take a sufficiently broadminded and long-term view of certain problems. But, surely, the Vietnamese rulers' crimes against the Hoa and against the Kampuchean people and their national independence are of a very different order of magnitude from any of China's errors and follies.

Jitendra Mohan

#### NOTES

- (1) King C. Chen, Vietnam and China 1938-1954 (Princeton, 1969), p. 262 and p. 270; full details on pp. 261-3 and 268-78.
- (2) See Mark W. Zacher & R. Stephen Milne (eds.), Conflict & Stability in Southeast Asia (New York, 1974), p. 299.
- (3) On the Vietnamese Foreign Ministry's White Book Concerning Viet Nam-China Relations (Beijing, 1979), p. 22.
- (4) Lawrence H. Theriot & JeNelle Matheson, "Soviet Economic Relations with Non Europ-

ean CMEA: Cuba, Vietnam, and Mongolia", in Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States, Soviet Economy in a Time of Change (Washington, 1979), vol.2, p. 569, table 5. As late as 1976, China "assisted Vietnam in meeting its food needs by giving 500,000 tons of rice", p. 571.

- (5) John Gittings, "China cuts all aid to Vietnam", Guardian Weekly, July 9, 1978.
- (6) Beijing Review, May 2, 1983, p. 14.
- (7) Melvin Gurtov, China and Southeast Asia - The

- Politics of Survival (Baltimore, 1975), p. 59.
- (8) Gurtov, ibid., pp. 58-9, 71-2, 75, 80, 131 and 165 for details of Chinese economic and military aid to Cambodia.
- (9) Huynh Kim Khanh, "Vietnam Neither Peace Nor War", Southeast Asian Affairs 1979 (Singapore, 1979), p. 342.
- (10) "Soviet Social-Imperialists Covet Southeast Asia", Peking Review, no. 33, August 15, 1975, pp. 20-1.
- (11) Jay Taylor, China and Southeast Asia: Peking's Relations with Revolutionary Movements (New York, 2nd ed., 1976), p. 377.
- (12) Ibid., p. 380.
- (13) "Memorandum on Vice-Premier Li Xiannian's Talks With Premier Pham Van Dong, June 10, 1977", Beijing Review, no. 13, March 30, 1979, pp. 17-22.
- (14) Huynh Kim Khanh, op. cit., p. 344.
- (15) "Memorandum on Vice-Premier Li's Talks ...", op. cit., p. 22.
- (16) Huynh Kim Khanh, "Assessing Post-Colonial Vietnam", in Khien Theeravit & MacAlister Brown (eds.), Indochina and Problems of Security and Stability in Southeast Asia (Bangkok, 1981), p. 2.
- (17) Gareth Porter, "Vietnam's Ethnic Chinese and the Sino-Vietnamese Conflict", Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars, vol. 12, no. 4, Oct-Dec 1980, pp. 55, 57. Incidentally, Porter lends support to the Chinese contention that on the question of the nationality of the Hoa in Vietnam, Hanoi went back on the agreements that had been made between the Chinese and Vietnamese Communist parties in 1955.
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